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                                                                                                                                     i. 
 
Abstract 
 
Up until the 1980s, the police often reluctantly intervened in domestic disputes. 
However, from the mid 1980s onwards, the introduction of pro-arrest family 
violence policies throughout the U.S., the U.K., and New Zealand, signalled a 
significant shift in police practices. It was hoped that the adoption of these 
policies would help improve the police response to family violence, and it was 
anticipated that police behaviour would consequently change. Unfortunately, the 
implementation of these policies has been fraught with difficulties, and they have 
often not translated easily into practice, or resulted in the intended changes. The 
current study, which was conducted in Christchurch in 2004, sought to 
understand how a pro-arrest policy was implemented at the local level. Drawing 
on a symbolic interactionist approach, and utilising Lipksy’s (1980) street-level 
bureaucracy theory, this research focuses on a number of issues, including the 
application of the pro-arrest policy at the street-level, and its associated 
problems, and the legitimate/illegitimate exercise of discretion. This study has 
found evidence of significant practical problems with the implementation of the 
pro-arrest policy, which are similar to those that have been reported overseas.  
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iii. 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
Pro-arrest policy: This type of family violence policy strongly encourages 
officers to arrest whenever there is sufficient evidence of an offence to proceed 
to court. However, officers can still exercise some discretion, since they are not 
mandated to arrest in every case. 
 
Mandatory arrest policy: Unlike a pro-arrest policy, where officers have 
some discretion, a mandatory arrest policy requires officers to always arrest 
whenever there is sufficient evidence of an offence. Mandatory arrest policies are 
not operating within New Zealand, but can be found in a number of U.S. 
jurisdictions. 
 
Domestic incident: An incident that occurs between intimate partners, which 
may or may not involve an offence. 
 
1D: This is the code used for all domestic incidents where no offences have 
been disclosed. 
 
Family violence: Family violence, as defined in the 1998 Canterbury family 
violence policy, draws on the definition utilised by the Domestic Violence Act 
1995. Accordingly, family violence includes abuse which is physical, 
psychological or sexual, and includes intimidation or threats of violence 
(1998:1.1). It covers a wide range of intimate relationships, including parents, 
children, extended family, same-sex relationships, heterosexual relationships etc. 
(also referred to as domestic violence). 
 
POL 400: A POL 400 form is an incident report form that all officers are 
required to complete after attending any incident with family violence overtones. 
This requirement applies irrespective of whether an offence has been committed. 
 
Result: This refers to how the police resolve an incident. Under the current 
Canterbury Family Violence Policy (1998/10), officers can only result domestic-
related events as K6 or K9. However, events that police attend can be resulted 
as K1 if the incident turns out not to be domestic-related.  
 
K1: Not family violence related, no offence committed, police presence 
sufficient. Event is not formally recorded on POL 400 or family violence 
database. 
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iv. 
 
K6: Domestic-related event, but no offence committed, or insufficient evidence 
of an offence. No arrest made. Incident is formally recorded on POL 400 and 
family violence database.  
 
K9: Domestic-related event, sufficient evidence of an offence. Arrest made. 
Incident formally recorded on POL 400 and family violence database. 
 
CARD system: CARD is the ‘Computer-Assisted Resource Deployment’ system, 
which is used to record all the information about the domestic incident from the 
Communications Centre. This data includes information relating to the time/day of 
the incident, which police unit responded, and how the incident is resulted.  
 
Family violence database: The information from POL 400s is transferred to 
the family violence database, which stores information from all domestic-
incidents attended by police. The data includes offender/victim histories, and past 
police response etc. 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
 
Although family violence1 is a problem faced by most, if not all societies, it has 
only been since the 1970s that it has been recognised as a fundamental 
political and social problem in western nations.  Prior to this, domestic violence 
was largely considered an individual “marital” problem, relegated to the confines 
of private households. In fact, there was little recognition of the social costs of 
domestic violence up until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when it became an 
issue of political debate. As a result of the growing awareness of domestic 
violence and its impact on wider society (and thus its acceptance as a social, 
rather than individual problem), there has been increasing concern directed 
towards resolving the problem. In response, a considerable body of research 
has emerged, examining the causes and consequences of family violence, as 
well as potential solutions for combating it. However, it has only been in the last 
two decades that researchers have shifted their focus to the role the state plays 
in reducing its incidence. 
 
One of the major areas of controversy has been how the police respond to 
family violence. Prior to international developments in the 1980s, the police 
tended to intervene minimally in ‘domestic disputes’. However, during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, various lobby groups (particularly feminist groups) 
began criticising this police approach. It was argued that (male) police officers 
showed little concern for the welfare of women who were subjected to their 
husbands’ ongoing violence, and it became clear that the police needed to 
change their approach to family violence. This in turn, led to important 
developments in policy, and theoretically, the way that police treated domestic 
                                                 
1 Family violence, as defined in the 1998 Canterbury family violence policy, draws on the definition 
utilised by the Domestic Violence Act 1995. Accordingly, family violence includes abuse that is 
physical, psychological, or sexual abuse, as well as intimidation or threats of violence (1998:1.1). It 
covers a wide range of intimate relationships, including parents, children, extended family members, 
same-sex relationships, heterosexual relationships etc… Throughout this thesis, family violence and 
domestic violence will be used interchangeably. 
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violence. Consequently, during the 1980s, most police departments in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, adopted pro-arrest (and 
sometimes mandatory arrest) family violence policies, ultimately signalling a 
significant shift in philosophy and practice. 
 
Since the adoption of these pro-arrest policies, numerous studies (e.g. Feder, 
1997; Binder & Meeker, 1988)  have examined their effectiveness.  In particular, 
there has been increasing emphasis on problems associated with implementing 
these policies at the street-level. While some studies have reported the police 
response improving dramatically since the introduction of a pro-arrest policy, 
and thus concluded that the policy has been successfully implemented, others 
have shown that there have been significant barriers impeding its application at 
the ground-level. These studies have often pointed out that the introduction of 
such policies has not had the desired effect of changing police culture, and 
consequently, little has actually changed in terms of how the police respond to 
family violence.   
 
Similar research (e.g. Schollum, 1996; Ford, 1986)  in New Zealand, following 
the introduction of a pro-arrest policy in 1987, has shown that there have also 
been ongoing problems relating to implementation at the street-level. Not only 
has there been convincing evidence that little has changed in practice since 
1987, but there are also suggestions that the family violence policy has never 
been successfully implemented, at either the national or district level. Despite 
such research being available to the police, many of the problems identified 
over a decade ago still appear unresolved, and the extent to which the pro-
arrest policy has been implemented is disparate at best. Although some studies 
have taken place in other areas of New Zealand, similar research in Canterbury 
has been absent. 
 
The implementation of pro-arrest policies obviously raises a number of 
important issues, including the effectiveness of training, and more importantly, 
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whether the philosophy of arresting offenders actually reduces recidivist rates 
(e.g. Gelles, 1993; Schmidt & Sherman, 1993). Furthermore, there has also 
been considerable emphasis on victim satisfaction with the police response, 
and victim perceptions of police behaviour (e.g. Stephens and Sinden, 2000; 
Hoyle and Sanders, 2000). While these issues are certainly important in 
understanding how effective the policy’s philosophy is, and whether policy 
changes have helped increase victim satisfaction with the police, this thesis 
takes a different approach. Rather than focusing on how these policies are 
initially implemented and accepted, and the implications of these policies for 
victims, this study concentrates on how the policy is applied out on the streets, 
by those responsible for implementing them – frontline officers. The concern 
therefore, is not for how offenders and victims perceive the police, but the 
practical dilemmas faced by frontline officers. 
 
Like a number of recent studies internationally, this thesis focuses on issues 
relating to frontline officers’ implementation of pro-arrest policies (and policies in 
general), as well as addressing problems relating to the exercise of discretion. 
Thus, in addition to contributing to the current body of literature on the police 
response to family violence, and the implementation of pro-arrest policies, this 
thesis critically examines a number of issues relating to the policing of family 
violence, including: 1) how do the police respond to family violence?; 2) how 
well is the current family violence policy being implemented?; 3) in what areas 
is policy compliance most problematic?; 4) why is the implementation of the 
policy fraught with difficulties? Like most research into the police, this study 
takes a symbolic interactionist2 approach to understanding how the police 
respond to family violence. Additionally, this research also utilises Michael 
Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy, which is commonly used to 
study and understand problems relating to the implementation of policies, 
particularly in organisations such as the police. Lipsky’s theory is also useful for 
                                                 
2 Essentially, symbolic interactionism is a social psychological theory, “which focuses upon the ways in 
which meanings emerge through interaction” (Marshall, 1998: 657). In particular, symbolic interactionism 
is primarily concerned with analysing the meaning of everyday life (Marshall, 1998). 
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exploring the role discretion plays in the implementation process, as well as for 
comprehending how policies are practically applied at the street-level. By 
drawing on these approaches, this study hopes to establish how the pro-arrest 
family violence policy is supposed to work in theory, and how it actually works in 
practice. In order to address these questions, a number of methods are utilised, 
including participant observation and semi-formal interviews. 
 
This thesis is divided into four major sections. Chapter two outlines the methods 
used in the research, as well as discussing some of the methodological 
problems associated with studying the police. Chapter three maps the 
development of police family violence policies in three countries: the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, examining how the pro-arrest 
philosophy has been developed, and how successfully these pro-arrest policies 
have been implemented. Consequently, this chapter provides a historical 
background in which the pro-arrest family violence policy has been developed 
and implemented, allowing for the current research to be placed into a broader 
context.   
 
Chapter four examines the discretionary capacity of frontline officers, and how 
officer discretion may lead to what appears to be policy non-compliance. More 
specifically, this chapter addresses how discretion is exercised ‘legitimately’ in 
the context of family violence. This not only entails a discussion of why 
discretion is needed, but also how it is exercised out on the streets. Legitimate 
variables that influence the arrest decision, as well as the situational 
contingencies faced by frontline officers, are examined in detail. The purpose of 
chapter four is to show that although there appears to be problems with policy 
compliance, in many respects, often these problems can be justifiably 
explained. 
 
In contrast, chapter five explores the problematic nature of discretion, and in 
particular, how discretion may be exercised in a discriminatory fashion, leading 
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to the selective enforcement of the law. Emphasis here is placed on the way 
that discretion may be used ‘illegitimately’ by frontline officers, and the 
implications this may have for the organisation and the citizens it serves. 
Furthermore, this chapter addresses issues around officer resistance, and how 
this may contribute to implementation problems. In short, chapter five discusses 
how problems with the implementation of the pro-arrest family violence policy 
may not always be justified. 
 
Family violence is a particularly difficult area to police, and also one of the most 
dangerous, for both officers and citizens alike. While problems relating to how it 
is policed are inevitable, unlike previous research, the thesis explores some of 
the reasons why these issues exist in the first place. By doing so, this study will 
hopefully extend our understanding of how and why the police respond to family 
violence the way they do. 
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Chapter two: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
Initially, the current study focused on how the police respond to family violence, 
and more specifically, female domestic violence. Consequently, most of the 
original data were collected for these purposes. However, it became clear after 
the interviews and the fieldwork were conducted, that female domestic violence 
was not the issue frontline officers were primarily concerned about. During the 
collection of the POL 400s in particular, it was obvious that there were a 
number of problems with the police response in general, and subsequently, the 
focus of the research shifted quite dramatically. Instead of the study being 
concerned with issues relating to female domestic violence, the focus shifted to 
problems with procedure, and more specifically, policy compliance. 
Consequently, the original methods used –policy analysis, participant 
observation, and semi-formal interviews with police managers and frontline 
officers, had to be supplemented by other methods – i.e. document analysis. 
Despite the various methods being discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter, it is important to briefly outline what the research entailed.  
 
Initially the research involved analysing current and past family violence 
policies, which facilitated the development of the interview questions. 
Furthermore, understanding policy requirements was also fundamental for the 
fieldwork component, since this was primarily concerned with how the policy is 
implemented at the street-level, and its associated problems. Secondly, this 
research utilised semi-formal interviews, with both police managers and 
frontline officers. In total, nine police managers were interviewed before the 
fieldwork took place, and this was for a number of reasons. Firstly, although I 
had familiarised myself with the current family violence policy, I wanted to 
understand the expectations that management had of frontline officers. This 
was particularly important since the current policy was already six years old at 
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this stage, and interviewing the managers meant that I was able to ascertain 
what management’s current expectations were, and whether these 
corresponded with the actual policy requirements. Secondly, by interviewing the 
managers before the frontline officers, I was able to familiarise myself with 
police terminology, which inevitably increased the rapport with frontline officers 
during the fieldwork, and helped further develop the questioning for the frontline 
officer interviews. 
 
The frontline officer interviews were conducted at the same time that the 
fieldwork took place, and in total, 14 frontline officers were interviewed, and 13 
officers were observed out in the field. While the other methods were valuable 
for contextualising the conditions from which officers are meant to frame their 
response, observing how they actually resolve domestic incidents, and thus, 
how the family violence policy is actually applied at the ground-level was 
invaluable. Utilising document analysis (i.e. analysis of the POL 400 forms) 
allowed an even greater understanding of police process, and more importantly, 
how officers frame their responses via paperwork. This was particularly 
important, since, as previous studies have highlighted, frontline officers are a 
significant source of implementation problems.  
 
Overall, this chapter is divided into two main sections. Firstly, in order to 
contextualise the current research, methodological issues associated with 
researching the police, and problems encountered are discussed. Following 
this, the various methods used in this research are discussed at greater length.  
 
Methodological issues 
 
A number of methodological issues arose during the course of this research, 
and the following is a discussion of some of the problems associated with 
researching the police. More specifically, issues around access, risk, and 
informed consent are examined. 
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Access  
Access in any formal organisation can be difficult to obtain, but securing access 
to the police is particularly problematic, especially given the closed nature of its 
organisation. Not only is initial access impossible to achieve at times, but as 
many police researchers stress, it requires ongoing negotiation (e.g. see Fox 
and Lundman, 1974; Reiner, 2000).  
Gaining access into the police-world is largely a matter of having good contacts, 
and without these, it appears that access is much harder to obtain. As McCall 
(1978) comments: 
Development of prior informal relations with department administrative 
personnel through proper sponsorship contributes greatly to the likelihood 
of negotiating department access (1978:86). 
 
In their quest to gain access into five police departments (but only successfully 
in three), Fox and Lundman (1974) found that researchers with previous contact 
with police officials, or those with personal/business contacts who had 
established relationships with the police, found it easier to gain access. These 
informal contacts provided the researchers with initial entry into the 
organisation, but when such contacts were absent, access was harder to 
achieve. Similarly, van Maanen (1978) also struggled to gain access to 
American police departments. He spent six months trying to gain admission, 
and during this time, he was denied entry to 14 departments in total. 
Fortunately, van Maanen (1988) discovered a faculty member in his school, 
who had previous contact with police management in Union City, and through 
this medium, he was able to meet the Chief of Police, and access was 
subsequently granted (1988:84-85). 
 
Those who have never been officers themselves face a particularly discernible 
barrier to access. These people Reiner (2000) terms ‘outsiders outsiders’, and 
these are people “…who are not employed or commissioned by the police or 
other governmental bodies with responsibility for policing (2000:222). As Reiner 
points out, ‘outsiders outsiders’: 
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…clearly face the greatest barriers in gaining formal access to police 
forces for research. They have no official status that mandates formal 
police co-operation and may (often rightly) be perceived as having critical 
concerns about police malpractice or failure (2000:222). 
 
This last point in particular is worth further mention. Outsiders’ motives are often 
questioned more rigorously than those from within the organisation. As van 
Maanen comments: 
…the most important explanation for the police reluctance to open their 
doors to a curious social scientist adheres in the nature of any relatively 
closed system. Outsiders to such systems are troublesome and even 
dangerous. Police fears on this score are not groundless, since there are 
many illegal and potentially embarrassing activities that go on within their 
boundaries (1978:317-318). 
 
Another reason why outsiders conducting research with the police may 
experience trouble accessing the organisation, is the secrecy3 that surrounds 
police matters in general. As van Maanen comments: 
…secrecy is important to the police because of the potential 
embarrassment a disclosure about mistakes, misguided policies, cover-
ups, and so on might bring the institution, organization, division, or other 
collective units in a department (1978:319). 
 
Ultimately, however, the decision to grant access to researchers lies with the 
police chief (in my case, the District Commander) or whoever is responsible for 
particular districts/departments. As van Maanen points out: 
…it is usually the Chief of Police whom the researcher must initially 
convince of the worth of his [sic] study if he expects to gain access. The 
chief is thought to be the crucial contact, the final authority…the chief 
takes formal responsibility for virtually all decisions taking place in the 
organization and often takes a very personal interest in even the most 
petty of matters bearing on his command (1978:328). 
 
Luckily with this research, my supervisor had contacts within the Christchurch 
Police department, and more importantly, he had established informal relations 
                                                 
3 While secrecy is an important issue, at times, too much information can be supplied, particularly with 
regards to operational matters in a general sense, but not enough of it to provide information about how 
police culture influences behaviour. Some officers/divisions (e.g. Youth Aid) are more open than others. 
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with the District Commander. Contact was initially made by my supervisor, and 
fortunately the District Commander had a particular interest in family violence 
and appeared receptive to the research taking place. However, I was still 
required to go through the formal channels, and a research proposal and 
covering letter was subsequently sent to the District Commander. Shortly 
afterwards, I was contacted via email by the Canterbury policing development 
manager, who was responsible for dealing with my application for access, and a 
meeting was arranged.  Following this meeting, I received confirmation that 
access had been granted at the district level, and a police supervisor was 
appointed to help facilitate the carrying out of the research.  After a similar 
process was followed, access was also granted at the national level by the 
Research Steering Committee, situated within the Office of the Commissioner in 
Wellington. 
 
Problems with access 
Once access has been initially granted, other issues also come into play. While 
some of these relate to technical concerns, such as confidentiality agreements 
or indemnity forms4, other problems relate to access to the ‘second gate’: those 
who are actually being studied (Fox and Lundman, 1974:53). Sometimes 
access to these organisational actors can be more complicated than securing 
access to the organisation itself, and whether officers grant similar admittance 
into their worlds is a significant issue. For example, some of the managers I 
tried to contact for interviews successfully avoided my attempts at contact.  
Similarly, at the frontline level, entrée can be problematic if the trust of the 
officers is not gained. Not only can frontline officers refuse to answer questions 
or avoid answering them, they can also restrict access out in the field in terms 
of what can and cannot be observed. Furthermore, the researcher may face 
reluctance on the part of less senior police officers in carrying out research 
because of a perceived collaboration with management. As Reiner points out: 
                                                 
4 An indemnity form is essentially an agreement between the police organisation and the researcher, 
which states that the researcher accepts any potential risk to their personal safety, and that the police 
organisation will not be liable for any damage caused, either to the person, or their property.  
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The less visible but more important access problem is securing the trust 
and genuine cooperation of the people in the research site itself, after 
formal access has been given…In general the very fact of having official 
approval for the research can be a difficulty when it comes to being trusted 
by the research subjects themselves, who may regard the researcher with 
suspicion as a tool of management (2000:218). 
 
However, once trust has been established, and the officers understand that the 
researcher is not an internal spy, most officers are often comfortable talking 
about their work experiences to outsiders. As Reiner explains: 
Although gaining entry is always a problem, and trust needs to be 
continuously cultivated, many police officers are only too glad to tell you of 
their views and experiences once initial barriers have been overcome 
(2000:224). 
 
Similarly, Punch (1989) comments: 
Policemen in general delight in talking and gossiping and even enjoy 
revealing glimpses of their underculture to outsiders. A number of 
researchers have remarked on the surprising openness of policemen when 
discussing their work and even in not disguising their deviance in front of 
observers (1989:182). 
 
Related to issues of access, is that of researcher liability. As Fox and Lundman 
point out, an important issue for police management is the desire: 
…to protect the liability of their personnel from possible damages to 
observers. Typically, public organizations have dealt with problems of legal 
liability by requiring observers to waive the right to possible damage suits 
(1974:57). 
 
The current research required signing an indemnity form against liability. This 
form essentially stated that as a non-member of the New Zealand Police, I 
accompanied officers at my own risk, and that the New Zealand Police was not 
liable for any injury (physical or psychological), loss of, or damage to, any 
property. Furthermore, I was also required to sign a deed of confidentiality 
agreement, which essentially stated that I would follow the instructions of police 
officers at all times while accompanying them.  
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Officers also had the power to prohibit me from being present in particular 
situations where unacceptable risks were present (e.g. firearms) and as Fox 
and Lundman (1974) point out, this is another way officers can protect 
themselves: 
In situations which were deemed too dangerous or serious for an observer, 
the ultimate decision remained with the patrolmen who were being 
observed. Thus, patrolmen could prohibit observers from being present in 
such situations, to further protect their liability (1974:58). 
 
Even though I had signed an indemnity form accepting total responsibility for 
my own personal safety, I still did not have unrestricted access to specific 
locations/crime scenes, particularly when firearms were potentially involved. 
 
Clearly access can be a complicated affair, particularly with the lack of any 
informal relations with the police. Furthermore, whether access is granted to 
researchers is largely contingent on the nature of the organisation in question. 
When access is granted, it obviously says something positive about police 
management:   
Management that permits research to be conducted generally reveals that 
something is different about their organization when compared to those 
which refuse research access. Thus, it has been observed, that 
organization members have higher morale, that the organization may be 
less rigid bureaucratically, or that the organization’s members may have 
greater confidence in ongoing processes (Fox and Lundman, 1974:55). 
 
However, carrying out research with the police is not only problematic in relation 
to access, as a number of other methodological issues also emerged. 
 
Risk to participants: confidentiality and anonymity 
Risk in social research is often assumed to relate to the potential danger to 
participants. Carrying out research with the police poses a number of potential 
risks, such as the threat of sanction/punishment for inappropriate behaviour that 
comes to light, or the hazard of public disclosure of what occurs behind closed 
doors. While officers are rarely subjected to increased physical danger when 
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accompanied by researchers, the risk of exposure is an important issue to 
consider. 
 
Such risks are often counteracted with promises of anonymity and 
confidentiality, but to what extent can such promises be fulfilled? In this 
research, for example, nine managers from the Christchurch district, most of 
whom knew each other, were interviewed. The fact they also came from the top 
echelon made the issue of anonymity even more problematic, and the only way 
I found to overcome this, was to omit any identifying information. Identifying 
managers, even by their sex or age was inappropriate, since such details, once 
again, could expose the individual concerned.  As Punch (1989:186) points out, 
anonymity is much harder to assure when carrying out research with more 
senior members of the police, since senior officers are less anonymous, more 
easily identifiable, and more cautious with what they are prepared to reveal.  
 
Anonymity was less problematic with the frontline officers While my police 
supervisor knew what shifts I had attended, he was not aware (to my 
knowledge) of the specific officers I accompanied. However, to ensure their 
identities were further protected, I decided to only include information relating to 
the officer’s sex and age, omitting which station they were situated in.  
Confidentiality was not only a core concern for myself as the researcher, but 
also for the officers involved. Officers were notified right from the start that their 
identities would be protected, and this was the justification for asking personal 
information such as their age. As Reiner (2000) notes, observing the police and 
their practices poses problems with confidentiality because: 
Much policing is dangerous, ‘dirty’ work: getting people to do what they do 
not want to do. The tactics for accomplishing this are almost inevitably 
going to be controversial even if they are legal, and they are frequently of 
dubious legality or clearly illegal…Such work is clearly seeking to uncover 
information which the subjects studied might wish to keep secret. At any 
rate the police studied will inevitably be anxious about how they are going 
to be represented to other audiences such as the managers or agencies to 
whom they are accountable (2000:218). 
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Similarly, as McCall (1978) points out, trust and confidentiality are particularly 
vital for frontline officers because: 
Policemen are highly suspicious, even of other policemen in their own 
department or unit…Each policeman must assure himself that the 
researcher can indeed be trusted not to report to police administrators any 
questionable discretionary judgments, violations of departmental 
regulations, or police offenders against the law (1978:89). 
 
However, trust and confidentiality can at times be tested. As Everett Hughes 
once remarked, “the fieldworker is inevitably a spy, a double agent, who will, in 
the end, betray his subjects” (cited in van Maanen et al, 1982:147). One 
incident that I brought to the attention of my police supervisor tested my 
commitment to protecting the frontline officer’s identity, but at the same time it 
also challenged the trust and rapport I had established with my supervisor. The 
incident, which was reported on in very general terms, highlighted some 
inappropriate officer behaviour, committed not by the officers I accompanied, 
but by a senior officer who had also attended the scene. Although 
anonymity/confidentiality to this officer had never been promised, by virtue of 
being in the presence of any frontline officer, confidentiality/anonymity was 
automatically extended in my mind. By refusing to supply specific details of the 
incident and the officers involved, in order for the supervisor (who is also a 
manager) to follow-up, I endeavoured to protect my respondents’ identity, but 
also at the risk of destroying the rapport and trust I had established with my 
supervisor in the process. However, I found out at a later date that management 
had tracked down information regarding the incident and officer through other 
means. 
 
During the course of their research, other researchers have also found the 
issue of confidentiality problematic. As McCall (1978:89) stresses, anonymity 
and confidentiality of data cannot be simply promised, but must be 
demonstrated in some way. Issues of confidentiality are even more pronounced 
when the study involves observing police deviance. As Punch (1989) points out, 
academic researchers can often find themselves: 
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…in the same moral predicament as policemen and may even employ the 
same imagery of muddy boots and grubby hands (‘in getting at the dirt one 
may get dirty oneself’, according to Marx) (1989:193). 
 
Punch (1989) goes on to say that knowledge of, or participation in deviant 
practices can be particularly dangerous for fieldworkers, since they may be 
subject to sanction from senior members of the organisation (i.e. access 
revoked) if caught. Although the incident I attended escaped the attention of 
police management until the fieldwork had been completed, and thus the 
fieldwork was not at risk of being terminated at that stage, I also wanted to keep 
open the possibility of returning to the field at a later date, should the need 
arise. Clearly issues around anonymity and confidentiality are significant 
methodological problems when researching the police, but other issues are 
equally problematic. 
 
Risk to researcher 
Because of the volatile nature of their work, officers are often confronted with 
on-the-job dangers, such as injuries and even death, and risk is an everyday 
calculation they must consider. However, when individuals train to become 
officers, they implicitly accept the dangers they may subsequently face. 
Researchers on the other hand, particularly those with minimal prior contact 
with the police, often enter the police-world with romantic notions of police work. 
The lack of understanding around the risks and dangers faced by those 
operating within this working environment, means that while researchers are at 
pains to minimise the risk to their participants, they often fail to acknowledge the 
risk they put themselves in (see Westmarland, 2000). Consequently, 
considerations for researchers’ own personal safety often becomes a 
secondary issue to the risk imposed on officers. As McCall (1978) comments: 
…field study of police work entails certain personal risks for the observer. 
Physical danger is a constant theme of police work – not only the danger 
of assault by offenders but the dangers posed by high speed auto chases, 
running down dark alleys, investigating dark and decrepit structures, and 
constant driving under all conditions (1978:88). 
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Similarly, as van Maanen (1988) argues: 
Danger, whether real or imagined, is a constant companion to the police. 
And fear is consequently an emotion every researcher who spends time in 
the field with the police must face. Fear, to an observer of the police, 
stems from several sources. Certainly, by associating closely with the 
police, it may come from the ever present danger existing in city streets. I 
can recall feeling as if I had a bull’s eye painted on the side of my head the 
first few times I rode in the front seat of a patrol car (1988:86). 
 
There were admittedly, a few occasions where I felt (however unfounded) my 
personal safety was in jeopardy. At one domestic incident I attended, one of the 
officers I accompanied took me aside and warned me that if the alleged 
offender turned up, to watch my back and stay close to the officers, because he 
was known to be violent and anti-police. Upon hearing that, my anxiety 
increased, and as it happened, the offender’s older brother (who was also 
known to be violent and anti-police) turned up, increasing my apprehension 
further. Interestingly, however, had the officer not warned me, I would never 
have perceived any risk in being there. There were, however, other incidents 
where the potential risk precluded me from observing particular incidents, 
namely those where a firearm was thought to be present.  
 
Informed consent 
Another important ethical issue which arose during this research was informed 
consent. A principal tenet of good ethical research is that participants are 
informed of the research, and that they give written consent, where practical, to 
participate. While there were no issues around informed consent for the police 
managers, who were provided with an information sheet and in turn provided 
written consent, it was a different matter for the frontline officers involved in the 
fieldwork.  
 
As Tolich and Davidson (1999:72) explain, informed consent involves the 
exchange of information, whereby the researcher communicates what the 
research is about, and what involvement would entail, and the participants 
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agree to participate in light of these conditions, before the research is carried 
out. But as Tolich and Davidson (1999) point out, it is not always possible to 
provide informants with an information sheet and consent form, which was the 
case with this research. While information sheets were given to the senior 
sergeant/shift commander well beforehand, and they were meant to be 
distributed to frontline officers prior to my arrival, this never appeared to 
happen. This may be due, in part, to the fact that officers have to deal with a 
considerable amount of paperwork, and also because of the likelihood that 
officers would not read it anyway. Consequently, only the senior staff knew 
beforehand about my research, and only one shift commander explained to the 
group at roll call, who I was and what my research involved. 
 
Consequently, most of the frontline officers I accompanied had no prior 
knowledge of my research, or what their participation entailed, and it could be 
argued that officers could not therefore give informed consent beforehand. 
However, I briefly outlined my research and what my presence entailed to the 
officers I accompanied once in the patrol car. I explained that I would be 
interviewing them during the course of the shift, and that I wanted to attend 
domestic incidents to observe their response. While officers were not explicitly 
asked for their consent to participate, they were not required to answer my 
questions, and they could also restrict my access if they did not want me 
accompanying them. At times, some of the officers employed one or both of 
these strategies. 
 
While the nature of this research meant accompanying officers into private 
residences, informed consent was never gained from the citizens present for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, this research was not about the individuals who are 
involved in domestic incidents. The participants in this study were the frontline 
officers themselves, and the research was designed to gain an understanding 
into how the police respond to domestic violence. It was therefore pertinent that 
I was able to accompany the officers when they attended domestic related jobs. 
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The citizens present were never considered participants, and have not been 
treated as such within this research.  Furthermore, informed consent was not 
sought because domestic incidents are often highly emotional, and asking for 
permission to discuss the incident in a thesis at such a time, would not only be 
highly insensitive, but would have interfered with the work officers were carrying 
out. Gaining informed consent at a later date was also not an option, since it 
would have been impractical going back to the scene of domestic incidents, and 
asking the victim/offender if their dispute could be reported on. This would have 
been not only highly insensitive, but also intrusive. While there may be good 
arguments for gaining informed consent from the citizens involved in the 
interactions with frontline officers, confidentiality is nevertheless assured, as 
these citizens are not identified in any way, and those incidents that are 
reported on are only discussed in very general terms. Furthermore, it is worth 
reiterating that this research focused specifically on frontline officers and their 
response to domestic incidents, and not on the citizens involved in the 
encounter.  
 
The current research 
The research setting 
The current research took place in 2004, and was carried out with the 
Christchurch Police, which is the metropolitan centre of the Canterbury Police 
District. Christchurch is one of five main cities in New Zealand and is situated 
on the east coast of the South Island. In 2001, Christchurch had a population of 
316,224 (www.stats.govt.nz).  
 
The Canterbury Police District is the largest police district in New Zealand by 
area, and its territory extends from south of Kaikoura to south of Timaru 
(www.police.govt.nz). The district is divided into four areas - northern, southern, 
central and south/mid Canterbury, with the main police headquarters located in 
Christchurch City. In 2004 there were 817 sworn members and 120.3 non-
sworn members in the Canterbury District, with a female staff of 15.6% 
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(including sworn and non-sworn) and 7.3% of staff identifying themselves as 
Maori (internal document, 2004). 
 
The current research was carried out with the Christchurch metropolitan police 
department, which consists of four main stations - Sydenham, Papanui, Hornby, 
and Central. The decision to carry out the research within Christchurch City, 
rather than across the Canterbury District as a whole, was based on a number 
of factors. Firstly, this research was conducted for a Master’s thesis, and 
extending the research to the whole district would have meant extra travel time 
(e.g. two hours drive to Timaru), as well as a data overload. The decision was 
also based on financial constraints, and it was decided that confining the 
research area to the Christchurch district, where I was based, would be more 
economical. Furthermore, there was enough variation and diversity within the 
four stations previously mentioned, that extending the geographical boundaries 
of my research was unnecessary. In hindsight, it may have been worthwhile, 
however, to have examined some of the more rural departments surrounding 
Christchurch city (e.g. Rangiora and Kaiapoi), in order to identify any 
differences between semi-rural and urban police officers.   
 
Policy analysis 
Before any practical research was undertaken, it was essential to understand 
and familiarise myself with the relevant family violence policies, since this 
research was largely concerned with how the family violence policy is 
implemented at the street-level, and the difficulties faced in achieving this. 
Consequently, policy analysis has been invaluable for understanding how the 
family violence policy has evolved since 1987, and for ascertaining current 
policy requirements. 
 
This analysis basically involved looking at the family violence policies since 
1987, and noting any changes in language, practice or provisions. With the 
exception of the 1987 policy (which could not be located), all family violence 
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policies were located and examined. These policies were primarily analysed in 
order to identify areas where policy compliance may be questionable. 
Furthermore, because of the initial focus of this study, the policies were also 
analysed to ascertain whether or not they adequately address female domestic 
violence (as well as other forms of family violence). Familiarising myself with the 
policy was therefore essential for carrying out participant observation, as well as 
for formulating the interview questions. 
 
Interviews  
While participant observation is an invaluable method for researching the 
police, the importance of using other methods should not be overlooked. 
Interviewing in particular, is a useful method for getting information the 
researcher wants, in a direct and open manner, and is a more economical 
means of obtaining data. As McCall (1978) comments, interviewing: 
…is more flexible than observation, allowing the researcher to circumvent 
the barriers of time, space, closed doors, and the curtain of subjectivity. 
Moreover, interviewing is usually more economical since any number of 
topics can be covered in a short span of time, whereas the observer can 
only wait and watch through many irrelevant events in hopes that those 
pertinent to his [sic] interests will soon transpire (1978:5). 
 
Although it was important to observe the frontline officers, I also wanted to 
utilise any ‘down’ time between ‘jobs’, to interview officers and obtain their 
views on family violence, the police policy, as well as a range of other topics 
previously discussed with the managers. This meant that even if I did not attend 
any domestic incidents during a shift, useful data would still be collected. As 
Haralambos and Holborn (1990) point out, interviews are sometimes used by 
participant observers to supplement the data collected through observations, 
since this: 
…has the advantage of allowing the researcher to request the precise 
information required, without waiting for it to crop up in normal 
conversation (1990:845). 
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In contrast, I was not able to observe the managers out in the field, and 
therefore interviews were carried out. 
 
Semi-formal interviews were carried out with police managers during August 
2004. The management interviews were conducted before the fieldwork for 
numerous reasons. Although I had analysed the policies myself, I wanted to 
ascertain management’s expectations of how the family violence policy would 
be implemented at the frontline, whether they anticipated any problems with 
policy compliance, and their professional views on female domestic violence.  
Secondly, by interviewing the managers first, I was also able to familiarise 
myself with not only the police language, but also issues management identified 
as being important. This inevitably helped facilitate more precise questioning for 
the subsequent interviews with the frontline officers.  
 
In total, nine managers5 were interviewed, and they were situated throughout 
the four main stations in Christchurch: Papanui, Sydenham, Central and 
Hornby. While the managers included both males and females, the majority 
were men, which undoubtedly reflects the fact that the police organisation is still 
largely dominated by males. The managers also varied in age and years in the 
organisation, with some having over twenty years of policing experience. 
 
The managers were initially selected by my police supervisor, who worked on 
the criteria that they were somehow involved with either the development or 
implementation of the family violence policy. Initial contact with the potential 
participants was made by my police supervisor, and this was subsequently 
followed up by an email I sent to all potential participants. An electronic copy of 
the information sheet outlining what their participation would involve, was also 
attached. A week later, potential participants were telephoned; however, some 
managers could not be initially contacted (due to being on annual leave), while 
                                                 
5 Although the term “managers” is used, not all of these participants were actually managers, but for the 
purpose of maintaining confidentiality, they are referred to as such. 
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others never returned phone calls. One manager also declined to participate. In 
the end, seven interviews were organised, and subsequently another two 
interviews were organised through two of the participants. Most of the 
interviews were conducted in the managers’ offices, and the interviews lasted 
between 30 to 60 minutes, and all were tape-recorded and transcribed in full 
afterwards. Both the management and frontline officer interviews were 
subsequently coded according to the relevant themes/issues. As previously 
mentioned, the interview questions were initially designed to predominantly 
address issues relating to female domestic. Consequently, although some of 
the data generated within these interviews were applicable to the final focus of 
the thesis, a lot of the information gathered could not be used. Obviously if this 
research was replicated, the interview questions would need to be modified 
accordingly.  
 
While interviewing managers was important, it was especially important to 
interview frontline officers. Firstly, frontline officers are the ones who attend 
domestic incidents on a daily basis, therefore making them somewhat “experts” 
on the matter. Not only could these officers explain the organisational stance on 
family violence and its corresponding procedures, but they could also highlight 
some of the problems associated with its policing. This was especially crucial 
with respect to policy implementation, and issues of policy non-compliance. 
Secondly, in many respects, frontline officers speak from a different perspective 
than management, and therefore ascertaining their opinions proved invaluable. 
As van Maanen (1988) points out, the hierarchical nature of the police 
organisation makes interviewing and observing the “lower caste” (e.g. 
patrolmen) more worthwhile since often there is conflict and tension residing at 
the lower levels. For the researcher, this:  
… means that the members of the lower caste will make better informants 
(reveal more). Not only do they have less to lose objectively, but they are 
under less strain to appear faultless to either their internal or external 
audiences…(van Maanen, 1988:88). 
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Furthermore, as others (e.g. McCall, 1978) have pointed out, frontline officers 
often demonstrate a significant willingness to discuss their work with outsiders. 
Interviews provide a forum for frontline officers to communicate to management 
the difficulties (and other issues) related to carrying out their work.  
 
Interviews were carried out with 14 frontline officers in total, which included both 
male and females from the three main stations: Papanui, Central and 
Sydenham. Ultimately these individuals were asked similar questions to 
management (see appendix 1), although minor modifications had been made 
either to the question structure or the language used. All of the interviews took 
place in the patrol car, either during ‘down time’ or on the way to ‘jobs.’ Often 
questions were asked whenever the opportunity presented itself, which meant 
at times there was a considerable lag between questions. Unfortunately, these 
interviews could not be tape-recorded because of heavy and constant 
background noises, such as the police CB. Their responses were, however, 
recorded in a notebook, and while at times I could not record exactly what was 
said, word for word, as Taylor and Bogdan comment: 
It is not necessary to have a flawless reproduction of what was said. What 
is important is capturing the meaning and approximate wording of remarks 
(1998:72). 
 
Furthermore, as Haralambos and Holborn (1990:845) point out, using tape 
recorders often “inhibit the natural behaviour of those being studied”, and the 
knowledge that their conversations are being recorded may have the negative 
effect of officers answering in a manner not entirely honest or forthcoming. 
 
Participant observation 
While a number of methods were used, the research drew primarily on 
participant observation, and the fieldwork involved accompanying officers from 
Sydenham, Papanui and Central police stations. While I had control over what 
stations I went to, what shifts I went on and how long I stayed, I had no control 
over which officers I accompanied. This decision appeared to be made by their 
 31
senior sergeants, and consequently, I was unaware of who I would be assigned 
to until I turned up at the station. As a result, I accompanied some officers more 
than once, and while it would have been beneficial to have interviewed different 
officers, it also served to increase the rapport I had initially established with the 
officers the night before. It also provided an opportunity to ask additional 
questions. 
 
In total, fifty hours of fieldwork were completed over a four-week period in 2004, 
on a total of 11 nights. Two weekends were spent with officers at Central, and a 
weekend each at the Papanui and Sydenham stations.  For six of these nights I 
accompanied the officers on the night shift (10.30pm - 8am on the weekends), 
and five nights on the late shift (4pm to 11pm and til 2am on Thursday, Friday 
and Saturday). However, I did not accompany the officers for the full duration of 
their shifts for a number of reasons. Firstly, there was a reduced likelihood of a 
domestic taking place beyond 2am, and secondly, I also had commitments the 
next day which precluded me from staying for the whole shift. Consequently, on 
the night shifts I turned up at roll-call (10.30pm), and stayed with the officers 
until 2.00-2.30 in the morning. On the late shifts, I usually turned up part way 
through the shift (around 8pm on Fridays and Saturdays, and 4pm on 
Sundays), and stayed until the end (when it finished at 11pm) or until the early 
hours of the next morning.  All observations were subsequently coded 
according to policy provisions, in order to establish whether policy was followed. 
Furthermore, the fieldwork observations were also analysed in light of the 
paperwork subsequently produced by frontline officers to see whether there 
were discrepancies between what actually happened, and what was officially 
reported.  
 
Advantages and disadvantages of participant observation  
Since the 1960s, a considerable number of ethnographic studies on the police 
have been conducted (e.g. van Maanen, 1988; Holdaway, 1983). Most of these 
studies have relied on participant observation as the primary means of data 
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collection, since this method has proved to be an important means of 
understanding the reality of police work. Participant observation is particularly 
suited to studying organisations such as the police, because it enables the 
researcher to observe and understand how things actually work in the day-to-
day running of things. While participant observation has numerous advantages, 
it has also been heavily criticised.  
 
Participant observation, sometimes referred to simply as fieldwork, is an 
ethnographic tool used to understand specific social worlds and the individuals 
who operate within them. According to McCall (1978), field research that 
includes direct observation involves the: 
…collection of empirical data concerning behavior, interaction, or social 
organization through more or less disciplined processes of looking at and 
listening to the conduct of relevant organisms within the context of their 
indigenous settings (1978:2). 
 
Participant observation is a particularly useful method for those wishing to 
understand cultural norms, the use of language, the examination of certain 
behaviour and practices, social interaction, roles and relationships, and the 
study of organisations in general (Tolich and Davidson, 1999:8).  As Reiner 
(2000) points out, participant observation is a particularly good method for 
researching the police because the work of frontline officers: 
…take[s] place outside the organization, away from immediate oversight 
by managers, with officers generally working alone or in pairs. This gives 
the rank and file considerable scope for making their accounts of incidents 
the authoritative ones as there is usually no challenging version other than 
those of the people who are being policed, who are normally low in ‘the 
politics of discredibility.’ The wish to penetrate this low visibility is why 
participant observation has been the main technique adopted by 
researchers wishing to analyse the practices and culture of policing 
(2000:219). 
 
Because this research involved looking at how officers respond to domestic 
incidents, participant observation, in conjunction with the analysis of official 
documents, allowed me to see whether or not officer accounts matched what I 
 33
had observed. Furthermore, since the research was looking in part at how the 
family violence policy is implemented at the street-level, observing the police 
carrying out their duties meant I was able to appreciate how officers go about 
their work, in terms of their interactions with citizens, and also how their 
behaviour is structured by organisational norms and rules. As van Maanen 
(1982) points out, often “…the rule like understandings that underlie social 
practices are unseen and unquestioned” (1982:145) by the members of the 
organisation. For an outsider (the researcher), it is much easier to see how 
rules actually shape the behaviour of officers, and to notice when rules are not 
followed. 
 
Perhaps the greatest advantage in conducting participant observation is the 
access to what Goffman (1963) refers to as ‘backstage’ behaviour. As 
Meyrowitz (1985) points out, ‘front region’ or ‘onstage behaviour’ is when: 
…the performers are in the presence of their “audience” for a particular 
role, and they play a relatively ideal conception of a social role (1985:29). 
 
Thus, when police officers are out in public, performing their duties and 
interacting with citizens, they are carrying out front region behaviour. Here they 
generally speak, dress and act in a way deemed appropriate and representative 
of the organisation. However, when officers are alone in their patrol car they 
tend to display backstage behaviour. As Meyrowitz (1985) states, a backstage 
area where back region behaviour is performed, is an: 
…area that is hidden from the audience and they share this area with 
others who perform the same or similar roles vis-à-vis the audience 
(1985:29). 
 
In many ways, front region and backstage behaviours are not entirely situational 
– as in physical context, but rather contingent on who is present in their social 
space at that time. There are a number of benefits with observing both front and 
back stage behaviour. As Punch (1989) comments on his research experience: 
The primary insight that I gained…was that there exists a wide disparity 
between the public presentation of police work – as sober, legal, 
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competent, professional and even “sacred” – and the backstage reality. 
Out of sight, there is another world of largely instrumental concerns, of 
simply getting through the day, of manipulation, violence, incompetence, 
humor and tomfoolery, and also of informal norms, rewards, and sanctions 
(1989:179). 
 
Observing back region performances by the police is critical for understanding 
the reality of police work, since often the organisation can be better understood 
through the informal and back region performances displayed by officers. It is 
here, in the back region, where the realities of frontline officers’ work can be 
understood more fully than if observation was based solely on front region 
performances. Participant observation is also particularly useful for 
understanding the language employed by those being researched (e.g. see 
Taylor and Bogdan, 1998; McCall, 1978). 
 
While participant observation has definite advantages for those conducting 
research on the police, there are also some practical problems to consider. 
Perhaps one of the most problematic aspects of participant observation is the 
hit-and-miss nature of it. Time limits have to be imposed, since studying an 
organisation for years on end is not applicable for many. Thus, at some stage 
there needs to be a cut-off point for the researcher to exit the field, even if they 
have not managed to observe a particular phenomenon to the degree they may 
have liked. This seems to be particularly problematic when studying the police, 
as van Maanen (1978) points out, since: 
…so much policework (at least at the patrol level) is patently 
unpredictable, there is no guarantee that one’s time in the field will be even 
roughly commensurate with the naturalistic observation of what the 
researcher might consider critical events. As many others have pointed 
out, the first-hand observation of the police in action can often be a boring 
and frustrating affair, since there is no assurance that one will see what 
one came to see (1978:320). 
 
This was an obvious problem for my own research, since I was primarily 
concerned with observing domestic incidents, and unfortunately, with 
domestics, there is no pattern of when and where they will occur. This meant 
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that sometimes I was driving around with the officers for hours on end without 
attending an incident, and in the end I attended only six incidents in total.  
Although everyday police work was somewhat interesting and exciting initially, it 
soon became very clear that the work at times can be quite mundane and 
boring. By the end of the fifty hours in the field, I felt I was no longer adding to 
my knowledge, and the tedium of not going to domestics, and spending hours in 
the car, quickly hit home.  
 
A common criticism levelled against participant observation as a research 
method is its spatial and temporal limitation. Often such research is limited to a 
particular group(s) and specific time periods and geographical locations, 
meaning that any findings only apply in that context. This means that 
generalisations about the organisation are often difficult to make, particularly if it 
is the only method employed. As Haralambos and Holborn (1990) comment: 
…to quantitative researchers the samples used in participant observation 
are too small and untypical for generalizations to be made on the basis of 
the findings. Any conclusions can only apply to the specific group studied 
(1990:847)…The data from participant observation rely upon the particular 
interpretation of a single individual, and is specific to a particular place and 
time (1990:847). 
 
The impact of the researcher’s presence on the participant’s behaviour is 
another common criticism (e.g. see Haralambos and Holborn, 1990). The 
presence of a member of the public observing how officers behave may result 
in officers modifying their behaviour. Others, however, disagree with this 
evaluation. As Skolnick points out: 
First, the more time the observer spends with subjects, the more used to 
his [sic] presence they become. Second, participant-observation offers the 
subject less time to dissimulate than he would have in answering a 
questionnaire…Third, in many situations involving police, they are hardly 
free to alter behaviour (1966:36). 
 
While it is very difficult to assure that the researcher’s presence has no impact 
on the data collected, as Skolnick (1966) comments, if officer behaviour is 
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modified at all, it only happens in one direction. Officers are hardly likely to 
behave more harshly towards citizens if a researcher is present. 
 
Document analysis 
The data from the fieldwork and interviews were also supplemented by the 
analysis of official documents, most importantly, POL 400 forms. A POL 400 
form is a family violence incident report form that all officers are required to 
complete after attending any incident with family violence overtones, and this 
requirement is irrespective of whether an offence has been committed. As 
McCall (1978) points out, the analysis of public documents such as official 
reports and statistics are often superior to informants, because: 
…official reports and statistics cover matters beyond the awareness of a 
particular informant, are based on regularized procedures often under 
external audit, are more precise than an informant’s memory…Typically, of 
course, the views conveyed by such documents are partisan or merely 
official views, but these are often important data in themselves, and, in any 
case those imparted by informants may be no less partisan or official 
(1978:7). 
 
More importantly however, the analysis of these POL 400 forms has been 
particularly vital for understanding how officers officially present the ‘facts’ of the 
incidents they have attended. For example, I was able to correlate the POL 
400s to the events I observed, and ascertain whether or not the details were 
compatible. At times, such data did not always neatly correspond with one 
another, which raised important issues discussed within this thesis. 
  
POL 400s were collected from the Christchurch district for the period of 2 
August to the 29th August, 2004, as this was the time frame in which the 
fieldwork took place. These POL 400s are stored primarily at the Central, 
Papanui and Sydenham stations, but also at stations situated outside of 
Christchurch city. I did not collect these latter POL 400s because it would have 
been time consuming and expensive travelling to the outside stations. 
Furthermore, a sufficient number of POL 400s were collected in the 
Christchurch City area. In retrospect however, it may have been beneficial 
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collecting these POL 400s. In total, 313 POL 400s were collected, although 149 
could not be located. These, I was told, were either located at an outside 
station, or were with the prosecutions office (i,e active files that were not readily 
available). The 313 POL 400s collected thus represent 67.7% of all POL 400s 
completed during this period.  
 
The POL 400s were analysed according to a number of variables, including: 1) 
sex of offender and victim; 2) action taken by officers; 3) variables relating to 
the nature of the incident – i.e. violence used or threatened against person or 
property; 4) whether protection orders existed and whether they were breached; 
5) relationship between victim and offender; 6) physical injury to victim; and 7) 
initial support provided to victims. 
 
Data from the CARD system were also analysed. CARD is the ‘Computer-
Assisted Resource Deployment’ system, which is used to record all the 
information about the domestic incident from the Communications Centre. This 
data includes information relating to the time/day of the incident, which police 
unit responded, and how the incident is resulted. CARD data were analysed 
according to the number of incidents attended, and how they were resulted. 
 
The exclusion of other methods 
Initially, the research was also going to involve distributing questionnaires to all 
frontline officers in the Canterbury Police District. However, it was clear from 
very early on that sufficient information would be collected from both the 
management interviews and the fieldwork. There were also other factors that 
influenced this decision not to use questionnaires, such as financial 
considerations. Distributing over 200 questionnaires would have been a costly 
exercise, not only in making copies of the questionnaires, but also in postage 
and packaging costs. In contrast, the research that was carried out cost very 
little financially. Secondly, I had to take into account the possible high non-
response rate. Other researchers who have carried out questionnaires with the 
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New Zealand Police have had disappointing response rates (e.g. Marsh, 1989 – 
response rate of 37%). In part, the high level of paperwork involved in police 
work must go to some way to explaining this. As McCall (1978) comments: 
Perhaps because of their ambivalence toward “book learning” and their 
antipathy toward paperwork, questionnaires and paper-and-pencil tests 
are not well received by many of the less professionalized officers 
(1978:87). 
 
 Furthermore, questionnaires would have been time consuming for the officers, 
since they would have had little time during their work hours to complete it. This 
would have meant having to answer the questionnaire during their personal 
time, which I felt would have contributed to a high non-response rate. Carrying 
out the interviews and fieldwork during the course of the officers’ shifts meant 
that I was not taking up any of their personal time. Another factor was validity, 
and this was something that my police supervisor also identified as being a 
potential problem. There is a greater likelihood with questionnaires that officers 
will answer questions according to what they consider the right answer. 
Conversely, officers may fill out the questionnaire deceptively, thus affecting the 
validity of the data. For these very reasons, it was decided that questionnaires 
would not be used in this research. 
 
Summary 
Although this research was initially concerned with how the police respond to 
family violence incidents (domestic incidents), and more specifically, incidents 
involving female offenders (female domestic violence), it became clear very 
early on during the research process, that the family violence policy was not 
being followed consistently. Initially, I assumed that family violence in general, 
was being policed effectively, and knowledge that it was not, required a shift in 
focus. Subsequently, the study became primarily focused on police process, 
policy implementation, and officer subversion and discretion.  
Although the change in focus did not require abandoning the initial methods 
chosen, the nature of the questioning was inevitably modified in order to 
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address the shifting focus. While participant observation and semi-formal 
interviews certainly provided some valuable data for the current study, it was 
also clear that other methods, in particular document analysis, had to be utilised 
in order to gain a greater understanding of the police organisation, the world of 
the frontline officer, and to examine how and why the implementation of the 
family violence policy in Christchurch has been problematic. However, given 
that the shift in focus obviously affected the type of data generated by the study, 
it is clear that a broader approach to investigating the police response to family 
violence may have uncovered some valuable information.  
 
Researching the police can be a difficult task, and much like the nature of police 
work itself, is rarely straight-forward. The task is further complicated when the 
research involves examining and highlighting police deviance. Obviously there 
are a number of methodological issues which arise from conducting police 
research, including problems with gaining and maintaining access, 
confidentiality and anonymity, and risk to participants and researcher alike. 
While a number of difficulties were encountered during the research process, 
such problems should not detract from the fact that researching a relatively 
closed system such as the police, also has numerous rewards.  
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Chapter three: Historical background 
 
Introduction 
Police family violence policy in the United States, the United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand underwent significant change in the 1980s. Up until the early 1980s, 
the police adopted a predominantly minimalist interventionist role in ‘domestic 
disputes’. However, during the 1980s, largely in response to pressure from 
various lobby groups, it became evident that the police had to take a more pro-
active stance towards domestic violence, particularly if they wanted to 
safeguard their police agencies from criticism (and sometimes legal action). 
After the findings of the Minneapolis Experiment were made public in 1984, 
most police departments across the U.S., the U.K., and New Zealand, adopted 
the pro-arrest philosophy favoured by the study, and to this day, most police 
policies still favour the pro-arrest approach.  
 
Given that the current research focuses on issues relating to the 
implementation of a pro-arrest family violence policy, it is important to place it 
within the context of a wider body of research. Furthermore, since 
developments in police family violence policy in New Zealand have often 
occurred in step with developments overseas, it is important to understand how 
pro-arrest policies were adopted and implemented in overseas police 
jurisdictions. Consequently, this chapter foreshadows many of the issues 
discussed within the current research and as such, provides a comprehensive 
foundation for understanding how and why these problems exist. In sum, this 
chapter maps the development of police policy in the U.S., the U.K., and New 
Zealand, and highlights some of the difficulties faced in implementing pro-arrest 
policies. The purpose of this chapter is to show that even though pro-arrest 
policies have been a fundamental development within police organisations, 
implementation has often been fraught with difficulties. Indeed, it appears that 
few, (if any) police departments have been able to successfully implement the 
policies at the street level.  
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The United States 
In the United States up to the 1970s, police tended to intervene minimally in 
domestic incidents. Although for decades this was not viewed as problematic, 
lobby groups (some of which emerged from the women’s movement) began 
pressuring the police to change their practices, and at the same time, a number 
of groundbreaking lawsuits were lodged against various police departments. 
These lawsuits argued that the police “…had denied women equal protection of 
the law by failing to arrest offenders of domestic violence” (Melton, 1999:4), and 
they signalled to police administrators the risk of not taking action against such 
offenders. The politicisation of domestic violence brought the issue of minimal 
police intervention into the public forum, and it was within this context, that the 
so-called Minneapolis Experiment originated.  
 
Minneapolis Experiment 
Funded by the National Institute of Justice, the Minneapolis Experiment, as its 
name suggests, was conducted in the city of Minneapolis, Minnesota in the 
early 1980s. Situated in two of the four precincts in the Minneapolis Police 
Department, the experiment was designed to test the theory that arrest would 
deter domestic violence offenders from committing future crimes. Working on 
this premise, the experiment assessed a number of different police responses 
to minor incidents of domestic violence: arrest, separation or mediation. A 
colour-coded pad was distributed amongst the officers, and if the colour of the 
form indicated an arrest should be made, officers had to respond accordingly 
(i.e. arrest). The deterrent effect of each was subsequently examined through 
the analysis of official police reports, as well as victim interviews at various 
intervals during the study period (for greater detail, see Sherman and Berk, 
1984). The experiment officially commenced in March 1981, and included an 
initial sample of 33 officers, which, by November 1981, had increased to 51 
officers (Sherman and Berk, 1984). By August 1982, 314 case reports had been 
collected, and the experiment officially came to a close. 
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By 1984, the initial findings of the Minneapolis Experiment were released, and it 
was concluded that arresting offenders appeared to result in lower recidivist 
rates. According to official police records, during the six month period following 
arrest, only 10% of arrested offenders were apprehended for repeat violence 
(Sherman and Berk, 1984:6). However, according to the victim interviews, the 
recidivist rate was higher, with victims reporting that 19% of those arrested had 
re-offended during this time period. Nevertheless, as Sherman and Berk (1984) 
point out, notwithstanding the victim interviews, arrest still appeared to be the 
most effective response. In contrast, the separation and mediation responses 
fared less well, with police reports and victim interviews indicating higher rates 
of recidivism (see Sherman and Berk, 1984 for more detail). In short, the 
experiment concluded, and advocated, that intervention in the form of arrest 
was a more effective police response than the traditional responses taken (i.e. 
mediation and separation).  
 
However, not long after the official findings were released, a number of issues 
relating to the external and internal validity of the experiment arose (see Zorza, 
1994; Binder and Meeker, 1988, for greater detail). In particular, there was 
convincing evidence that officers were still exercising considerable discretion 
during the experiment, although the experiment was designed to effectively 
remove officer discretion. Even though the police action was supposedly 
dictated by the specific colour of a randomly-assigned form (i.e. pink = make an 
arrest), it was clear that officers did not always respond accordingly. As 
Sherman and Berk (1984:4) note, while 99% of offenders targeted for arrest 
were actually arrested, only 78% of those who were meant to be advised 
actually received advice, and only 73% of those supposed to be separated, 
were actually separated. While Sherman and Berk (1984:4) attribute this 
discrepancy to the fact that officers may have resorted to arresting the offender, 
there appears to be no evidence to support this. As Binder and Meeker (1988) 
comment: 
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…many officers failed to follow experimental procedure for various 
reasons, and the plan to monitor the process of random assignment could 
not be maintained, which made it impossible to ascertain the degree to 
which officers intentionally subverted experimental purposes (1988:350). 
 
The fact that most officers failed to turn in cases within the study period, tends 
to support the view that officers exercised considerable discretion during the 
experiment. As Sherman and Berk (1984:3) note, most officers turned in only 
one or two cases in total, while three of the initial 33 officers were responsible 
for handing in 28% of the total cases (n=314). 
 
Furthermore, there was evidence that the officers in the study had advanced 
knowledge of which response they would be using. As Zorza (1994) comments: 
Officers may have violated the study’s assumptions that cases were 
randomly allocated by failing to respond to domestic disturbance calls or 
by reporting incidences of misdemeanor domestic abuse cases as “felony 
assaults” or “nonmisdemeanors”. For example, an officer might misclassify 
a misdemeanour as an incident involving an acquaintance or friend, or fail 
to make an arrest near the end of his or her shift or before a vacation to 
avoid spending extra time on duty (1994:935). 
 
Although the Minneapolis Experiment was supposed to control officer 
discretion, as is evident, officers actually exercised considerable discretionary 
power during the study period. In short, although the experiment concluded that 
arrest had the greatest deterrent effect, it was equally clear that mandating 
particular responses did not result in the intended effects. Indeed, officers 
appeared to readily subvert the experiment, and it was clear that they controlled 
their own decision-making, deciding for themselves what type of intervention 
the situation warranted. However, despite these criticisms, the early results of 
the Minneapolis Experiment were accepted, and in turn, were incorporated into 
police policy 
 
Impact of the Minneapolis Experiment 
While the Minneapolis Experiment had a profound effect on police domestic 
violence policy, mandatory arrest policies were already being introduced in the 
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U.S. before the experiment had even been conducted. For instance, by mid 
1983, 33 states had already enacted statutes which permitted arrest, and six 
states already had a mandatory arrest policy (Zorza, 1994:936). In essence, the 
Minneapolis Experiment effectively assisted the widespread adoption of pro-
arrest or mandatory arrest policies throughout the United States. For example, 
as Buzawa and Buzawa point out: 
In 1984, only 15 out of the 140 cities surveyed by the Crime Control 
Institute had policies encouraging arrests. After the original…(Minneapolis) 
study received mass attention, this tripled by 1985 to 44 out of the 140 
cities surveyed (1990:95-96).  
 
By January 1987, 176 cities throughout the U.S. had adopted some form of pro-
arrest policy (Gelles, 1993:576). The experiment’s impact was further facilitated 
by the release of the final report from the U.S Attorney General’s Task Force on 
Family Violence6, made public the same year, and also an important lawsuit, 
Thurman vs City of Torrington7 (see Gelles, 1993). 
 
As is evident from the widespread adoption of pro-arrest and mandatory arrest 
policies, the Minneapolis Experiment had a considerable impact on police 
department policies throughout the U.S., and the Minneapolis Police 
Department itself changed its official domestic violence policy, adopting a pro-
arrest approach. Although arrest was not mandatory, officers were required to 
file a written report, explaining why they failed to make an arrest when it was 
legally possible to do so (Sherman and Berk, 1984:8). However, whether the 
introduction of pro-arrest policies actually translated comfortably into practice 
was another matter. 
 
                                                 
6 This report drew heavily on the results of the Minneapolis Experiment in framing its final report. The 
report called for police departments and criminal justice agencies to recognise and treat family violence 
as a criminal activity, and to respond accordingly. The report also recommended that arrest should be the 
preferred response to family violence (Gelles, 1993:577).  
7 In June 1983, Tracy Thurman filed a civil suit against the City of Torrington and 29 police officers, 
claiming that the police had failed to protect her from the violent attacks of her estranged husband. 
Thurman was subsequently awarded $2.3 million, which was later settled outside of court for $1.9 
million. This case was particularly important for the police, since the minimalist approach to the policing 
of family violence left them vulnerable to similar lawsuits (Gelles, 1993).  
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Effects of changes on police practice  
Where pro-arrest or mandatory arrest policies are implemented well, and have 
the support of police management, increases in arrest rates have generally 
followed. As Buzawa and Buzawa (1990:99) point out, after a mandatory arrest 
law was introduced in the state of Washington, the arrest rate increased 
fourfold. Likewise, Lawrenz et.al (1988), who conducted research on a south 
western city police department, found that after a mandatory arrest directive 
was issued8the: 
… average number of arrests per month increased from nine before the 
July directive to forty-six after July, an increase of over 500 percent 
(1988:495). 
 
Similarly, in the Minneapolis Police Department, following the experiment and 
the subsequent introduction of a mandatory arrest policy, the arrest of domestic 
violence offenders increased considerably. As Sherman and Berk (1984) 
comment: 
The initial impact of the policy was to double the number of domestic 
assault arrests, from 13 the weekend before the policy took effect to 28 the 
first weekend after (1984:8). 
 
However, despite the arrest rate more than doubling within a week of the 
mandatory arrest policy being introduced, the arrest rate dropped considerably 
in the long term. In 1986, the Minneapolis Police Department acknowledged 
that: 
…despite a mandatory arrest policy, out of 24,948 domestic assault calls, 
only 3,645 arrests were reported, or less than 20%....Instead, according to 
police reports, in 60% of these incidents, the officer disposed of the case 
through “talk” or “mediation” with suspects arrested only about 22% of the 
time...In still other cases, an officer responded but failed to file the report 
required by policy (cited in Buzawa & Buzawa, 1990:99). 
 
                                                 
8 In brief, this directive instructed officers to make an arrest for a domestic violence related crime if 
probable cause existed; to arrest irrespective of whether the victim wanted this; a written report was to be 
made on all cases involving domestic violence calls, irrespective of if an arrest was made; and if an arrest 
was not made and probable cause existed, officers were required to justify their action. 
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The Minneapolis Police Department has not been the only police department to 
experience difficulties in exacting real-world change through the implementation 
of pro-arrest or mandatory arrest policies. Indeed, while most jurisdictions 
recorded initial increases in arrests made, the arrest rate quickly returned to 
normal. In Phoenix, Arizona, for example, in the three weeks following the 
adoption of a pro-arrest policy: 
…the arrest rate of 18% was less than the prearrest9 rate of 33%. That 
rate went up to 67% only after the chief intervened and personally 
instructed officers that he was in fact committed to the policy. Officer 
behavior then changed with a subsequent increase in arrests (Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 1990:101). 
 
However, as Buzawa and Buzawa (1990) note, the arrest rate quickly dropped 
back to 42%, which was close to the pre-policy arrest rate, and in part, this was 
a result of judicial criticism of “the wave of ridiculous arrests” (1990:101). This 
suggests that even when management communicate their ‘commitment’ to a 
policy, the actual implementation of that policy also has to be negotiated among 
the patrol officers. Furthermore, as was the case with the Minneapolis 
Experiment, officers still exercised considerable discretion, and continued to 
rely on other traditional responses, such as mediating and separating. For 
example, in her study of the Phoenix, Arizona Police Department, Ferraro 
(1989) found that the introduction of a pro-arrest policy did not uniformly 
transform the practices of police officers, and even when arrests could be 
legally justified, officers often took other action. While the official arrest figures 
provided by the police department indicated that the arrest rate for ‘family fights’ 
(domestic incidents) had doubled within the first two months of the presumptive 
arrest policy being implemented, field observations told a different story10. As 
Ferraro (1989) comments: 
Of the 69 cases of domestic violence, only 9 (13%) resulted in arrest. This 
is a marked reduction from the 53[%] to 72% rate reflected in the official 
police statistics (1989:171). 
                                                 
9 Pre-arrest refers to the arrest rate before a pro-arrest policy was introduced.  
10 Ferraro (1989) does not specifically state why this discrepancy existed – i.e. why the official arrest rate 
did not correspond with the arrest rate produced through fieldwork observations. It may suggest however, 
that the official source of arrest rates was not entirely accurate.  
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Ferraro (1989) found that while there were often legal justifications for not 
making arrests, at the same time, other incidents should have resulted in arrest, 
based on the same circumstance. As Ferraro (1989) points out: 
Officers did not blatantly subvert the policy and tell women who pleaded 
for arrest that there was nothing they could do. Neither did they uniformly 
arrest in every case that legally met the criteria of the presumptive arrest 
policy (1989:176). 
 
Jones and Belknap (1999), in their study of Boulder County, Colorado (which 
had had a pro-arrest policy in place since 1986), concluded that in jurisdictions 
where pro-arrest policies have been in place for a number of years, a serious 
police response is more likely. Jones and Belknap (1999: 9) found that although 
20% of offenders had no action taken against them, almost 60% of offenders 
were jailed. However, Jones and Belknap (1999) also found that there was 
reduced officer compliance with informal policies, such as contacting the shelter 
and charging offenders with child abuse offences when children were present. 
A number of illegitimate factors also appeared to influence the arrest decision. 
For example, officers were less likely to take any action if the offender and 
victim had been married at some point, but were more likely to jail offenders if 
the couple were still together (Jones and Belknap, 1999:10; see also Feder, 
1997).  In sum, while pro-arrest policies signalled a significant shift in the way 
police family violence policy was framed in the U.S., this did not always 
correspond to a change in police practice. Indeed, the implementation of such 
policies has often been fraught with difficulties, and has not always resulted in 
the intended outcomes. However, commitment to pro-arrest family violence 
policies in the U.S. is still particularly strong, as is evident in the Grants to 
Encourage Arrest Policies Program11, which promotes the implementation of 
                                                 
11 The Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies Program is funded under the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994, and is designed for the purpose of establishing or enforcing policies favouring arrest and 
prosecution of persons committing domestic violence (Archer et.al, 2002). With respect to law 
enforcement agencies, the program directs funds to be used for implementing pro-arrest programs and 
policies in police departments, the development of policies and training programmes etc. (Archer et.al, 
2002). 
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pro-arrest and mandatory arrest policies in police departments across the 
country (see Archer et.al. 2002 for more detail). 
  
The United Kingdom 
The 1980s 
Prior to developments within the U.S., a number of important studies on the 
police were being conducted in the United Kingdom during the 1980s. This 
research identified a number of areas where the police could improve their 
responses, not only to domestic violence incidents, but other areas of policing 
as well (e.g. Edwards, 1989; Smith & Gray, 1983). Smith and Gray (1983) for 
example, completed a series of projects with the London police in the early 
1980s, and found that officers often regarded domestic disturbances as 
“rubbish.” Many officers did not consider domestic disturbances as “proper” 
police work, principally because the people involved often did not want or 
require assistance from the police. Even when there were indications that 
disputes could easily escalate, officers appeared to show little concern.  
 
Following the study of Smith and Gray (1983), Edwards (1989) carried out two 
studies with the Metropolitan Police of London between 1984 and 1985. Her 
initial research specifically focused on two London police stations - Holloway 
and Hounslow, as well as a police department in Kent. Edwards’ (1989) 
research concluded that arrest was the least used and preferred police 
response in most cases. In part, officers were often reluctant to arrest domestic 
violence offenders because of a presumption that the victim would later 
withdraw the complaint, thereby negating their work in preparing the case for 
prosecution. Edwards (1989) found that officers would rarely arrest offenders 
without complainant commitment for prosecution, and arrest usually only 
occurred if the injuries were exceptionally severe, if the violence continued after 
the police had arrived, or if the offender threatened the police. As Edwards 
(1989) comments: 
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In the latter case the object of the arrest was not to ensure protection of 
the complainant, but to enforce public subordination and compliance with 
police authority (1989:102). 
 
This exercise of discretion often led to the under-enforcement of the law, and 
the police frequently seemed unwilling to make arrests, even with the 
knowledge that the situation could easily escalate once the police left the scene 
(c.f. Smith and Gray, 1983; Edwards, 1989).  Officers appeared primarily 
concerned with calming the situation down and leaving as soon as possible. It 
was therefore clear from these studies that the police needed to modify their 
approach to domestic violence.  
 
The same year that the Minneapolis Experiment’s findings were released in the 
United States in 1984, similar developments were under way in the U.K. For 
example, in 1984 the Metropolitan Police set up their own internal working party 
to address domestic violence, and in its first report, released in 1986, the party 
indicated a serious need for changes to police statistics, policy, training, victim 
support, and information disseminated throughout the community. With respect 
to the changes to police policy, the working party recommended officers taking 
victims of domestic violence to places of safety, developing guidelines based on 
the implementation of new legislation, considering conducting prosecutions 
irrespective of victims’ commitment, improved training for all levels of the police, 
and the adoption of a multi-agency approach12 (Edwards, 1989: 198). Following 
this, in June 1987, the Metropolitan Police issued new guidelines 
(encompassed in a circulated force order) to London police, on how to respond 
to domestic disputes. These guidelines emphasised the criminal nature of 
domestic violence, and stressed the importance of treating domestic assaults 
as seriously as other assaults. The order also highlighted the need for improved 
training and reporting procedures, and providing support to victims of domestic 
violence. The order also required officers to write up incidents either in a crime 
                                                 
12 A multi-agency approach basically involves the police working with other statutory and non-statutory 
agencies in an effort to improve victim/offender support services.  
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report or incident book, irrespective of whether an arrest was made, and it also 
encouraged officers to use their powers of arrest more frequently (Edwards, 
1989:198). Consequently, a number of police stations throughout London 
committed themselves to improving the police response. 
 
In 1988, Edwards conducted a follow-up study to ascertain whether the force 
order had been successfully implemented. Police records were examined for 
the six month period between March and August 1988 for the Holloway and 
Hounslow (original) stations. While the records suggested that there had been a 
considerable number of arrests made after the order was issued, there also 
appeared to be a high number of cases that were either initially or subsequently 
classified as ‘no-crime’. ‘No-criming’ is a significant clear-up category13 , used 
for incidents where no identifiable offence has been committed, or when the 
complainant is reluctant to support the prosecution of the offender. In her study, 
Edwards (1989) found that a high number of incidents reported at both 
Hounslow and Holloway stations were initially or subsequently no-crimed. For 
example, during the six-month period of her study, 91.3% of incidents attended 
by Holloway Police were initially or subsequently no-crimed, whereas at 
Hounslow, 94% of all incidents attended were no-crimed, either initially or at a 
later date (Edwards, 1989:201-202). As is evident, the majority of incidents 
attended by police at both stations during this six month period were not crimed. 
While the downgrading of crimed cases to the no-crime classification was 
primarily due to complainant unwillingness to press charges, the considerable 
number of incidents initially and subsequently no-crimed may also indicate 
officer resistance to the arrest policy. For example, it has been argued that call-
downgrading can be used as a form of work avoidance (see Crime and 
Misconduct Commission, 2005:31). As Morley and Mullender (1994) comment, 
‘crime-downgrading’ is part of a broader subversion of recording practices: 
                                                 
13 No-criming is the U.K. equivalent of the N.Z. 1D result code – meaning that an offence has not been 
committed, and no further police resources are required – As Ford (1993) found in his New Zealand 
study, officers often used the coding 1D (cleared K1 – no action required), even when offences were 
identified. 
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Police disregard for domestics was reflected in their recording practices. 
Some calls were not recorded in station message books. Some were 
written up as ‘no call for police action’, even when considerable time had 
been spent at the scene. Some were recorded in categories which 
precluded their identification as domestic violence. Some were recorded 
as incident reports rather than crimes even with clear evidence of a 
criminal offence, one aspect of a more general tendency to ‘crime down’ 
domestic offences. A high proportion of incidents initially crimed were 
subsequently ‘no-crimed’, disappearing from the statistics altogether 
(1994:13-14). 
 
Thus, while no-criming may be an appropriate clear-up category when offences 
are not committed, it is also problematic given that it may be used for resolving 
incidents where offences are committed. Consequently, these no-criming rates 
may be reflective of officer resistance to the pro-arrest policy, and may indicate 
a general reluctance to treat domestic violence incidents as criminal offences.  
 
As a result of the large number of incidents no-crimed, Edwards (1989) found 
that the number of arrests made during this six month period was relatively low. 
For example, only 23% of the 180 cases initially crimed at Holloway actually 
resulted in an arrest. Likewise, at Hounslow Station, only 22% of the 103 crimed 
cases recorded an arrest being made.  Despite the differences evident between 
both stations, and the problems relating to no-criming, Edwards (1989) 
concluded that the new policing policy in London was having a significant 
impact on service delivery, police recording, and support for victims. This was 
further supported by an increase in the number of domestic disputes recorded 
by the Metropolitan Police. For example, 354 cases of domestic violence were 
officially recorded in 1986, and this increased to 1,194 by 1987 (Edwards, 1989: 
207). In sum, Edwards’ (1989) study suggested that street-level changes were 
occurring as a result of the introduction of pro-arrest policies, despite a number 
of problems impeding its full implementation.   
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60/1990 Home Office circular 
In 1990, the Home Office issued a circular (60/1990) on domestic violence, 
encouraging police departments across England and Wales to develop and 
publicise force policy statements and strategies to deal with domestic violence 
(Home Office Circular, 60/1990:1). More precisely, it recommended that pro-
arrest policies and operational interventions be developed in order to deal 
effectively with domestic violence (Hamner and Griffiths, 2000). Not only did the 
circular emphasise the importance of treating domestic violence as a crime, but 
it also stressed that the police should “play an active and positive role in 
protecting the victim and that their response to calls for help is speedy and 
effective” (Home Office Circular, 60/1990:2 for more detail).  
 
The circular made a number of other recommendations to Chief Officers, 
including the overriding priority being the protection of the victim and the 
apprehension of the offender; establishing multi-agency links; considerations 
around establishing dedicated domestic violence units; emphasising the need 
for officers to respond positively to incidents; and reviewing recording policy to 
ensure all offences are properly recorded and not ‘no-crimed’ (Home Office 
circular, 60/1990).  
 
The 60/1990 circular strongly recommended that force policy statements (which 
essentially represent the position of Chief Officers on specific issues) should be 
issued. As the circular states: 
The Home Secretary recommends that Chief Officers should consider 
issuing a force policy statement about their response to domestic violence, 
to provide guidance to their officers and ensure that they are fully aware of 
their force’s priorities, the response that is expected of them in assisting 
victims and the powers which are available to them. The use of force 
policy statements can play a helpful role in influencing the attitudes and 
behaviour of officers who are called on to deal with cases of domestic 
violence (Home Office Circular, 60/1990:4). 
 
The circular stated that the central features of the force policy statement should 
include 1) the overriding duty to protect victims and children from further attack; 
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2) the need to treat domestic violence as seriously as other forms of violence; 
3) the use and value of arrest powers; 4) the dangers of seeking conciliation 
between assailant and victim; and 5) the importance of comprehensive record-
keeping to allow the chief officer to monitor the effectiveness of the policy in 
practice (Home Office Circular, 60/1990).  
 
Home Office circulars make policy recommendations to Chief Officers of the 43 
police forces in England and Wales, but they do not have the power to compel 
Chief Officers to implement policies they recommend (Morley and Mullender, 
1992: 269). However, despite this, numerous forces (and divisions within them) 
adopted policies encouraging arrest, and a number of divisions also established 
specialised domestic violence units, instituted computerised domestic violence 
registers, and developed inter-agency links (Morley and Mullender, 1992:269). 
While the issuing of the 1990 Home Office Circular appeared to have a positive 
impact on some police forces within England and Wales, it was also evident 
that some forces were opting to ignore some or all of the  60/1990 circular’s 
recommendations.  
 
Implementation of the 60/1990 Home Office Circular  
A number of police stations throughout England and Wales were committed to 
changing their domestic violence policies prior to the issuing of the 60/1990 
Home Office Circular; but this number significantly increased after 1990. 
However, despite police adopting the recommendations in their local force 
policies, various studies conducted after the issuing of the circular, indicated 
that the policy’s’ translation into practice was often more complicated (e.g. see 
Hoyle and Sanders, 2000; Grace, 1995).  While there was evidence that multi-
agency links were being successfully established, other aspects of the 60/1990 
circular were not implemented as effectively. For example, even though the 
60/1990 circular recommended forces adopt pro-arrest strategies for dealing 
with domestic violence, it appeared that the number of persons arrested for 
such crimes had not uniformly increased. For instance, Hoyle and Sanders’ 
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(2000) study of victims within three Thames Valley Police areas during 1996-
1997, found that despite the Thames Valley Police introducing domestic 
violence officers and pro-arrest policies in an attempt to increase victim 
cooperation, the arrest rate between 1993 and 1996 remained stable.  
Similarly, Kelly et.al’s (1999) evaluation of the New Islington Division (NI) and 
Holloway police division (NH), found that even when offences were recorded by 
the police, arrest and/or charges only occurred in the minority of incidents. For 
example, of all incidents recorded for the six months prior to the Domestic 
Violence Matters14 project being implemented, only 13% resulted in arrest. 
However, of all incidents recorded as crimes (‘crimed’) 38% resulted in an 
arrest. During the same time period, of all incidents reported at the NH division, 
15% resulted in arrest, but of all incidents recorded as crimes, 36% resulted in 
arrest (Kelly et.al, 1999:40). Whilst these figures may appear relatively high, the 
large number of arrests resulting from incidents crimed detracts from the fact 
that a considerable proportion of incidents were never crimed. For example, at 
the NI division, only 34% of incidents were crimed, whereas for the NH division, 
only 41% of incidents reported were crimed (1999:40). This means that 66% 
and 59% of incidents respectively, were not. While as previously discussed, not 
all incidents involve offences committed, no-criming can also be used as a tool 
of officer resistance to the pro-arrest policy. Thus, figures relating to no-criming 
should be approached with caution (see Ford, 1993, and Marsh, 1989 for a 
comparative discussion of the New Zealand situation). 
 
However, when we compare the situation at Holloway with the earlier study of 
Edwards (1989), there appears to have been some changes in arresting and 
recording practices. For example, in 1988, during the six month period Edwards 
(1989) carried out her research, Holloway station records established that only 
23% of crimed cases actually resulted in an arrest. In contrast, Kelly et.al’s 
                                                 
14 Domestic Violence Matters is an adaptation of a Canadian project, which involves locating a team of 
skilled civilian crisis interveners within the police service, to follow up on police responses to domestic 
violence. The pilot project was established at both the Islington and Holloway police divisions (Kelly 
et.al, 1999). 
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(1999) study recorded 36% of all crimed cases resulting in arrest. This suggests 
that the 60/1990 Home Office circular did have a measure of success in 
changing police arrest practices at some stations. Other researchers (e.g. 
Plotnikoff and Woolfson, 1998) however, have shown that recording practices 
were not significantly improved since the issuing of the 60/1990 Home Office 
circular. Plotnikoff and Woolfson (1998), for instance, found a number of 
problems with domestic violence recording practices. Not only did they 
conclude that the police forces they evaluated did not have a systematic 
approach to the management of information relating to domestic violence 
incidents, they also found that patrol officers did not always hand in reports to 
domestic violence officers.  
 
Impact on officer attitudes/practices 
While the Home Office Circular appears to have had some impact on the 
number of incidents no-crimed or resulting in arrest, the day-to-day 
implementation of the circular appears to have been more problematic. Such 
problems have been primarily attributed to the fact that officers continued to 
intervene reluctantly in domestic incidents. 
 
For example, while 1992 survey data collected from 100 women’s refuges 
reported that in some areas police officers were giving a higher priority to 
domestic violence, providing more information to women, and generally 
becoming more sympathetic and understanding of women’s situations, a 
number of problems were also identified. A major issue highlighted by the 
survey was the inconsistency among different police stations and divisions, 
which meant the police response was often very uneven, and in some areas in 
particular, police attitudes seemed largely unchanged (cited in Morley and 
Mullender, 1994:25). These survey findings were further supported by the 
Home Affairs Committee Report (1993), which stated: 
It was clear that the picture varied both between different police forces and 
within individual forces, and a recurrent description of the police response 
was that it was “patchy” (cited in Morley and Mullender, 1994:25). 
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Similarly, surveys carried out by Kelly et.al (1999) in 1993, 1994 and 199515, 
also identified a number of areas where police attitudes (and consequently 
practices) had not dramatically changed after the issuing of the Home Office 
Circular 60/1990. For example, in the 1993, 1994 and 1995 surveys, 43%, 49% 
and 56% of police respondents respectively, believed that mediation was the 
best response. Overall support for arrest as the best response decreased over 
the three surveys. For instance, in 1993, 40% of respondents agreed with this 
evaluation, whereas this decreases to 35% in 1994 and to 33% in 1995 (Kelly 
et.al, 1999:60). It appears that the Home Office circular did not change officers’ 
entrenched belief that mediation was the best response, and it appears that 
support for arrest decreased over time as well. Inevitably, this would have 
affected officers’ willingness to arrest offenders, and increased their reliance on 
less formal means of intervention (i.e. mediation and separation). 
 
There were also similar fluctuations in support with respect to officers’ 
perceptions of positive arrest policies. In the 1993, 1994 and 1995 surveys, 
60%, 43% and 44% of respondents respectively, believed that positive arrest 
policies protected victims of abuse, although over time, fewer officers supported 
this belief (Kelly et.al, 1999:60). As Kelly et.al (1999) point out, over time, there 
was less agreement amongst the officers about whether arrest would act as a 
deterrent, and there was uncertainty about whether these policies would affect 
the willingness of victims to call the police, or increase the dangerousness of 
perpetrators (Kelly et.al, 1999:63).There were, however, indications that the 
Home Office circular did have some impact in terms of officers treating 
domestic violence more seriously, but even this was prone to variation. For 
example, 63% of respondents in the 1993 survey, 57% in the 1994 survey, and 
61% in the 1995 survey, believed that domestic violence should be handled like 
any other assault (Kelly et.al, 1999:60).  
                                                 
15 The 1993 questionnaire included 106 respondents, the 1994 questionnaire 181 respondents, and the 
1995 questionnaire, 157 respondents. 
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However, such figures should be treated with caution, given that officers 
distinguished between what they termed ‘domestic violence’ and ‘domestic 
disputes’. Seventy percent of officers surveyed regarded domestic violence as a 
crime, involving the use or threat of violence. In contrast, domestic disputes 
were considered to involve only verbal interchanges and arguments, and were 
therefore not considered as constituting crimes (Kelly et.al, 1999:58). 
Nevertheless, there was no consensus amongst officers as to what 
differentiated the two categories. Some officers utilised an inclusive definition of 
domestic violence, while others drew on a more exclusive definition. For 
instance, a third of the officers surveyed by Kelly et.al (1999:58) incorporated 
emotional and verbal abuse, disputes and arguments into their classification of 
domestic violence. In contrast, other officers drew on much more limited 
definitions, which specified injury and partner relationships. This lack of 
consensus among officers over what distinguished the two categories is, as 
Kelly et.al (1999) point out,  
… nonetheless disturbing, suggesting that police discretion is informed by 
differing perceptions of (or ways of investigating) domestic violence, which 
will inevitably produce variable and inconsistent practice (1999:59).                                       
 
Whether incidents are considered domestic violence (and therefore crimes), is 
therefore largely dependent on the officer responding to it, and whether the 
incident fits their definition of what constitutes domestic violence. As Kelly et.al 
(1999) point out, this has the effect of creating a lottery system for victims: 
…in which one officer will define her [sic] experience as violence, and 
respond to it as a crime, whilst another will not (1999:115). 
 
Furthermore, this differentiation also has consequences for recording practices. 
If an officer attends an incident that does not fit with his/her perception of what 
constitutes domestic violence, then he/she will not fill out a crime sheet, since 
no crime, according to the officer, has been committed. As Bourlet (1990) points 
out, the incident has to be identified as a crime before being recorded as such:  
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This may seem to be an over-simplified statement, but the identification of 
the crime is a subjective matter and open to the views, opinions and even 
the prejudices of individual police officers (1990:4). 
 
In sum, as Kelly et.al’s (1999) study showed, the implementation of the 60/1990 
Home Office circular did not have the desired effect on police attitudes and 
responses that was expected. Not only did Kelly et.al (1999) conclude that 
neither divisional nor force policy had become routine aspects of daily practice, 
but that neither were being consistently enforced. Furthermore, as Kelly et.al 
(1999) comment: 
A number of key elements of what are considered current best practice 
(such as providing information about refuges and the officers’ name and 
contact number) are still not integrated into daily practice. Of particular 
concern are the officers who say they ‘never’ act in ways which force and 
division guidelines recommend…(1999:65). 
 
While it is inevitable that officers will not be able to follow policy at all times, the 
fact that some officers stated that they never followed force and division 
guidelines illustrates that they still exercised considerable discretion when 
responding to domestic incidents. Officers not only exercised discretion in 
relation to whether the incident was considered to constitute domestic violence, 
or whether the incident was crimed or no-crimed, but also in determining 
whether or not, and to what degree, they followed policy. Thus, irrespective of 
what policy says officers should do, the fact that officers exercise discretion 
means that, in practice, they will largely respond according to their own 
individual preferences. 
 
19/2000 Home Office Circular 
Partly in response to the evidence that the pro-arrest policy had not been 
successfully implemented, the Home Office issued a revised circular on 
domestic violence in 2000, which was subsequently distributed to Chief Officers 
throughout England and Wales. While the 19/2000 circular contained a number 
of new and revised provisions, perhaps the most significant feature was its 
increased emphasis on the pro-arrest approach.  
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Although the 60/1990 Home Office Circular did not specifically mandate 
arresting offenders, the 19/2000 Home Office Circular uses stronger language 
to convey arrest as the primary means of responding to violent domestic 
incidents: 
The duty of police officers when attending a [violent] domestic incident is to 
protect the victim and children (if applicable) from any further violence. 
Where a power of arrest exists, the alleged offender should normally be 
arrested. An officer should be prepared to justify a decision not to arrest in 
the above circumstances. The second duty is to hold the offender 
accountable (Home Office Circular, 19/2000: section 4, emphasis added). 
 
As the research by Edwards (1989), Kelly et.al (1999), and others suggested, 
arrest rates following the introduction of the 60/1990 circular did not increase 
significantly. By recommending that officers should have to justify the decision 
not to arrest (c.f. U.S. situation), it allows police management to evaluate the 
appropriateness of responses to domestic violence incidents. Indeed, if officers 
do not arrest an offender, and do not provide the necessary justification, 
management have recourse to sanction the officer for his/her inaction.  
Another important feature of the 19/2000 circular is the emphasis placed on 
strong and effective leadership. As some researchers (e.g. Plotnikoff and 
Woolfson, 1998) concluded, problems with the implementation of pro-arrest 
policies (and similar initiatives), resulted from poor management practices, and 
in particular, the lack of effective leadership. Consequently, the Home Office 
circular addresses this by stating: 
Chief Officers and managers must show strong leadership. They must also 
be committed to dealing effectively with domestic violence incidents, giving 
appropriate support to their staff. Research has shown that an apparent 
lack of direction or oversight of domestic violence matters on the part of 
headquarters can communicate itself down through the command 
structure resulting in domestic violence work receiving low priority 
(19/2000:4). 
 
Clearly the 19/2000 Home Office circular re-emphasises the need for Chief 
Officers and police departments in England and Wales to continue treating 
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domestic violence seriously.  Whether this has actually helped facilitate the 
implementation of these recommendations, or indeed, pro-arrest policies in 
general, is unknown. However, given that the 19/2000 circular did not propose 
restricting officer discretion, it would seem that such problems are unlikely to be 
resolved, since problems with the implementation of pro-arrest policies often 
stem from the exercise of discretion in the first place (see also Jones et.al 1994, 
for a discussion of changes in the U.K.; Jones, 1995, for a summary of similar 
changes in the Netherlands, and Horton, 1995 for changes in France). 
 
Discussion 
The introduction of pro-arrest family violence policies in the U.S. and U.K. has 
been a significant development in policing practice, and despite a number of 
issues relating to its implementation, change has occurred, however, not 
necessarily for the better. As Buzawa and Buzawa (1990) point out, since the 
introduction of pro-arrest (and mandatory arrest) police policies, there is now 
even less consistency and predictability of officer actions, and the “primary 
characteristic of the police response to domestic violence today is its inherent 
unpredictability…which is in contrast to the past, when inaction or apathy was 
the norm” (1990:99). Buzawa and Buzawa (1990) attribute this to a number of 
factors. Firstly, there was no effective plan to implement these pro-arrest 
policies, particularly in the United States. While there was definitely widespread 
support among national and feminist groups, as Buzawa and Buzawa (1990) 
point out, there was only sporadic support among local and state organisations, 
such as the police. Secondly, Buzawa and Buzawa (1990) note that there 
appeared to be little appreciation of the “desires, frustrations or organizational 
reality confronting line managers and the rank and file police” when considering 
such policies (1990:100). Thirdly, as Buzawa and Buzawa state: 
Although nominally constrained by rigid rules, officers have become adept 
at circumventing rules, laws, and policies that are not in conformance with 
their underlying beliefs. During the course of responding to accelerated 
requests for change, this extends to ignoring or subverting recognized 
rules of criminal procedure, or explicit organizational goals and directives. 
The result is that the officers may merely become more careful with their 
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paperwork to simply ensure the report “covers” them while they continue 
with their desired response (1990:100). 
 
Furthermore, Buzawa and Buzawa (1993) argue that the discretionary capacity 
of frontline officers must, to some extent, explain the problems relating to 
implementing these pro-arrest (and mandatory arrest) policies: 
…substantial discretion is placed with the line officer. As such, line officers 
may be critical obstructions to implementing any new policy if they do not 
agree with new rules and policies….Unless the values of the policy are 
shared by those who are affected, the “implementation game” is likely to 
be difficult and the outcome uncertain (1993:570). 
 
Even despite adequate training, officers can revert to their preconceived 
attitudes and practices, and it is very difficult to enforce official rules/policies 
when decisions to arrest are often dependent on an officer’s judgement, 
according to whether there is proof of injury, self-defence and so on (Buzawa 
and Buzawa, 1993:571). Similarly, as Kelly et.al (1999) point out, attitudinal 
barriers, and the routine trivialisation of domestic violence, impedes the 
successful implementation of the pro-arrest policy, and consequently, may 
explain the discrepancies between what was expected to happen, and what 
actually happened in practice (see also Chan, 1997, for a discussion of the 
difficulties of changing police culture). In sum, irrespective of who is responsible 
for introducing pro-arrest family violence policies, the success or failure of the 
policy is largely contingent on those responsible for implementing it – i.e. the 
frontline officers, and the degree to which they exercise their discretion in 
applying it, and to whom. 
 
New Zealand 
1980s 
Prior to the introduction of a pro-arrest policy in New Zealand in 1987, there 
were two general approaches to policing domestic violence. Up until 1970, the 
police tended not to intervene in domestic disputes, unless a person was 
seriously injured or killed (Ford, 1993). However, around 1970 the police 
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increased their involvement in domestic disputes, mainly due to increased 
feminist pressure. The resulting “crisis intervention” training course developed 
for recruits in 1979 (based on an American system): 
…adopted a low key policing method to avoid any confrontation in the 
domestic dispute situations. It was recommended that the arrest of 
aggressors would be used as a last resort (Marsh, 1989:9). 
 
Consequently, when called to a “domestic”, police began mediating between 
the two parties, to stop the violence and resolve the conflict, albeit temporarily 
(Ford, 1993). The police response, therefore, was not focused on identifying 
possible offences that may have been committed, but on calming the situation 
down before leaving. In other words, domestic violence continued to be treated 
as a non-criminal activity. However, as Ford (1993) points out, there was 
dissatisfaction with these two approaches in the late 1970s, and there were 
claims that the police were not being effective in the way they handled domestic 
disputes. Such complaints included a lack of consistency, a lack of 
investigation, misadvise, and a lack of concern for the safety of victims. For 
example, in 1979, Inglis (cited in Ford, 1985:16) reported that despite officers 
attending domestic disputes and providing immediate protection to victims, the 
latter were dissatisfied overall with the service given, and officers appeared to 
have little knowledge of what to do once the violence stopped. 
 
This minimalist approach to policing domestic violence was increasingly 
criticised, particularly in the early 1980s (e.g. Ford, 1985). For example, in the 
“Socio-Economic Assessment of Women’s Refuges” (1983), claims were made 
that the police (as well as the courts), were “unwilling, unable or ineffectual in 
assisting and protecting victims of domestic violence” (cited in Ford, 1985:17). 
Similarly, in a Broadsheet 16interview with Doris Church, coordinator of the 
Christchurch Battered Women’s Support Group in the early 1980s, it was 
reported that: 
                                                 
16 Broadsheet was a New Zealand feminist magazine 
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…domestic violence is not treated seriously by either the police or the 
courts; frequently both police and courts have been involved in the case 
before the murder has been committed. When recently seeking police help 
to prevent a possible murder attempt, Doris Church was informed by the 
police that they were “not into the business of protecting people before an 
offence was committed” (Crossley, 1983:15). 
 
The weakness of this minimalist intervention approach was well illustrated by 
the murder of Julia Martin in 1982. Despite the police being notified several 
weeks before Martin’s murder that her husband had possession of a shotgun, 
and was likely to commit violence against her, no preventive action was taken. 
As Crossley (1983) points out, this evidence was not presented at the 
subsequent murder trial, and consequently, Martin’s husband was acquitted on 
the grounds of temporary insanity. Crossley argues that the police were not 
interested in revealing that they had not taken this information seriously 
(1983:16), yet it was partly because of the police inaction that Martin had died. 
 
While mediating and separating provided a short term solution to the violence, it 
did not bring the offender into the criminal justice system, and consequently, 
offenders were usually not held accountable for their violence. In the long term, 
this police response did little to stop the violence, and the police inaction in 
domestic disputes was being increasingly criticised. It soon became clear that 
the New Zealand Police, like overseas police agencies, needed to change their 
approach to domestic violence, with particular emphasis placed on positive 
intervention, primarily through arresting offenders.  
 
The Domestic Protection Act 1982 
An important precursor to changing the police response to domestic violence 
was the introduction of the Domestic Protection Act 1982.  A significant 
development in this Act was the introduction of non-molestation and non-
violence orders issued by the Court.  Non-molestation orders prohibited 
respondents from harassing the applicant at home, place of 
business/employment, or in public (1982:16), whereas non-violence orders 
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prohibited respondents from using violence against the protected person. Both 
orders could only be made by men and women in heterosexual married or de 
facto relationships. A major downfall of the Act, however, was the lack of a legal 
definition as to what constituted domestic violence.  
 
Another important feature of the 1982 Domestic Protection Act was the power 
granted to police to arrest, without warrant, offenders who had breached non-
violence orders. As the Act stated: 
Where a non-violence order is in force, any member of the Police may, 
subject to section 10 of this Act, arrest without warrant any person whom 
the member of the Police has good cause to suspect of having committed 
a breach of the order (Domestic Protection Act, 1982:9). 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental feature of this legislation, however, was the 
provision (section 12) relating to the detention of the person arrested. As the 
Act stated: 
Where a person is arrested under section 9 of this Act, he [sic] shall be 
subject to subsection (2) of this section, be detained in Police custody for a 
period of 24 hours (1982:12.1) 
 
This provision allowed officers to take offenders into custody without formally 
charging them, thereby providing a cooling down period. At the end of the 24 
hours, the offender had to be released, and would not appear in court unless 
charges were laid. As a Department of Justice report (1993) commented, “…the 
ability to arrest and detain without charge was one of the most important and 
revolutionary aspects of the 1982 Act” (1993:26). However, at the end of the 
day, this provision did little to resolving the violence, as offenders were able to 
continue their violence once released from police custody.  
The Act also allowed officers considerable scope for discretion. Section 10 of 
the Domestic Protection Act stated that: 
No member of the Police shall arrest any person under section 9 of this 
Act unless that member of the Police believes that the arrest of that person 
is reasonably necessary for the protection of the person for whose 
protection the order was made (Domestic Protection Act, 1982:10:1). 
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Thus, despite officers being empowered to arrest persons breaching non-
violence orders, they also had to evaluate the necessity of such action. In 
considering whether or not to arrest for breach of a non-violence order, officers 
had to consider a number of factors: (1) the seriousness of the act that 
constituted the alleged breach; (2) the time that had elapsed since the alleged 
breach was committed; (3) the restraining effect on the person liable to be 
arrested of other persons or circumstances; and (4) the need for a cooling-off 
period (Domestic Protection Act, 1982:10:2). Even though officers were legally 
empowered to arrest those who breached such orders, they were equally 
authorised to use their discretion not to arrest.  
 
Not long after the Minneapolis findings were released, the New Zealand Police 
began to consider adopting a pro-arrest policy, which was further facilitated by 
the research of Ford (1985). Although Ford (1985) did not believe the New 
Zealand Police should adopt a mandatory arrest policy17 (primarily because it 
would remove officer discretion), he did maintain that a pro-arrest policy was 
worth further investigation. In 1985 Ford recommended: 
That the Police Department review their intervention policies in regard to 
domestic violence. A feasibility study should be carried out on the “arrest” 
policy and a pilot scheme implemented. This pilot scheme should be 
thoroughly evaluated before a decision is made on whether or not to 
officially implement the policy nationwide (1985:83). 
 
Subsequently, Ford (1986) conducted a pilot project on pro-interventionist 
strategies in Hamilton during March/April and August/September 1986. Largely 
modelled on the interventions used in the Minneapolis Experiment, the pilot 
project attempted to replicate the findings of the experiment in New Zealand, to 
ascertain whether pro-arrest policies should be adopted. Four key areas of 
change were implemented including: 1) officially recording all domestic dispute 
                                                 
17 Mandatory arrest policies, unlike pro-arrest policies, do not allow officers to use their discretion. If 
there is sufficient evidence that an individual has committed a criminal offence, officers must arrest the 
offender. In contrast, pro-arrest policies allow officers to use their discretion. Although management 
presume an arrest will be made if there is sufficient evidence that an offence has been committed, 
officers are not required to arrest every offender. Other mitigating circumstances may result in the officer 
using his/her discretion, and warning the offender, and/or separating the respective parties. 
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complaints; 2) recording all domestic incidents involving identifiable crimes as 
offences where applicable18; 3) referring victims to social service agencies; and 
4) making more arrests in cases where a prima facie offence is established, 
even without an official complaint (Ford, 1986:vii). Primarily officers participating 
in the pilot project were required to change their mindset, from arresting as a 
last resort, to arresting unless there were very good reasons for not doing so. 
Furthermore, the project mandated that the decision to arrest was not to be 
based on whether the victim was prepared to make an official complaint, or 
follow through with the subsequent prosecution. When there was evidence of 
an assault or other criminal offence, but insufficient evidence to proceed to 
court, officers were required to officially warn the offender, and even if there 
was no evidence of an offence having been committed, officers were required 
to assist the victim to leave the premises, and/or give advice to victims (Ford, 
1986:37). 
 
The pilot project appeared to have a measure of success, with an increasing 
number of domestic violence offenders arrested during the study period. For 
instance, from April to September 1986, the arrest rate increased each month 
(with the exception of July), with 24% of offenders arrest in April, 36% arrested 
in August, increasing to an arrest rate of 42% in September (Ford, 1986:38). 
Furthermore, although officers in the study were initially sceptical about the 
deterrent effects of arrest and hesitant about the potential fall-out for victims, 
the project appeared to alter officer attitudes towards domestic violence (Ford, 
1986). For example, of the 94% of officers (n=54) who responded to Ford’s 
(1986)survey, 72% were satisfied with the new police policy, and 87.5% of 
officers thought the new arrest procedures had helped standardise the 
response to domestic violence (Ford, 1986:59). Additionally, 92.5% of the 
responding officers supported the changes being implemented throughout the 
department (1986:60), and overall officers perceived the new approach as 
much better for both themselves and for victims (Ford, 1986). 
                                                 
18 Rather than the previous minor incident code – e.g. ID 
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As a result of the pilot project’s success, Ford (1986) made a number of 
recommendations including: 1) that only non-offence domestic disputes should 
be coded under the incident coding of 1D (domestic incident), while all other 
complaints (i.e. those involving offences) coded19 under the appropriate offence 
coding and dealt with accordingly; 2) police should arrest more frequently; 3) an 
arrest should be the first option considered, not the last, and if there is sufficient 
evidence of an offence, an arrest should be made unless there are good 
reasons for not doing do; 4) victims should not be required to make official 
complaints as a precondition of arrest or testify at court; and 5) the police 
should take more responsibility to link the complainant with a support agency or 
group that is able to offer long-term support and assistance. 
 
1987 policy change 
Thus, by 1987, there was convincing evidence that the New Zealand Police 
should change their approach to domestic violence, and in 1987, a pro-arrest 
policy was introduced to all police departments by the Police Commissioner, 
Mal Churches, in the form of a Commissioner’s Circular 1987/11. While the 
actual 1987 policy cannot now be located20, the policy is referred to in some 
studies (e.g. Ford, 1993). 
 
The Commissioner’s Circular 1987/11, by all accounts, stated that the minimal 
interventionist approach to domestic violence was inappropriate, and a strong 
pro-arrest philosophy was clearly emphasised. As Schollum (1996) comments: 
The policy directed that arrest action must be taken where sufficient 
evidence of an offence existed, and that action be taken to assist victims of 
such offences (1996:12). 
 
                                                 
19 Every offence has its own specific code – e.g. male assaults female has an offence code of 1553  
20 A number of efforts were made to locate the 1987 policy, including searching the Police library, and 
making contact with the national family violence coordinator. However, such efforts proved futile, and 
the original policy could not be located.  
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The 1987 policy changes were based on four key areas: 1) referring victims to 
social service agencies; 2) referring offenders to social service agencies; 3) 
coding offences appropriately; and 4) arresting offenders when an assault, 
danger to victim, or breach of court order is disclosed, and there is sufficient 
evidence to arrest (Marsh, 1989). In sum, two underlying principles constituted 
the backbone of the 1987 policy: 1) ensuring protection for victims and 2) 
holding offenders accountable via arrest.  
 
In essence, the 1987 family violence policy aimed to change the police 
response to domestic incidents. Like the overseas attempts, the New Zealand 
policy emphasised the need for officers to treat ‘domestics’ as serious incidents, 
which often involve identifiable crimes. Rather than approaching domestics with 
a view to calming the situation down and mediating between the parties, the 
new policy stressed that officers had to attend domestics with the mindset that a 
criminal offence might have been committed and their duty, therefore, was to 
establish if there was sufficient evidence to make an arrest. As some of the 
managers in the current study pointed out, the pro-arrest policy signalled a 
significant change in the way police responded to domestic incidents, with 
strong emphasis on positive intervention based on holding offenders 
accountable21. While arrest was certainly encouraged, the 1987 policy also 
allowed officers to retain some degree of discretion, with the circular stating: 
Common sense should prevail where incidents are extremely minor or 
police intervention is clearly inappropriate (cited in Schollum, 1996:12). 
 
In short, the pro-arrest policy certainly encouraged officers to arrest offenders, 
but officers were not required to arrest on every occasion.  
 
Implementation of the new policy 
Similar to the international experience, the New Zealand Police encountered a 
number of difficulties in implementing the 1987 family violence policy at the 
                                                 
21 c.f. Edwards (1989:200), who argued that “In theory, the new (pro-arrest) policing policy holds out a 
promise of radically changing the police response to domestic violence.” 
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ground level. In 1989, Marsh (1989) conducted the first evaluation of the 1987 
policy’s implementation, and on the whole, concluded that the policy had not 
been successfully implemented on a nation-wide basis. While Marsh (1989) 
identified a number of barriers impeding its application at the ground-level, he 
partly attributed such problems to the nature of the training programmes which 
had been developed to facilitate the necessary changes. The training package, 
which was developed to assist the introduction of the new policy, had not been 
employed by all police departments, meaning some officers were never 
exposed to the new training. However, despite not all officers being exposed to 
the training programme, Marsh (1989) found that there were no discernible 
differences between those who had attended training programmes on the new 
policy changes, and those who had not. Subsequent problems with policy 
compliance were partly attributed to this haphazard application of the training 
package. As Ford (1993) comments:  
As a result of the mess up with the initial training package there was not 
only inconsistent training but also very inconsistent application of policy. In 
1988 this fact was brought to the attention of District Commanders and the 
policy was given a further push. However, rather than accepting that the 
new policy had not been implemented as planned, most districts became 
very defensive and claimed that implementation had been thorough and 
successful in their particular districts (1993: no page number). 
 
Additionally, Marsh (1989) found a number of problems with the coding of 
domestic incidents. Like the U.K. experience, Marsh (1989) found that some 
officers were still treating violent domestic incidents as non-criminal offences, 
despite there being clear evidence of offences. For example, during one month 
there had been offences clearly defined, yet they were still being cleared as 1D 
(domestic dispute, no offences committed). These offences included 15.3% 
breach of court orders, 11.3% assaults, 22.5% disorderly type offences, and 
14.3% of threatening behaviour, all of which had been cleared under the 1D 
coding (c.f. no-criming), rather than the appropriate offence codes (Marsh, 
1989:30). In short, rather than coding them as criminal offences, under their 
respective offence codes, officers recorded them under the category 1D – 
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which is used to record incidents that do not involve criminal offences. As 
Marsh (1989:30) points out, despite the fact that 74.7% of police respondents 
accepted coding domestic dispute complaints appropriately, in practice, it 
appeared that they still regarded the domestic dispute complaint in the 
“traditional” police sense. In other words, rather than treating these incidents as 
criminal offences, the officers recorded them as non-criminal events.  
 
However, problems with policy compliance were not only restricted to issues 
around training and recording practices, since a key area of non-compliance 
related to victim referrals to social service agencies. Even though the policy 
required officers to refer victims to the appropriate support agencies, this was 
not consistently happening. For example, 42% of social service agencies 
surveyed stated that within a three-month period, the police did not refer any 
victims, either to their agency or any other agency known to them. Indeed, 
40.5% of officers22  surveyed indicated that during October, 1989, they did not 
refer any victims to social service agencies (Marsh, 1989:29). Furthermore, 
83.3% of officers acknowledged that they had not provided victims with a list of 
agencies who could provide support, while 81.8% of officers did not contact any 
agencies with referrals of victims (Marsh, 1989:29). Referrals of offenders to 
social service agencies also failed to take place consistently (see Marsh, 1989 
for discussion). 
 
While Marsh (1989) found that there were high levels of support for specific 
provisions within the 1987 policy – for example, 86.1% of officers supported 
using arrest as the first response for assaults, breaches of court orders, or 
when victims were in danger, this support did not easily translate into practice. 
Not only were victims and offenders not being consistently referred to social 
service agencies, but correct recording was also not taking place. Furthermore, 
a number of officers (32.3%) stated that they never used arrest as a first priority 
(Marsh, 1989:31). As Marsh commented: 
                                                 
22 N=225 officers 
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When the practical application of the new arresting system was carried 
out, the police showed a reluctance to implement it as laid down in the 
Commissioner’s policy change (1989:31). 
 
Following Marsh’s evaluation of the 1987 policy’s implementation, the first 
report of the Hamilton Abuse Intervention Pilot Project (HAIPP) was released. 
Launched in Hamilton in July 1991, HAIPP was modelled on the Duluth 
Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP), which was formally established in 
Minnesota, U.S. in 1981. A community-based organisation, DAIP had 
established a coordinated approach to domestic violence, with primary focus 
centred on protecting victims from future violence, by combing legal and non-
legal sanctions on offenders (www.duluth-model.org/). Like DAIP, HAIPP 
piloted an integrated approach to family violence, involving the police, the 
courts, and victim support agencies. With respect to the police, HAIPP 
advocated an active policy of arresting abusers. 
 
HAIPP’s first year report, released in 1992, indicated that the project was being 
successfully implemented, with officers arresting offenders more frequently. For 
example, the first report showed that there was an increase in arrests made, 
with 311 arrests recorded, an average arrest rate of 25.9% per month.23 At the 
same time, however, a number of problems relating to monitoring police 
compliance with the arrest policy were identified. While there was evidence that 
officers, on the whole, were arresting more regularly, it was also clear that a 
high number of cases involving non-arrests had escaped the attention of HAIPP 
(Robertson & Busch, 1993:37). In other words, HAIPP’s initial success was 
negated by the fact that they did not always hear about cases involving non-
arrests. As Robertson et.al (1992) comment: 
…a further analysis suggests that the percentage of arrests is lower than it 
should be under the policy…comparison between five sections in Hamilton 
indicated that one section is arresting in 22% of incidents attended while 
the others rate between 9-13%. This finding…supports the contention that 
                                                 
23 The arrest rate prior to the implementation of HAIPP is unknown, since HAIPP only started recording 
arrest rates from the beginning of the project, not beforehand. 
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some police at least should be arresting more frequently than they are 
(cited in Ford, 1993: no page number). 
 
Problems with the policy’s implementation were also identified by a study 
commissioned by the Victims’ Task Force. Released the same year (1992), the 
report studied the policing of court orders under the Domestic Protection Act 
1982 (among other things), and concluded that the 1987 police policy had been 
poorly implemented. As Busch et.al (1992) comment: 
Some (officers) supported the arrest policy: some were critical of it. All 
agreed that it was being unevenly implemented with significant regional 
and individual differences (1992:156). 
 
For example, a large number of incidents at three selected police districts (large 
city, small city, and rural town) were resulted as K1 – police presence sufficient, 
no further action, which indicated that the majority of domestic incidents did not 
result in an arrest. Of all the districts examined, 61.8% of all incidents were 
K1ed, meaning that arrests were not made in a large majority of incidents the 
police attended, offences were not identified, and details of these incidents not 
formally recorded (Busch et.al, 1992:157). While not all incidents involved 
criminal offences, the study concluded that, in contravention of the 1987 policy, 
the arrest decision was highly contingent on whether the victim wanted an 
arrest made. Although the study acknowledged that there were obvious barriers 
to arrest facing rural police officers (e.g. help too far away, inadequate facilities 
for holding prisoners overnight and considerable distance to suitable holding 
cells), which may deter officers from apprehending offenders, such problems 
should not have theoretically existed in the city. In short, while the study 
accepted that rural officers were likely to arrest fewer offenders because of time 
and resource constraints, the high number of non-arrests in the city could not 
be easily explained. As Busch et.al (1992) comment: 
While the police response to domestic violence may sometimes be 
constrained by a lack of resources, our data suggests [sic] that there are 
other, more significant problems with the implementation of the arrest 
policy. We conclude that there persists, among many police officers, an 
informal policy of minimal intervention in ‘domestic disputes.’ According to 
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their informal policy, the aim of intervention is to restore order and leave 
(1992:159). 
 
Additionally, in most districts Busch et.al (1992) visited, there appeared to be a 
negative view towards repeated calls. As Busch et.al (1992) comment: 
…some officers tend to discount repeated calls. In most districts we 
visited, we were told that there were certain addresses to which police 
were frequently called. In such circumstances, the calls tended to be taken 
less seriously as police come to see victims as at least partly responsible 
for their victimisation and unwilling to take decisive action (1992:161). 
 
In short, although the 1987 policy signalled the need for officers to move 
beyond the minimal interventionist stance, which characterised police practice 
prior to 1987, there was convincing evidence that little had changed in practice. 
Indeed, as Busch et.al (1992) found in most districts they visited, officers still 
appeared reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes, particularly if they had 
visited the address before.  
 
 
1992 policy change 
In response to these studies, which all concluded that the implementation of the 
1987 policy had not been as successful as anticipated, the New Zealand Police 
amended the family violence policy in 1992: 
The first survey into the effectiveness of the change of policy was carried 
out in 1989/90. Results indicated there were inconsistencies throughout 
the country in terms of implementation…It is time that Police policy was re-
stated and re-enforced (Ten-One, 22 May, 1992:11). 
 
While it is difficult to establish what amendments were made to the 1987 policy 
(since this could not be located), it is clear that the 1992 policy re-emphasised 
arrest provisions, including the following: 1) when an offence has been 
disclosed involving assault or danger to a victim from an offender, and there is 
sufficient evidence to arrest the offender, he/she should be arrested and 
charged; 2) the aggressor should be arrested without an official complaint; 3) if 
the complainant does not give evidence, evidence from police staff and the use 
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of photographs will clearly be sufficient to take the case to court; and 4) arrest is 
the standard procedure where physical force or the threat of physical force has 
occurred (Ten-One, 22 May, 1992:11).  
 
1993 policy update 
Following the 1992 policy update, new research indicated that despite police 
management’s commitment to the pro-arrest policy, many of the implementation 
issues identified by previous research had still not been resolved. For instance, 
Ford (1993) found that the pro-arrest policy was still being applied 
inconsistently, not only across districts, but also between various departments 
in the same city. Although, as discussed earlier, problems with the training 
packages may partially explain such problems, Ford (1993) contends: 
…it must be accepted that the main reason for failure of the police to be 
able to implement this policy uniformly over all sectors of the police 
probably rests with individual officers and particular sections of the police 
in various parts of the country (1993: no page number). 
 
Although Ford (1993) certainly found a number of problems with the policy’s 
implementation, he did not, however, conclude that the policy change had 
failed. As Ford (1993) pointed out, there was a noticeable increase in the 
number of offenders arrested after the policy’s introduction, which suggested 
the policy had been partially successful in bringing about change. There was 
also evidence that the pro-arrest approach was working elsewhere. For 
example, the second report of HAIPP, released in 1993, concluded that there 
were a number of improvements in the police response to domestic violence in 
the project. For instance, the study found that there had been a 67% increase in 
the number of offenders arrested compared to the first year, with an average of 
43.2% of arrests recorded per month, compared with 25.9% per month during 
the first year (Robertson and Busch, 1993).  
 
 While HAIPP’s first report identified problems with monitoring systems, the 
second report discussed how an enhanced system for monitoring non-arrest 
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incidents had been subsequently developed. This in turn, resulted in a 
considerable number of non-arrest incidents coming to the attention of HAIPP – 
almost twice as many non-arrests as arrests (Robertson and Busch, 1993:3). 
Although the monitoring systems were improved, the report also highlighted the 
fact that officers were still predominantly using non-legal interventions (i.e. 
mediation and separation), and that a considerable number of incidents 
involving identifiable offences were still being coded as 1D (domestic incident, 
no offence committed).  
 
Partly in response to these studies, the policy was once again updated in 1993. 
The influence of the second HAIPP report in particular, should not be 
overlooked, since the 1993 policy emphasised the multi-agency approach to 
domestic violence for what appears to be the first time. Accordingly, the 1993 
policy states: 
These policy guidelines reaffirm the 1987 policy and based on the 
Hamilton Abuse Intervention Pilot Project, amplify the desired intervention 
approach. Preliminary reports show the Hamilton project is having a 
measure of success based around (3) key objectives…including the 
protection of the victim; consistent policies and practices amongst multi-
agency groups, holding assailants accountable (Ten-One, 27 August, 
1993:11). 
 
The multi-agency approach was an important development in police policy, 
since it acknowledged that social service agencies were better equipped to 
address the underlying causes of family violence.  Furthermore, by creating 
networks amongst other service agencies, such as the courts, Women’s Refuge 
and Victim Support, this would provide greater support for victims, and enhance 
the ability to develop suitable programmes for offenders as well (Ten-One, 27 
August, 1993:11). The 1993 policy also introduced local victim support 
coordinators who became responsible for referring victim details to the local 
Women’s Refuge or other support agencies, and district/area liaison officers 
who coordinated with these agencies, and were responsible for any family 
violence related problems. 
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The 1993 policy also signalled a change in terminology, from domestic incidents 
to ‘family violence complaints’ (Ten-One, 27 August, 1993:11). In part, this may 
have stemmed from Ford’s (1993) recommendation that using the term 
‘domestics’ tended to trivialise the problem, and that ‘family violence’ more 
appropriately reflected the seriousness of such incidents. The change in 
language suggests that police management were further attempting to alter 
officers’ perceptions of domestic violence, emphasising once again, the 
seriousness of such incidents. Coupled with the change in language, the 1993 
policy also introduced a working legal definition for family violence, and placed 
considerable emphasis on firearms provisions. This was largely the result of the 
Arms Amendment Act 1992, which enabled police to confiscate firearms from 
offenders if they were respondents of non-molestation or non-violence orders, 
or if an officer could establish grounds for making an offender a respondent of 
any such order (section 27A; see Newbold, 1997). Consequently, the 1993 
policy states that officers should always “endeavour to establish if any firearms 
are available at the premises or under the control of the offender” (Ten-One, 27 
August, 1993:11). 
 
Also, possibly as a result of previous research, the 1993 policy emphasised the 
importance of good training. The policy identified a number of features such 
training should cover, including: 1) a definition of family violence; 2) the need to 
police family violence; 3) family violence statistics for the district or area; 4) the 
police family violence policy and local policies and practices; 5) details of the 
multi-agency group; 6) the possible dangers when attending incidents; and 7) 
court orders and firearms legislation. The policy further stated that such training 
should also involve prosecution staff, investigators, and the district or area 
liaison officer, to outline the local policies and practices (Ten-One, 27 August, 
1993:11). The importance of this training is underlined by the following 
comment: 
 77
It is essential police receive appropriate training to ensure high levels of 
skill are maintained to deal with situations involving family violence 
(1993/19). 
 
Lastly, the evaluation provision in the 1993 policy is worth commenting on. As 
the policy stated: 
To achieve and maintain a service to deal effectively with family violence it 
will need to be monitored, evaluated and modified as a matter of course 
with the principle objective being the protection of victims. In districts this 
may include the assistance of the multi-agency group (Ten-One, 27 
August, 1993:13) 
 
This provision highlighted not only management’s commitment to dealing with 
family violence appropriately, but also recognised the need for the policy to be 
monitored for compliance, evaluated for effectiveness, and modified in light of 
developments in legislation, as well as in response to international 
developments.  
 
1994 policy update 
In 1994, the family violence policy was again updated to address new 
procedures, and more specifically, the introduction of a family violence 
database and new ‘POL 400’ forms. A POL 400 is a form officers must 
complete every time a domestic incident is attended and resulted as K6 
(reported) or K9 (arrest made), and it records such information as 
victim/offender details, who reported the incident, the presence of protection 
orders, physical injury, and so on (see appendix 2). Information from POL 400s 
is then  placed on the family violence database, which, according to the 1994 
policy, was designed as a pro-active tool in reducing the incidence of family 
violence (Ten-One 60/12). The family violence database records the details of 
incidents attended to in the past, offender and victim histories, and so on, 
enabling officers to respond accordingly to any future incidents. Furthermore, 
the database also improves officer safety by allowing them to query the 
database on their way to incidents, in order to establish the presence of 
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firearms, and offenders’ history with the police. This in turn allows officers to 
take the necessary precautions to ensure their personal safety.  
 
The Domestic Violence Act 1995 
In 1995, family violence legislation was updated with the introduction of the 
Domestic Violence Act 1995, which came into effect in July 1996. While the 
Domestic Protection Act 1982 had ensured protection for married and de facto 
heterosexual couples (and their children), it did not recognise other intimate 
relationships. In contrast, the Domestic Violence Act 1995 extended protection 
to individuals in any intimate relationship. Furthermore, while the Domestic 
Protection Act 1982 did not define domestic violence, the Domestic Violence 
Act 1995 provided a comprehensive definition, which incorporated physical, 
sexual or psychological abuse (Adams & Kearns, 1996:1).  
 
The Domestic Violence Act 1995 also introduced “protection orders”, which 
replaced non-violence orders under the Domestic Protection Act. Anyone over 
the age of 17 can apply for a protection order, or have a representative (e.g. 
police) apply for one on their behalf24 (Domestic Violence Act 1995:10). 
However, a number of criteria must be satisfied before a court can issue a 
protection order including: a) the respondent is using, or has used, violence 
against the applicant, a child of the applicant’s family, or both; and b) the 
making of an order is necessary for the protection of the applicant, or child of 
the applicant’s family, or both (Domestic Violence Act 1995: 14:1). Protection 
orders work by prohibiting respondents from: 1) physically or sexually abusing 
the protected person; 2) threatening to physically or sexually abuse the 
protected person; 3) damaging or threatening to damage the property of the 
protected person; 4) engaging, or threatening to engage in other behaviour, 
including intimidation or harassment; 5) encouraging any person to engage in 
behaviour against a protected person, where the behaviour, if engaged in by 
                                                 
24 Protection orders can be made on behalf of a person under the age of 16, however, they can only be 
issued against respondents over the age of 17, unless the “child” is, or has been, married, or in a civil 
union or de facto relationship (Domestic Violence Act 1995:10). 
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the respondent, would be prohibited by the order (Domestic Violence Act 
1995:19:1; see Domestic Violence Act for penalties).  Perhaps the greatest 
feature of protection orders was that they extended protection to victims, 
irrespective of their living arrangements with the offender. Thus, victims could 
reside with a respondent of an order, and still have legal protection.  
 
The Domestic Violence Act also empowers the police to arrest, without warrant, 
if a protection order is breached, and police powers relating to firearms are also 
extended under this legislation, allowing officers to seize any firearms and 
revoke firearms licenses within a 24 hour period from anyone who has a 
protection order made against them (Police Mangers’ Guild Trust, 2001:6). 
 
1996 policy update 
The same year the Domestic Violence Act came into effect, Schollum (1996) 
released the findings from her survey of New Zealand police officers and the 
family violence policy. Like previous research (and indeed, the current study), 
Schollum (1996) identified a number of concerns about the policy’s 
implementation, including the fact that some officers had not changed their 
attitude toward family violence, nor accepted the new approach. Schollum 
(1996) also found that officers were not always aware of specific policy 
provisions.  For instance, while nearly 96.4% of officers were aware that an 
offender should be arrested where there is sufficient evidence of an offence, 
and 91.3% of officers supported this requirement, officers were not always 
familiar with all the specific provisions, or did not always adhere to them. For 
example, while 96.6% of officers were aware that they had to complete a POL 
400 form, only 70.5% supported this requirement, with the level of compliance 
largely dependent on the type of offence or incident. POL 400s completed for 
assaults by males on females had the highest level of compliance (92.9%), and 
incidents involving intimidation/threats had the lowest (62.9%). This clearly 
shows that even when officers are aware of, and support policy requirements, it 
does not necessarily translate into practice.  
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Like the concerns of Marsh (1989) and Robertson and Busch (1993), Schollum 
(1996) also found that officers did not always result incidents appropriately, with 
many officers still using the K1 code (i.e. not a domestic incident, no POL 400  
filled out, and no further police action required) instead of documenting every 
incident by way of POL 400. Furthermore, Schollum (1996:40) established that 
despite a considerable number of officers supporting the pro-arrest policy, many 
still warned or cautioned an offender rather than using more formal means of 
intervention (i.e. arrest). Schollum (1996:65) found that such problems were 
often the result of victims’ behaviour, and their preferences for police action – 
i.e. warning or arrest, or both. 
 
Schollum (1996) also concluded that there was a lack of clear and consistent 
lines of supervision and accountability. As she comments: 
Supervision arrangements vary greatly from district to district. In some 
districts (or perhaps only at certain stations within those districts ) it 
appears that supervisors are monitoring compliance with the policy hardly 
at all; in others supervision appears reasonably constant; and at still others 
supervisors seem to be treating the policy as a ‘mandatory arrest’ policy 
with ‘Male assaults female’ as the only acceptable charge. This variation in 
the supervision of individual decisions must have a negative impact on the 
overall implementation of the policy, and certainly undermine its 
effectiveness (1996:72). 
 
Schollum (1996:80) overall identified a number of barriers impeding the full 
implementation of the policy, including: 1) victims’ wishes for non-arrest 
intervention; 2) a perceived lack of support from the courts; 3) confusion over 
the appropriate use and extent of discretion; 4) misuse of the 1D (domestic 
incident, no offences identified) incident code; 5) insufficient supervision; 6) 
evidence of stereotypical and unhelpful attitudes towards certain victims; 7) 
non-completion of POL 400s in many instances; 8) continuing use of the K1 
clearance for 1D incidents; 9) lack of district monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms, as well as a number of other factors. Schollum’s (1996) study 
clearly shows that nearly nine years after the 1987 policy was implemented, a 
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number of problems had still not been resolved, and full implementation of the 
policy across New Zealand had still not been achieved.  
 
In response to the introduction of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and perhaps 
coupled with the research findings of Schollum (1996), the family violence 
policy was again updated in 1996, and this constitutes the most recent national 
policy.  Three important developments were made within this policy. Firstly, 
there was recognition for the first time that children who witness domestic 
violence inadvertently become victims themselves- albeit indirectly - and the 
policy emphasised the need to provide support to these children (Ten-One, 
121/11:2). Secondly, the policy introduced area or district family violence 
coordinators, who were responsible for “local inter-agency liaison, problem 
resolution, monitoring staff compliance with local protocols, and family violence-
related training” (Ten-One, 121/11:6). Additionally, family violence coordinators 
were responsible for ensuring the POL 400s were completed and resulted 
appropriately. 
 
A third important development within this policy was the introduction of a 
provision dealing with supervisors. As the policy states: 
In the rare case where action other than arrest is contemplated, the 
member’s supervisor must be consulted (Ten-One, 121/11:19). 
 
The inclusion of this provision is important in many respects. Firstly, it appears 
to be the first time the provision was included in the arrest section. This tends to 
suggest that management believed that the increased monitoring of officer 
performance was important in ensuring the policy was followed. Secondly, 
stipulating that officers should consult with their supervisors if they decide not to 
arrest, limits the discretionary capability of frontline officers. Finally, introducing 
the supervisor provision not only helps to ensure officers treat domestic 
incidents seriously, but it also provides a degree of accountability.   
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Subsequent studies 
Following the 1996 policy update, the findings from Carbonatto’s (1998) study 
on family violence and the police response in Porirua, Waitakere and Wellington 
were released. Like previous research, Carbonatto (1998) found there were 
clear indications that officers were not always complying with policy. Although 
all the officers spoken to advocated treating incidents of domestic violence 
seriously, this did not always translate into complete support for the policy. 
Similar to Schollum’s (1996) study, Carbonatto found that officers’ awareness of 
specific provisions of the policy was not always complete:  
…while all police spoken to were aware that they had to act in such 
situations by arresting the offender, most had little knowledge over and 
above this requirement about specific aspects of the policy – particularly 
the requirement to remove firearms and fill out the Form 400 (POL 400) for 
every incident (1998:117). 
 
Furthermore:  
One of the main findings of this research was that the police did not always 
act in accordance with their policy. For example, the policy states that all 
offenders should be held in custody until their first court appearance; 
almost a fifth of the total sample of offenders, however, were immediately 
released following their arrest. In addition, the Form 400 – the form that 
police are required to fill out every time they attend an incident of ‘family 
violence’ – was completed in just over half the cases surveyed (1998:257). 
 
Carbonatto also found a number of problems with police management at the 
district level, and more importantly, how their attitudes and commitment to 
policy often filtered down to the frontline officer. Not only did each of the three 
districts that Carbonatto studied have varying commitments to the policy, but 
each had different views on how that policy was applied:  
…the varying districts adhered to the policy differently, with one district 
adhering to the policy in its strictest sense through monitoring its cases, 
supporting victims and focusing on the quick resolution of cases. Police in 
another district, however, interpreted the policy quite differently with the 
result that more than half of domestic violence cases surveyed within a 
three-month period were diverted (1998:257). 
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Additionally, Carbonatto (1998) found that often those most responsible for 
policy implementation had varying levels of commitment:  
The commitment of senior police in charge of co-ordinating domestic 
violence policies in each district also varied. My observations confirmed 
those views expressed by two senior management police officers that, in 
two of the districts, those officers involved in co-ordinating police domestic 
violence efforts were involved in a job they had no particular commitment 
to (1998:117). 
 
Finally, Carbonatto (1998) found that the concerns of police management were 
often not focused on the victims, but on the way the organisation operated. 
Some senior managers Carbonatto (1998) spoke to were more concerned 
about how the police worked as an operational unit, and how officers could 
improve their performance in this area, with apparently little importance placed 
on the concerns and needs of victims. Overall, Carbonatto’s (1998) study 
suggested that family violence was still being policed inconsistently across 
various police districts, and like previous research, there were still a number of 
problems with the policy’s implementation in general.  
 
Current policy in the Canterbury Police District 
In 1998, the Canterbury Police District (the district in which the current study is 
located), updated their family violence district policy, and this constitutes the 
most recent regional policy. While the policy has not significantly changed from 
its earlier national counterpart (nor indeed from the original 1987 policy itself, by 
all accounts), some minor differences are evident. For example, while the 1996 
national policy was based on three core principles, the 1998 Canterbury policy 
is built upon five: 1) correct recording and resulting of events; 2) holding 
offenders accountable; 3) support and protection of victims; 4) consistent district 
practices; 5) adequate supervision and accountability for the police response 
(1998:3, emphasis added). 
 
Other provisions which appear in the 1996 national policy are also re-
emphasised, such as the need for officers to treat events with domestic 
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overtones seriously, and action taken must include: 1) sound response and 
investigation techniques, including querying the family violence database and 
“person of interest” sub system to obtain information; 2) dispatching police to 
the scene; 3) attending police treating events seriously; and 4) correct 
recording, reporting and resulting of events. The policy also states that all 
domestic- related events must be resulted K6 (reported) or K9 (arrest made), 
and a POL 400 completed (1998:5.1); however, officers are still able to use the 
1D (domestic incident, no offence committed) coding for incidents where no 
offence is committed.  
 
Perhaps the most important provision within the 1998 Canterbury policy is the 
emphasis placed on officers to consult with supervisors and the requirement to 
record the reason for non-arrest, if they are contemplating action other than 
arrest whenever there is sufficient evidence of an offence (1998:7.1). With 
respect to victim support and protection, the 1998 policy emphasises the need 
for all victims of family violence to have access to appropriate and timely 
support and information about services and remedies, and for referrals to 
specific support services to be made as soon as possible after the event 
(1998:10.2). Following the 1998 policy, a Memorandum of Understand (MOU) 
has been established between the police and the New Zealand Council of 
Victim Support Groups. This is a formal recognition of the relationship between 
the police and victim service agencies, and the agreement sets out the 
responsibilities of the various parties in providing adequate support for victims 
of family violence.  
 
Summary 
The adoption of pro-arrest (and sometimes mandatory arrest) family violence 
policies by police departments throughout the U.S., the U.K., and New Zealand 
in the 1980s, signalled a significant shift in philosophy. Prior to such changes 
occurring, the police tended to follow a minimalist interventionist approach, 
which was clearly ineffective. However, largely as a result of the Minneapolis 
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Experiment, police organisations were provided with the impetus for exacting 
change, and this resulted in the widespread adoption of pro-arrest policies. 
While police family violence policies continue to evolve to this day25, the pro-
arrest philosophy underpinning most, has remained largely unchanged. 
However, despite management’s commitment to introducing pro-arrest policies, 
and consequently to changing the attitudes and practices of their officers, a 
number of implementation issues have emerged. Irrespective of the level of 
support for the policy, it appears that few police departments in the U.S., the 
U.K., or NZ, have been particularly successful in fully introducing pro-arrest 
policies. While some police organisations have had a measure of success in 
changing some aspects of police practice, exacting change at the street-level is 
a complex process. Furthermore, while police managers in all three countries 
appear to be committed to the pro-arrest approach, the fact remains that such 
support is not always evident out on the streets. While situational contingencies 
may make it difficult for frontline officers to implement the policy as intended, it 
is also clear that some officers do not support the pro-arrest approach, and this 
will inevitably affect their willingness to follow the policy strictly. 
 
Indeed, it appears that many of the problems discussed within this chapter, 
stem from the fact that frontline officers are still able to exercise considerable 
                                                 
25 For example, since the current research was carried out, there have been a number of developments in 
the police response to family violence, primarily with respect to the multi-agency approach. For example, 
in 2005, Family Safety Teams were established in four locations throughout New Zealand: 
Hamilton/Auckland (May 2005), Wairarapa/Hutt Valley (May 2005), Christchurch (July 2005), and 
Counties Manakau (July 2005). These teams have been established for the purpose of providing an 
integrated multi-disciplinary response to family violence and child protection, and they involve 
representatives from a number of statutory and non-statutory organizations, such as Women’s Refuge, 
Child, Youth and Family and so on. Essentially, these teams are responsible for identifying gaps in 
service delivery, monitoring and evaluating practice and systems, developing new practices and systemic 
change, and pro-active advocacy and intervention. In Canterbury, there has also been the establishment 
of a monthly roundtable, involving police and Women’s Refuge representatives. Although these 
developments have certainly been important for enhancing the multi-agency approach, there appears to 
have been few developments in terms of how frontline officers respond to family violence, although I am 
aware that since the introduction of a new family violence coordinator in August 2004, there have been 
some changes with respect to training. In particular, this coordinator has introduced a new training 
package for new recruits, where the principal features of the family violence policy are addressed, and 
what the requirements of the policy are. This appears to be particularly important given that most new 
recruits have reported little training at the police college with respect to family violence.  
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discretion under pro-arrest policies. Not only do officers use their discretion in 
determining how the policy is applied, but how they respond to domestic 
incidents in general. It should therefore not be overly surprising that pro-arrest 
policies have not translated into the increased use of arrest. While such policies 
certainly appear to have influenced officers’ willingness to positively intervene in 
domestic incidents, ultimately, individual officers will decide how to frame their 
intervention accordingly, and this will not necessarily be contingent on the 
formal policies of the police organisation. Drawing on the Christchurch 
experience, as the next two chapters will show, there are a number of reasons 
(both legitimate and illegitimate) why the pro-arrest policy is difficult to 
implement in practice. 
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Chapter four: The pro-arrest family violence 
policy in practice 
 
Introduction 
Although the introduction of a pro-arrest family violence policy in New Zealand 
in 1987 signalled a more proactive approach to family violence, as the previous 
chapter has illustrated, implementing pro-arrest policies at the ground level has 
generally been less successful than anticipated. Whilst the pro-arrest policy has 
been in force in New Zealand for over 17 years now, its implementation, at both 
the local and national level, has been incomplete. However, New Zealand is not 
alone here, as other police jurisdictions in the U.S. and U.K. have also 
experienced difficulties applying the policy in practice. As the previous chapter 
highlighted, it is clear that what works in theory, does not always work in 
practice. Indeed, as a number of implementation theorists (e.g. Heywood, 1997; 
Lipsky, 1980) have concluded, there is often a gulf between decision and 
delivery, and implementing policy as intended is often a complex task. 
Consequently, most of the issues discussed within this chapter (and the next) 
relate to the disjuncture between the pro-arrest policy in theory, and its actual 
practical application. 
 
As with previous research, both nationally and internationally, a number of 
issues relating to the implementation of the current family violence policy in 
Christchurch have been identified in this study. Many of these issues stem from 
the emphasis placed on arresting family violence offenders. However, it is 
important to note that this research is not concerned with whether pro-arrest 
policies are indeed effective for reducing future violence. Instead, the focus is 
on whether the Canterbury family violence policy, like pro-arrest family violence 
policies elsewhere, has been effectively implemented, and particular attention is 
paid to the difficulties faced by the police in applying the policy at the street-
level. Consequently, this chapter addresses some of the reasons why arrest is 
not used more regularly, and what legitimate variables influence the arrest 
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decision.  Additionally, this chapter discusses how officer discretion may affect 
the arrest decision, and ultimately, how it might explain the incongruity between 
the family violence policy in theory and in practice. 
 
What constitutes successful implementation? 
It is clear that the adoption of pro-arrest policies was based on the premise that 
arrest would decrease offender recidivism, and thus reduce the incidence of 
family violence in general. However, it is also apparent that such policies were 
expected to result in a more serious police response to family violence. In other 
words, the adoption of pro-arrest policies was intended to increase officers’ 
willingness to arrest family violence offenders, whereas in the past, emphasis 
was on minimal intervention.  
 
Although there are a number of national and international studies that have 
evaluated whether these pro-arrest policies have been successfully 
implemented (e.g. Ferraro, 1989; Lawrenz et.al, 1988; Jones and Belknap, 
1999) these studies have generally failed to define what constitutes successful 
implementation in the first place. They have, however, tended to point to arrest 
rates and policy compliance as markers of success. In other words, increased 
arrest rates have been used to show that family violence has been treated more 
seriously since the introduction of pro-arrest policies, and that more offenders 
have been arrested as a consequence. Policy compliance has been gauged to 
indicate whether, and to what extent, specific aspects of the policy have been 
effectively implemented at the street-level.  
 
Defining successful implementation is certainly complex business, and as 
Meyers and Vorsanger (2003) point out, there are a number of difficulties 
inherent in evaluating whether implementation is successful. Primarily, there are 
differences in the political, organisational, technical, and other contexts affecting 
a policy’s implementation, which means a single standard of success is not 
 89
applicable. Consequently, what constitutes success in one context may be 
construed as unsuccessful in another. As Meyers and Vorsanger argue: 
The same front-line decisions and actions that represent cooperation in 
one implementation context may reflect shirking or even sabotage in 
another (2003:252). 
 
When management in the current study was asked what constituted successful 
implementation for the Christchurch Police, there was no response, which 
suggests that defining success is indeed difficult, even within a specific context. 
Given the problems inherent in defining successful implementation, success in 
the context of the current research is gauged in terms of arrest rates and policy 
compliance with the arrest provision, which does not mean that other markers 
of success (e.g. recidivist rates, victim satisfaction) are not used to assess 
success in other policy areas.  Thus, when assessing whether or not the pro-
arrest policy has been successfully implemented, we are essentially referring to 
whether a) the police response to family violence is more serious; b) officers are 
more willing to arrest offenders; c) whether specific provisions within the family 
violence policy are being complied with.  
 
Arrest rates 
While policymakers and other interest groups expected the adoption of pro-
arrest family violence policies to increase the use of arrest, the arrest rate has 
not increased to the extent anticipated. Some researchers in the United States 
(e.g. Ferraro, 1989) for instance, have argued that despite police departments 
introducing pro-arrest or mandatory arrest policies, many officers still appear to 
frame their intervention26 in domestic incidents by other means (i.e. warning 
and/or separation). As Lawrenz et.al (1988:498) point out, even when 
management emphasise the beneficial results of arrest, daily arrest patterns 
change little. Thus, irrespective of the support demonstrated throughout all 
                                                 
26Drawing on Goffman, Marshall (1998:238) defines a frame as “definitions of the situation [that] are 
built up in accordance with the principles of organization which govern events…and our subjective 
involvement in them.”. Frame their intervention in this context essentially means officers decide how 
they will resolve the situation – i.e. through formal means- e.g. arrest, or informal means – e.g. warnings. 
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levels of the organisation for the policy, arrest rates have not changed 
considerably since pro-arrest policies were introduced. The situation is by no 
means different for the Christchurch police. 
 
Two main police sources are drawn on for ascertaining arrest rates for family 
violence incidents in Christchurch: CARD27 data, and POL 400 forms (see 
chapter two). As table 1 shows, the breakdown of 462 domestic incidents28 
recorded on the CARD data for August 2004 shows that 69 arrests were made, 
producing an arrest rate of 14.9% for this one-month period. Comparatively, 
257 incidents were reported (K6), and 136 recorded as police presence 
sufficient (K1) 29. In contrast, as table 2 shows, according to the POL 400 data 
(n=313) from the same time period, only 8.9% of incidents reported an arrest 
(K9). However, it also should be noted that not all of the POL 400s were 
collected during this period, and there were also a small number (4.5%) where 
the police action was unknown. Despite this, it is worth noting that most 
domestic incidents police attended during this period, were only reported (K6)30, 
and did not result in an arrest (CARD data = 55.6%; POL 400 data = 86.5%). 
On initial inspection, it appears that most incidents do not result in arrest, but 
are rather cleared as K6 – i.e. resolved through mediation and separation. 
 
                                                 
27 As discussed later in chapter two, CARD refers to the Computer-Assisted Resource Deployment 
system, which is used to record all possible domestic related incidents police attend on a weekly basis. It 
also includes information such as the time of the incident, which police unit responded etc… 
28 These 462 incidents do not refer solely to incidents involving offences, but all incidents coded as 
‘domestic related’ by the Communications Centre.  
29 K1= police presence sufficient. This refers to incidents that theoretically do not involve any criminal 
offence, and the incident is not formally recorded by way of POL 400. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that all incidents resulted as K1 are non-criminal events. For example, one incident 
observed in the current study involved a sergeant resulting the event as K1 even though the victim had 
injuries (i.e. bruising and bleeding), and there was considerable damage to the victim’s car. The offender 
could not be located at the scene, and after the offender’s younger brother turned up, the sergeant became 
frustrated, and the decision was made to withdraw from the scene without resolving the situation, and the 
incident was subsequently resulted as K1 – not domestic related, and no offence committed. As this 
incident exemplifies, officers sometimes do result incidents involving criminal offences as K1, despite 
policy strongly indicating that this is not to happen. 
30 Incidents resulted as K6 means that either offences were not committed, or there was insufficient 
evidence for an arrest to occur, but the incident is formally recorded via POL 400, and the information is 
subsequently placed on the family violence database. Similarly, incidents resulted as K9 indicate that an 
arrest is made, and the incident is formally recorded on a POL 400 and on the family violence database. 
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Table 1 Arrest rates – CARD data August 2004 
 
Result code 31 Number Percentage % *
K1 136 29.0 
K6 257 56.0 
K9 69 15.0 
Total 462 100% 
 
* Percentages rounded to nearest percent 
 
 
Table 2   Action taken (arrest rates) – POL 400 data August 2004 
(n=313) 
 
Action/result # % * 
K6 271 87.0 
K9 28 9.0 
Unknown 14 4.0 
Total 313 100 
* Percentages rounded to nearest percent 
While these arrest rates for Christchurch appear relatively low, they closely 
correspond to those generated by other researchers within New Zealand, and 
internationally as well. For example, Busch and Robertson (1992), in their 1992 
New Zealand-wide study, found an arrest rate of 14.3%. Similarly, Ford (1993), 
in his survey of three New Zealand districts, also found an arrest rate of 14.3%. 
In the U.S., Ferraro’s (1980), study of the Phoenix, Arizona Police Department, 
found arrests were only being made in 15% of cases, and even the Minneapolis 
Police Department ( the original site of the Minneapolis Experiment), recorded 
arrests at a rate of 14.6% in 1986 (cited in Buzawa, 1988:99).  Thus, even 
though the Christchurch arrest rate for the month of August 2004 may seem 
low, in comparison to other jurisdictions, we can conclude that it is relatively 
“normal”. From this we can also conclude that arrest is the least used police 
response, not only in Christchurch, but in other localities as well (including 
                                                 
31 Although there are 9 possible result codes that can be used, the result codes K1, K6, and K9 are the 
most commonly used ones. According to the family violence policy however, family violence incidents 
can only be resulted as K6 or K9. Nevertheless, at times, the result code K3 is sometimes used, which 
means that the incident is offence free.  
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overseas). The majority of family violence offenders are not arrested32, but 
rather warned and temporarily separated from their victims.  
  
The practice of arresting offenders 
The 1998 Canterbury family violence policy requires that offenders are held 
accountable for their violence, and in many respects this accountability occurs 
when they are arrested and brought into the criminal justice system. Arresting 
domestic violence offenders not only removes them from the situation, thereby 
ensuring victims’ short-term safety, but charging perpetrators also places them 
in front of a court (in most circumstances). While the arrest and subsequent 
detention might punish the offender in the short-term (i.e. by taking away their 
freedom), the long-term sanctions imposed by the court – i.e. imprisonment or 
non-custodial sentences (e.g. community service, fine), are likely to ensure 
offenders are truly held accountable for their violence. The emphasis therefore, 
does not appear to centre on arresting perpetrators per se, but bringing 
offenders into the criminal justice system in order to impose sanctions on their 
behaviour.  
 
The arrest provision in the 1998 Canterbury family violence policy, states: 
Providing there is sufficient evidence, offenders who commit Family 
Violence [sic] assaults or related offences shall, except in exceptional  
circumstances, be arrested as soon as practicable. In the rare case where 
there is sufficient evidence but action other than arrest is contemplated, 
the member’s supervisor must be consulted, and the reason for non-arrest 
recorded (1998 Canterbury family violence policy:7:1, emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, in theory, when an offence is committed, and there is sufficient 
evidence to support making an arrest, the expectation is that officers will arrest, 
and non-arrests will only occur rarely.  
 
                                                 
32 Some overseas studies have shown that compared to physical assaults committed by strangers, the 
arrest rate for family violence assaults is actually considerably higher in most cases (for example, see 
Dunrose et.al, 2005; Felson and Ackerman, 2001).  
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Unlike the situation under the Domestic Protection Act 198233, where officers 
had the power to detain offenders without charge, under the Domestic Violence 
Act 1995, no such provision applies. This means that if officers take an offender 
into custody, he/she must be charged. The emphasis once again, is not on the 
short-term removal of the offender from the scene (since this can be achieved 
through the separation of the parties), but placing the offender into the criminal 
justice system.  
 
In line with policy, most managers expect that frontline officers will arrest 
domestic violence offenders whenever offences are identified, and evidence 
supports such action, as the following comments from managers illustrate: 
…within all reason…you know, looking at the circumstances…if there’s an 
offence been committed [offenders] should be arrested. 
 
….the policy is any offence involving family violence you arrest regardless, 
and that’s the general policy we have. 
 
If you attend a family violence incident and there’s evidence of family 
violence, you arrest. If you attend a family violence incident and there’s a 
complaint, either by the spouse or a sibling of the family, that you arrest 
them, and that’s a policy. 
 
…we will arrest if there’s evidence of a crime, gather the evidence, and put 
the person before the court. 
 
As these comments illustrate, whenever there is evidence of an offence, the 
offender should be arrested. At the same time, however, the type of evidence 
needed to justify an arrest is often unclear, and may differ from situation to 
situation. Whether the level required relates to that needed for the case to 
proceed to court, or merely to justify taking away someone’s liberty, is not 
explicitly stated. However, it appears that management’s expectations are that 
offenders will be arrested, and that the arrest decision will not be dependent on 
                                                 
33 As the previous chapter discussed, under the Domestic Protection Act 1982, the police had the power 
to detain offenders without charge for a period of 24 hours. This was viewed as an enforced ‘cooling-
down’ period. 
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whether officers believe the arrest is necessary, but if the evidence supports 
this action.  
 
Similarly, most of the frontline officers spoken to agreed with management’s 
expectations: 
If we can prove an offence has been committed, then we will arrest. 
-M33 
 
If the evidence says arrest is warranted, then you really have to do it.  
– M38 
 
You have to look for an offence, and you have to have evidence, otherwise 
you won’t arrest. –M31 
 
 If there is evidence of an offence, I will arrest them. –M31 
 
However, while arresting offenders appears relatively straight-forward when the 
necessary factors are there (i.e. evidence of an offence being committed), the 
fact remains that domestic incidents are complex, and arrest is not always 
applicable. Issues relating to the exercise of discretion and its effect on the 
implementation process will be explored, utilising Lipsky’s (1980) theory of 
street-level bureaucracy 
 
 
Street-level bureaucracy 
Street-level bureaucracies are organisations such as schools, police and 
welfare departments, “whose workers interact with and have wide discretion 
over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public sanctions (Lipsky, 
1980:xi). Street-level bureaucrats, in turn, therefore, are public service workers 
who interact with citizens directly on a daily basis (Lipsky, 1980), and who are 
responsible for reducing the citizen’s demands, and categorising the individual 
accordingly. As such, street-level bureaucrats34 such as frontline police officers, 
first determine what the client’s needs are, and then define what treatment the 
                                                 
34 Throughout this thesis, the terms street-level bureaucrat and frontline officer will be used 
interchangeably.  
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citizen is to receive from the bureaucracy (Prottas, 1978). In doing so, as Lipsky 
(1980) points out, street-level bureaucrats exercise considerable discretion over 
whether the client should receive the service they demand, and the nature of 
that service. This theory is particularly useful for understanding problems with 
implementing policies, especially in organisations such as the police, where 
frontline officers exercise considerable discretion. 
  
Why discretion is important 
It has long been recognised that frontline officers exercise considerable 
discretion during the course of carrying out their work (e.g. Manning and van 
Maanen, 1978; Goldstein, 1967; Reiss Jr, 1971). Furthermore, it has long been 
established that officers often employ their discretionary power when it comes 
to the arrest decision (e.g. Manning, 2003; Kleinig, 1996; Reiss Jr, 1996). 
Although there are numerous competing definitions as to what constitutes 
discretion, at its basic level, discretion refers to the power to make choices 
among alternative (and often competing) lines of action, which can be justified 
as being legitimate, and exercised within the effective limits of the individual 
officer’s power (Feldman, 1992; Davis,1974, cited in Adler and Asquith, 1981). 
In the context of family violence, we are essentially referring to an officer’s 
decision to arrest an offender. However, in general, officers also have 
considerable discretion in determining the level and quality of service they 
provide to their clients – i.e. citizens.  
The hierarchical nature of the police organisation means that formal rules and 
policies are often (if not always) constructed by those in the top echelon, and 
those at the bottom of the organisational structure, the frontline officers, are 
responsible for following the rules and applying them out on the streets. 
However, which rules apply and how they should be applied, is often a 
complicated process, particularly given the nature of police policies (and 
policies in general). As Lipsky (1980) points out, discretion is characteristic of 
street-level bureaucrats’ work, because: 
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The essence of street-level bureaucracies is that they require people to 
make decisions about other people. Street-level bureaucrats have 
discretion because the nature of service provision calls for human 
judgment that cannot be programmed and for which machines cannot 
substitute. Street-level bureaucrats have responsibility for making unique 
and fully appropriate responses to individual clients and their situations. It 
is the nature of what we call human services that the unique aspects of 
people and their situations will be apprehended by public service workers 
and translated into courses of action responsive to each case within (more 
or less broad) limits imposed by their agencies (1980:161). 
 
In other words, street-level bureaucrats, such as frontline officers, need to be 
flexible to individual clients and individual circumstances, yet police policy, and 
indeed the law, assumes that citizens will be treated in a similar manner, when 
clearly this is not realistic. Thus the need for discretion arises largely out of the 
limitations of policy and the broad and multitudinous nature of organisational 
rules in the first place.  As Prottas (1978) points out, although a few rules are 
given ‘de facto’ priority and are therefore obeyed more regularly, the fact 
remains that the rest are meant to be equally obeyed, yet obviously cannot be 
(1978:295).  Similarly, Allen (1984) contends that discretion (relating to policy), 
arises because of: 
…the unresolvable conflict in our culture between the desire to give 
authoritative guidelines in the form of clear, specific, coherent, and rational 
“rules” and the impossibility of doing so… The universe of social 
interaction is incredibly, indeed unknowably, complex. Each person 
operates in a web of relationships with enormous numbers of objects, 
people, and institutions in ever-changing combinations and 
permutations…What occurs when we write rules to govern social 
interactions is that the necessary simplicity of the rule clashes with the 
complexity of human experience…(1984:2-3). 
 
Other researchers (e.g. Lipsky, 1980; Manning and van Maanen, 1978) have 
pointed out that policy is often incapable of providing adequate instruction to 
officers on how to deal with every situation: 
… street-level bureaucrats often work in situations too complicated to 
reduce to programmatic formats. Policemen cannot carry around 
instructions on how to intervene with citizens, particularly in hostile 
encounters. Indeed, they would probably not go out on the street if such 
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instructions were promulgated, or they would refuse to intervene in 
potentially dangerous situations (Lipsky, 1980:15).  
 
Similarly, Manning and van Maanen (1978) contend: 
…it would be a mistake to assume that policies can be found that will 
provide meaningful guides to action in most situations of real or potential 
disorder. The most feasible rules perhaps are those which tell the 
patrolman what not to do…But relatively few rules can be devised that tell 
a patrolman what he should do with quarrelling lovers, angry neighbors, or 
disputatious drunks. This is not because the police have had little 
experience with such matters (on the contrary!) or even because they do 
know in a given case what to do (they may), but because so much 
depends on the particular circumstances of time, place, event and 
personality (1978:67). 
 
In other words, rules cannot dictate officer behaviour, it merely guides it, and 
even this is limited by the fact that rules cannot always be applied to specific 
contexts. Thus, while the weaknesses of formal rules and policies certainly 
provide a foundation for discretion to exist in the first place, it is also clear that 
the very nature of police work itself also contributes to the development and 
maintenance of discretionary decision-making.  
 
The nature of police work 
Policing is a highly unpredictable activity that is fraught with danger, uncertainty, 
and complexity. The policing of family violence specifically is by no means a 
straight-forward activity, particularly since such incidents are often highly 
volatile. As most frontline officers spoken to in this study continually stressed, 
domestic incidents are complex, multi-faceted, and consequently, a universal 
response is often inappropriate for dealing with the specificities of individual 
incidents. Thus, discretion is fundamental to frontline officers, precisely because 
it allows them to respond flexibly to individual circumstances, Similarly, as a 
number of managers pointed out, officers need some level of discretion (albeit 
closely circumscribed), as the following comments illustrate: 
…every incident is different and we have to (have discretion), the policy 
should give us some guidelines on how to deal with things, but I think 
we’ve got to rely on the fact that our officers are individuals, and they will 
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treat things, and see things differently, and you can’t have something 
written down that says, “thou shalt do this every time you attend this.” 
Because it just doesn’t work like that. There will always be an exception to 
the rule, and if you use that exception then are you breaking the rules? 
 
…you can’t have policy dictating too much. You’ve got to sort of have it at 
a fairly high level with a lot of open doors, because you just can’t say you’ll 
do this, because there’s a lot of situations in there where you’ve gotta be 
flexible depending on the circumstances. You just can’t have a hard and 
fast rule… 
 
…the constable on the street has to make up his own mind, and obviously 
governed by policy, but he’s got to use his own initiative and be satisfied 
that a clear-cut offence has been committed, to make the arrest….because 
for the cop on the coalface, he has got to have the initiative and the 
discretion to make that decision, and there’s always two sides to a story, 
it’s never always that clear-cut. 
 
Discretion is also important for frontline officers, not only because of the nature 
of their work, but the expectations citizens make of them. When officers attend 
domestic incidents involving a complainant and alleged offender, they must 
decide not only whether to overlook or sanction the behaviour, but also how 
they will intervene in a relatively small time frame. In contrast to judicial 
decision-making, where no such time limits are imposed, officers have to make 
on-the- spot assessments. Thus, as Reiss Jr (1971:130) points out, although a 
lawyer or judge may take a long time reviewing officers’ decisions, the latter 
often work under considerable time constraints, and consequently, they must 
make a quick decision as to what to do, if anything, about the situation. As one 
manager commented: 
…it’s a big onus on a constable, to make that decision to arrest. It’s got to 
be a big judgement, and it’s going to take months to get dragged through 
the courts, and the courts can have all the time to make the decisions and 
all that… while the cop on the street’s got a few minutes to make that 
decision whether to arrest or not arrest, and yeah, he’s got to weigh it all 
up very quickly, and it’s a hell of a situation. 
 
Similarly, as George Kirkham once stated: 
As a police officer,…I found myself forced to make the most critical 
choices in a time frame of seconds rather than days: to shoot or not to 
 99
shoot, to arrest or not to arrest, to give chase or to let go – always with a 
nagging certainty that others, those with great amounts of time in which to 
analyse and think, stood ready to judge and condemn me for whatever 
action I might take or fail to take…(cited in Lipsky, 1980:32). 
 
As we can see, there are a number of valid reasons why officers must exercise 
discretion. Thus, while frontline officers have little control over what incidents 
they are sent to, they have considerable autonomy in deciding how that 
intervention is framed (Manning, 2003), irrespective of what policy or rules may 
apply. Discretion may be used to determine the nature of the incident, and 
what, if any rules, are relevant to it (Kleinig, 1996), whether they should be 
applied to that particular situation, and what sanctions are most suitable. In 
short, officers have considerable discretion in determining whose behaviour to 
sanction, and whose to overlook.  
 
Why discretion is necessary in domestic incidents 
While arrest is certainly applicable (and mandated by policy) when offences 
have been committed, the fact remains that arrest is not always appropriate, 
and in many cases, not even applicable for a number of reasons. Firstly, not all 
domestic incidents involve offences. In fact, the majority of incidents police 
attend do not involve the use (or even threat) of violence, only verbal 
altercations. As one frontline officer commented: 
A lot of domestics aren’t domestics – just normal arguments that couples 
have. –M29 
 
Although most frontline officers support arresting family violence offenders if 
violence has been used, and there is evidence of this, most officers seem 
unprepared to arrest for verbal arguments alone. As a couple of frontline 
officers stated: 
Most couples have arguments, but they’re mainly verbal. If it gets to the 
point where we’re arresting couples for normal couple stuff (i.e. verbal 
arguments) it’s not good. –M29 
 
If it’s not serious, and it’s just verbal, you don’t want to antagonise things 
by arresting someone. –M31 
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Additionally, even when an assault may have taken place, discretion is 
important, since there are varying levels of assault. As one frontline officer 
commented, discretion is important, because “…a push is considered assault – 
do you lock them up for that?” (M44).  
 
Secondly, not all ‘domestic incidents’ are actually domestic-related. As one 
manager commented, sometimes what is coded as a domestic by the 
Communications Centre is not actually related to family violence. For example, 
someone may ring the police, and all the Communications Centre can hear is 
arguing in the background, but there will be no-one on the phone: 
…and it could be a kid playing on the phone, mum and dad shouting, 
doing something in the background, or the television being turned up, and 
they (Communications Centre) enter it as family violence. Alternatively, 
someone will pick up a phone, dial 111, and it will be a party, and they’ll 
enter it as family violence, ‘cos they hear a lot of noise. Or someone rings 
up, and [the Communications Centre] enters it as family violence, but it’s a 
complete stranger on the doorstep who’s trespassing… 
 
Thus, even though the Communications Centre initially codes these types of 
incidents as “family violence incidents”, they are not in fact domestic-related, 
consequently negating the need for an arrest. 
 
Thirdly, domestic incidents, by their very nature, are rarely straight-forward, and 
the family violence policy can not always be easily applied to specific 
circumstances. As Worden (1989) points out: 
Disputes are complex situations that require for their resolution a 
consideration of seemingly infinite contingencies including the following: 
What is the subject of the dispute? What is the relationship of the 
disputants? Is the dispute rooted in previous and more deeply seated 
conflicts, or is it a discrete episode? What do the disputants want of the 
police (e.g., to leave, to make an arrest)? What is the potential for 
violence? Is one or more of the disputants intoxicated? Because disputes 
are so complex, police administrators are hard-pressed to specify clearly 
the courses of action that officers should take in resolving disputes 
(1989:676). 
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The arrest decision is further complicated by the fact that establishing whether 
an offence has taken place, and gathering enough evidence is not always an 
easy matter. As some frontline officers argued: 
The difficulty for us (i.e. the police) is that we go to things like this (i.e. 
domestic incidents), and they just don’t want to talk to you, they don’t want 
to make a complaint – they just don’t want to know you. If someone 
doesn’t want to talk to you, then it makes it difficult (to arrest), unless there 
is obvious evidence. –F31 
 
Domestic violence is not clear-cut, and quite often when we get there we 
don’t get all the information as some people are willing to talk, and others 
aren’t. It’s a bit hard to get a full picture of what has been going on when 
both parties don’t talk…Discretion is important based on the fact that one 
party might be willing to talk and the other might not. –F32 
 
Furthermore, the presence of alcohol (which is usually an aggravating factor, 
according to a number of frontline officers and managers spoken to), may also 
make it difficult to determine whether an offence has been committed or not. As 
one manager commented: 
…a lot of [the] time, one or both parties are intoxicated, and it’s really hard 
to get to the bottom or find out what exactly has gone on. 
 
A lack of information and/or a loss of cooperation undoubtedly complicate the 
job of frontline officers. While officers can gather some information 
independently of the individuals involved in the encounter – i.e. noting any 
visible injuries, or disturbances to furniture, it is hard for officers to make 
appropriate decisions if all the necessary information is unavailable. 
Furthermore, officers may have difficulty proving in court, that the evidence is 
actually indicative of a crime having been committed, and not the result of some 
other circumstance.  
 
Additionally, not all incidents involve a sufficient level of evidence to support the 
arrest decision, and although arrests are sometimes made without the 
necessary evidence, this practice leaves the police as an organisation open to 
external criticism. For example, a newspaper article featured in The Press 
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(Thomas, November 22, 2004:A1) criticised the police for failing to properly 
investigate violence cases, which subsequently resulted in poor conviction 
rates. Convictions for violent crimes, such as family violence often sat at around 
the 49% mark, compared to an average conviction rate of 66% for all other 
crimes. As Nigel Hampton, QC, a Just Cause spokesman cited in the article 
pointed out: 
They (police) send cases to court without thorough investigation which end 
up falling down (Thomas, The Press, November 22, 2004:A1). 
  
Management also appears acutely aware of this, as one manager commented: 
…if there’s not enough evidence, then there’s no point us charging 
someone, because it would just be a waste of time. 
 
Furthermore, even when it comes to arresting offenders who have breached 
protection orders, the law allows officers to exercise a degree of discretion. For 
example, under the Domestic Violence Act 1995, any breach of a protection 
order35 constitutes a criminal offence, and the police are empowered to arrest, 
without warrant, any person they reasonably suspect of having committed a 
breach of the order (Domestic Violence Act 1995:50:1). However, the Act also 
states that in considering whether a person should be arrested, the police must 
take into account a number of factors: 1) the risk to the safety of any protected 
person if the arrest is not made; 2) the seriousness of the alleged breach; 3) the 
length of time since the alleged breach occurred; and 4) the restraining effect 
on the person liable to be arrested (Domestic Violence Act 1995:50:2). The 
police policy with respect to breaches of protection orders reflects this 
legislation. Thus, while it may be easy to assume that every breach of a 
protection order will result in the arrest of the offender, officers are clearly 
allowed, by virtue of the legislation, to decide whether or not the arrest is 
necessary or justified. Furthermore, if officers do arrest for breaches of 
protection orders, their decision-making will be evaluated on the basis of some 
or all of these conditions being met. At the same time, however, breaches which 
                                                 
35 As discussed in the previous chapter, a protection order is a form of court-ordered protection for 
victims. 
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do not result in an arrest will not necessarily be subject to the same level of 
scrutiny (if at all). 
 
Finally, discretion is particularly important if the incident involves mutual abuse. 
Although domestic incidents usually involve one victim and one offender, 
incidents involving individuals as both offenders and victims are not uncommon. 
In fact, some frontline officers believe that incidents of mutual abuse constitute 
a high proportion of incidents they attend. While officers’ decision-making is 
relatively uncomplicated if one party has clearly committed an offence against 
another, if both parties have injuries, and/or both are making complaints, 
officers clearly must use their discretion in determining what, if any, action to 
take. The level of discretion afforded to responding officers is further facilitated 
by the fact that the family violence policy does not address issues of mutual 
abuse. Consequently, there is no official directive as to how officers should 
respond to mutual assaults (although such issues may be addressed during 
training sessions). 
 
The blurring of victim and offender roles makes the task of the responding 
officers particularly difficult, especially if independent evidence is lacking. As 
some managers pointed out: 
It sounds so easy, sitting in here, it sounds so easy that you know you can 
sort it all out. It’s sometimes bloody difficult, and you do get situations 
where, well a police constable goes along and both lots are making 
allegations of assault against the other and, very difficult to sort out who’s 
right and who’s wrong, who’s the cause of it, who hit who first, and whether 
there are any other particular assaults [that] are more serious than the 
other and should be dealt with, and shouldn’t be.  
 
…it might be that you run ragged all night because you’re going from job to 
job to job, and you’re now at this domestic and you can’t work out, well 
who’s the perpetrator, who’s not? They’ve both assaulted each other, 
should I leave them here to carry on fighting and just walk away from it, or 
should I lock them both up and get them both out of the scene? You know, 
you’ve got to weigh it all up when you go [sic] there. 
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The situation is further complicated when issues of self defence are considered. 
As one manager stated: 
…if someone hits someone over the head with a frying pan because she 
or he was fearful for their lives because the other one was attacking them, 
that’s self-defence. You’ve got to weight it all up when you’re there. 
 
While individuals have the legal right to defend themselves (Crimes Act 1961: 
section 62), the force used must be considered “reasonable.” Thus, as another 
manager pointed out: 
…it’s the degree of force too that takes precedence. So if you get 
someone gently pushing a person, and he [sic] beats you up, they don’t 
cancel. It’s difficult. 
 
Although the family violence policy provides no guidance for situations involving 
mutual abuse, it appears that some managers expect officers to identify the 
primary perpetrator, and arrest them if circumstances warrant it. As some 
managers commented: 
…if there’s an indication that one has provoked it, they will be 
arrested…Look at who started it, and generally they get arrested.  
 
If there’s evidence of a perpetrator, one who started it, they go in for 
assault, because if they’re on private property, you can’t lock them up for 
fighting. 
 
Other managers, however, supported officers taking a pragmatic approach, and 
expected that officers would separate the parties, rather than dealing with them 
through more formal means of intervention (i.e. arrest): 
…you might have to make a call and just separate them. If it’s something 
more serious, you lock them up because otherwise they’ll get back 
together and something else, more serious, could happen. 
  
I think quite often in those situations we take a pragmatic approach and 
either arrest nobody or separate people off and try and sort of resolve it in 
that way, because we just can’t know who’s the offender and who’s not the 
offender. 
 
Similarly, most of the frontline officers spoken to said that they were less likely 
to arrest in these types of incidents, preferring instead to deal with the situation 
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by separating the parties for the night, except of course, if a serious offence 
was committed: 
The short term solution is to mediate and separate the parties for the night 
if it wasn’t serious abuse. If there was an injury or evidence that a crime 
had been committed, look to arrest. If we didn’t arrest, we would be 
severely criticised by the bosses. -M29 
 
You just split them up basically. It’s pretty hard to arrest any of the parties 
if both have been fighting. Obviously if one has committed a serious 
assault- e.g. with a bottle, they’re going to get locked up. - M44 
 
If it is only verbal, then we will try to separate. Usually it’s the male that 
leaves. If he’s not prepared to leave, then we will ask the woman to leave. 
If both parties have smacked each other, then you have to look at self-
defence – whether or not one of the parties has hit back in self-
defence…You know that that sort of case won’t go to court. You need the 
compliance of one party. If there is a minor assault, it’s not really an 
offence. But if it’s a serious assault, you would look to arrest. - M31 
 
If both have been abusing each other, and there is no clear offence by one 
against the other, then we would separate rather than arrest. – F32 
 
Although in theory, both parties can be arrested, it appears that this is not the 
preferred practice for most managers and frontline officers, as the following 
comments illustrate: 
In the end, it’s a balance call. We’re not going to arrest both parties, 
because that’s an impractical solution. – M33 
  
To be honest, I can’t really think why you would arrest both parties to a 
domestic, because once one party’s arrested, the major reason for 
arresting one party would be to ensure the safety of the other, so…I can’t 
really see why you would need to arrest both… -manager 
 
Other managers and frontline officers however, could see no reason why the 
family violence policy is not applied equally to both parties, and a dual arrest36 
made. As two managers commented: 
                                                 
36 In specific states within the U.S., where police departments work from a mandatory arrest policy, 
issues of dual arrest have emerged. Concern about the use of dual arrests has largely resulted from the 
increasing number of women being arrested along with their partners. Some (e.g. Miller, 2001), have 
argued that women who engage in self-defence are inadvertently arrested, primarily because mandatory 
arrest policies direct officers to arrest someone. Thus, when the situation is not clear-cut, and it is not 
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…in theory, if there’s been crimes committed by both of them, you should 
be following the policy in respect to both of them, which could mean both 
of them get locked up. 
 
…I can see no reason why we wouldn’t arrest both parties if they’ve both 
committed offences, or charge both parties, which may mean they’re not 
both arrested, or one might be arrested at the time. 
 
Of course, arresting both parties also has its problems. Not only would two 
patrol cars be required to transport the individuals back to the station, but with 
respect to the prosecution, these individuals are occupying roles of both 
offender and victim. This can make a successful prosecution difficult to obtain, 
particularly in the absence of independent evidence, as one frontline officer 
pointed out: 
It makes it difficult in court, because you have an individual who is both an 
offender and a victim. You need the cooperation of the person as both the 
victim and offender. -F32 
 
The prosecution of cases involving mutual abuse is further complicated by the 
fact that under New Zealand law, married couples cannot be compelled to 
testify against one another.  
As we can see, incidents involving mutual abuse clearly call for officers to 
exercise discretionary judgement, and it is understandable why arrests do not 
always occur in situations such as these. While domestic incidents in general 
are complex events, incidents involving mutual abuse are even more difficult to 
police. 
 
Thus, while arrest may appear to be a relatively simple decision (i.e. arrest if 
evidence of an offence), the fact remains that such decision-making is often 
highly contingent on circumstances relating to the context of the incident, and 
the individuals involved. Furthermore, as Manning (2003) points out, although 
officers’ decisions may appear binary – arrest or not arrest, this is not entirely 
accurate. As he comments: 
                                                                                                                                                 
obvious who the offender(s)/victim(s) are, both parties are arrested, leaving the decision of 
guilt/innocence for the courts to decide.  
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…the question of how to act is equally important. Police can choose to do 
nothing, refer to other agencies, give advice, warn, threaten, formally 
caution, or arrest (2003:179). 
 
Furthermore, as Reiss Jr (1996) points out, arrest is often regarded as one of a 
number of possible courses of action that officers can take. Even when officers 
are contemplating action other than arrest, the possibility of arrest remains a 
viable option. Thus, if officers are considering warning the offender, but the 
offender suddenly becomes aggressive, an arrest may subsequently take place. 
Additionally, as Reiss Jr (1996) argues: 
…the less likely it is that any consequences will befall the officer for 
choosing among these different courses of action, the less likely it is that 
the officer will enforce the law by arrest (1996:164). 
 
In sum, the arrest decision is by no means straight-forward, and there are often 
a number of reasons why an arrest does not take place. However, it is equally 
clear that the decision to arrest may also be influenced by other factors, other 
than situational contingencies. Despite there being no consensus amongst 
researchers as to what criteria must be met for an arrest to take place, there is 
nevertheless considerable agreement that a number of legitimate variables 
come into play during officers’ decision-making process.  
 
 
Legitimate variables 
Most arrests, as previously discussed, occur when there is evidence of an 
offence. Researchers have shown that there are a number of legitimate 
variables which impact on the arrest decision, and these include: whether the 
offender is intoxicated or under the influence of drugs; the presence of injuries 
and the seriousness of those injuries; whether witnesses are present; damage 
to property; victim’s preference for arrest; and whether the offender is located at 
the scene (e.g. see Feder, 1998; Jones and Belknap, 1999; Felson and 
Ackerman, 2001). Unfortunately, there appears to be no research generated in 
New Zealand, that addresses what variables may affect the arrest decision, so 
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in many instances, research from the international context is borrowed, in order 
to discuss these issues in the current context. 
 
Whether the offender is intoxicated 
Some researchers have found that arrests are more likely to occur if the 
offender is intoxicated. As Jones and Belknap (1999) found, the only factor 
significantly related to whether any formal police action was taken, and whether 
the defendant was jailed, was the involvement of drugs and alcohol. When 
offenders are intoxicated, they may be more uncooperative once the police 
arrive, and consequently, may antagonise the responding officers. Additionally, 
because intoxicated offenders are generally less controllable, they not only 
pose a greater risk to victims, but also to the officers at the scene. In 
Christchurch, it appears that the presence of drugs or alcohol may influence the 
arrest decision, since POL 400s require officers to record the presence of either 
(factors present –see appendix 2). Indeed, as many frontline officers contend, 
alcohol is often an aggravating factor in domestic incidents.  
 
Offender’s behaviour 
A related variable which can affect the arrest decision (and related to the above 
factor), is the offender’s behaviour towards the police. As Worden (1989) states: 
In disputes, officers who believe (correctly or not) that citizens are 
disrespectful or hostile might be more inclined to rely on their coercive 
authority rather than on their personal authority, that is, to adopt coercive 
responses rather than mediating or persuading one of the disputants to 
leave….Officers who believe that citizens are respectful may be more 
willing to assume a cooperative rather than an adversarial posture vis-à-vis 
citizens. They may thus be more likely to mediate or perhaps to 
counsel…(1989:689). 
 
As Feder (1998) points out, researchers have found that the likelihood of being 
arrested increases when offenders are disrespectful toward the responding 
officer. Feder’s own study (1998:8) found that offenders who were belligerent to 
the police were six times more likely to face an arrest, compared to those 
offenders who were not. Similarly, Jones and Belknap (1999) concluded that: 
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…aggression directed at a police officer appears to be a stronger predictor 
of the arrest decision than aggression toward the victim (1999:3). 
 
Likewise, Grosman (1975) points out that the offender’s demeanour may affect 
the arrest decision: 
Police hostility and the potential for police violence are increased by their 
perception of an individual encountered as hostile, dangerous, or even as 
a “wise guy”. A wise guy is an individual who, when approached, displays 
disrespect for the police and engages in verbal abuse. That person is 
going to be handled in quite a different way from one who responds 
politely when being questioned about similar behaviour (1975:89). 
 
Also, as previously discussed, Edwards (1989) found offenders who threaten 
the police are more likely to be arrested, primarily to enforce “public 
subordination and compliance with police authority” (1989:102).  When 
offenders actually assault police officers, in most circumstances they will be 
arrested, irrespective of if any other offence is committed. For example, in one 
of the incidents recorded via POL 400 that I analysed, no offences were 
committed in relation to the initial call, but when the officers arrived, an assault 
was committed against one of the officers, and the offender was subsequently 
arrested.  
 
The presence of witnesses 
The presence of independent witnesses also appears to bear a relationship to 
the arrest decision. Indeed, as Jones and Belknap (1999) point out, some 
researchers have concluded that when the violence is witnessed by children or 
other individuals independent of the victim, the likelihood of arrest increases. As 
Felson and Ackerman (2001) comment, the presence of witnesses may help 
the police establish probable cause, and may help officers to understand what 
actually happened, particularly when different versions of events are given. As 
one manager in the current study stated: 
If you’ve got an independent witness, fine. If you haven’t, sometimes 
you’ve got one person’s word against the other. 
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Independent witnesses may not only help in clarifying the incident, but they are 
also an important evidentiary source when it comes to the prosecution. 
However, as one manager in this study commented, the presence of witnesses 
is not the sole determining factor in the arrest decision, since: 
….there’s a lot of evidential stuff you can gather when you haven’t got 
witnesses to the actual crimes. 
 
Furthermore, Felson and Ackerman (2001) point out that the presence of 
independent witnesses is less likely when it comes to family violence incidents, 
since often the offending occurs in a private context. Additionally, witnesses are 
not always reliable, and the credibility of their version of events may be affected 
by their relationship to the victim/offender or both (i.e. they do not want to “nark” 
on family), and also whether they are under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
Finally, children might be the only independent witnesses to the incident, and 
although officers may speak to the children, as one manager pointed out, this is 
usually done for ascertaining whether the offending is long-term, rather than for 
“witness” purposes. 
 
Who contacts the police 
Another interrelated factor is who first contacts the police. When the police are 
contacted by someone other than the victim (i.e. a neighbour), arrest is more 
likely to occur (Jones and Belknap, 1999). One frontline officer in the current 
study, who had policing experience in south Auckland, commented that the 
locals were used to domestics occurring - they were part of the everyday 
landscape. Thus, when the locals rang the police, officers knew it was serious. 
Some researchers (e.g. Buzawa and Buzawa, 1990) have also pointed out that 
third-party involvement in the incident makes the event more criminal and an 
issue of public order (rather than private order). However, when the police are 
called by third parties (e.g. neighbours), the police presence is often viewed as 
an unwelcome intrusion on the affected parties’ private lives. Consequently, 
officers can sometimes face a degree of hostility and anger from both parties on 
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arrival, meaning securing cooperation may be difficult. This may, in turn, affect 
the officer’s ability to arrest. 
 
Presence of offender at the scene 
The likelihood of arrest also increases if offenders are present on the scene 
once the police arrive. When offenders are not present, and cannot be easily 
located once the police arrive, the chances of being arrested at a later date are 
generally small. Indeed, with this knowledge, it appears that some offenders 
ensure that they cannot be (easily) located. As Ferraro (1989) points out, 
arrests generally cannot be made unless the offender is on the scene. Although 
warrants may be issued for the offender’s arrest at a later date, it appears that 
most arrests occur on the scene or not at all. Similarly, Feder (1998) found that 
an offender’s presence at the scene upon an officer’s arrival had the largest 
impact on the police response. For instance, offenders who were present were 
19 times more likely to be arrested than those who were not (1998:8). 
 
Victim preference for arrest 
Officers’ willingness to arrest the offender may also be affected by whether 
victims support the arrest decision. A number of researchers have concluded 
that the victim’s preference for an arrest was strongly and positively related to 
officers’ decision-making (Feder, 1998). For instance, Feder (1998) found that 
offenders whose victims preferred an arrest were 12 times more likely to be 
arrested. Similarly, Schollum’s (1996:41) survey of New Zealand police officers 
found that offenders were more likely to be warned than arrested if the victim 
did not want the offender charged (4.3% always, 15% most times, and 40.6% 
sometimes).  As Schollum states: 
It is clear that some of the reasons for the use of warnings and cautions, 
and ‘no offence disclosed’, as clearances rather than arrest, involve the 
victims…the victim may be unable or unwilling to make a complaint….or 
the victim may want police protection but not action against the 
abuser…(1996:65). 
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Likewise, Edwards (1989) found that if victims were reluctant to prosecute their 
abusers, the police were unlikely to arrest the offender. As she comments: 
…the willingness of the complainer to press charges was regarded as of 
foremost importance (in officers’ decision to make an arrest). In the 
absence of complainer commitment, the police initiated independent action 
only when the violence inflicted was unusually severe, or when the 
aggressor had threatened the police and behaved belligerently” 
(1989:102). 
 
Other researchers, however, have found that victim preference for arrest has no 
correlation with the arrest decision. As Jones and Belknap (1999) comment: 
A number of researchers found, as expected, that victims’ requests for the 
police to arrest their batterers increase the likelihood of arrest. According 
to a larger body of research, however, a considerable proportion of victims 
requesting arrest encounter officers who are unwilling to make an arrest 
(1999:3). 
 
Furthermore, as Bell (1985) argues: 
…although criminal complaints are initiated in 21 percent of the domestic 
dispute incidents reported to Ohio police jurisdictions, offenders are 
arrested in only 15 percent of these incidents (1985:51). 
 
This suggests that while victim preference for arrest may have some influence 
on the arrest decision, arrests do not always occur. For example, Choi 
(1994:98) found that in very serious cases of domestic violence (i.e. injury and 
weapon involved), officers were more likely to arrest offenders, even without 
victim requests for charges to be laid. However, as the seriousness of the 
incident decreased, victims’ requests for arrest increased the likelihood of 
officers arresting. For example, 37% of the less serious cases resulted in arrest 
when the victim requested charges, compared to the 17% of cases where the 
victim did not make such requests (Choi, 1994:98). 
 
Victim willingness to make an official complaint 
Related to the victim’s preference for arrest, is their willingness to make an 
official complaint against the victim. There is some evidence to suggest that 
officers may be more reluctant to arrest if the victims are not prepared to testify 
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against the offender in court. While some victims may support an arrest, they 
may not be willing to testify in court, believing that the initial time spent in 
custody is sufficient punishment. As Schollum (1996:65) found, if victims did not 
want police action taken against the offender, or if the victim had a history of not 
following through with their initial complaints (particularly at the court stage), 
officers were more likely to warn than arrest offenders. Similarly, as Worden 
(1989) points out: 
Officers who believe that citizens do not cooperate with the police, for 
example, by refusing to press charges or to testify in court, perceive a 
disincentive in taking legal action; while an arrest may temporarily restore 
order, prosecution often depends on the cooperation of victims and/or 
witnesses. Legal action may be a more attractive option to officers who 
believe that citizens are likely to follow through on an arrest (1989:689). 
 
Consequently, the arrest decision may be influenced by the victim’s willingness 
to testify. 
 
One manager commented that if someone reports that they have been 
assaulted, then this will usually constitute sufficient evidence for the police to 
investigate further. However, arresting solely on the basis of the complaint, and 
in the absence of corroborating evidence, does not appear to be the preferred 
practice. While the presence of an official complaint may have some bearing on 
the arrest decision, it is also clear that some frontline officers may consider the 
lack of one as a valid justification for not arresting. For example, a number of 
POL 400s had comments such as ‘no complaint from victim’, ‘nil complaint 
forthcoming’, and ‘victim…was unsure if he wanted to pursue laying a formal 
complaint against offender.’ Similarly, in the frontline officer interviews, it was 
clear that some officers based their decision to arrest largely, although not 
solely, on the presence of a complaint, and the victim’s willingness to testify in 
court, as the following comments illustrate: 
Not all domestics warrant arrest. It also depends on whether the person 
wants to make a complaint as well. – M28 
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If there’s an offence that’s been committed, and the victim is willing to 
make a complaint and go through the court processes, then we would look 
to arrest. – M28  
 
While the presence of a complaint may be necessary in most cases, as one 
manager pointed out, sometimes an arrest will be made without a complaint, 
because: 
…sometimes when you turn up, it’s serious enough that regardless of what 
the person says, you’re going to arrest anyway. 
 
Although the family violence policy states that officers do not need a complaint 
in order to make an arrest, there are a number of reasons why it occurs. While 
the initial verbal complaint (i.e. the reporting of a crime) may be sufficient 
evidence for the police to proceed with investigations, and to collect 
corroborating evidence, the fact remains that the case will be stronger in court if 
there is a formal statement or the victim is prepared to testify. Inevitably, verbal 
statements taken on the spot are considerably weaker than formal statements, 
because the former can be contested by the victim in court – i.e. the victim can 
claim that the police version of events is untrue.  
 
The presence of injuries 
The presence of injuries has also been positively related to the arrest decision. 
Loving and Farmer (cited in Choi, 1994) for instance, found that according to 
officers they surveyed, serious injury to the victim is the second most important 
factor for arrest. Similarly, Choi (1994) found that the presence of an injury was 
positively linked to the arrest decision, with arrests occurring in 57% of incidents 
where the victim was injured, compared to the 25% of arrests which occurred in 
cases where there was no injury. Feder (1998:8) also found that offenders who 
injured their victims were six times as likely to face an arrest. As Feder (1998) 
argues, the arrest decision was generally not determined by the level of 
violence used, but the consequence of that violence. As Friday et.al (1991:203) 
comment, the more serious the injury, the more likely an arrest will occur. They 
found that two-thirds of offenders who caused “some” injury to their victims 
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were arrested, whereas cases involving “possible injury” or “no injury” resulted 
in arrest in only one-third of the cases (see also Jasinski, 2003). Similarly, some 
of the frontline officers and managers spoken to in this study, stated that if there 
was evidence of an injury, then arrest was likely to occur, as the following 
comments illustrate: 
If there was an injury or evidence that a crime had been committed, you 
would look to arrest. –M29 
 
If there was no injury, you may find it [the incident] was reported on, but 
not an arrest. But if there is evidence of an injury, there generally should 
always be an arrest. - manager 
 
Other researchers, however, have found that while the presence of injuries may 
have some bearing on the arrest decision, it is by no means the deciding factor. 
As Feder (1997) argues: 
Even when there is extensive injury to the victim, studies indicate a rate of 
arrest that rarely falls outside the 11% to 23% range (1997:82). 
 
Similarly, as Jones and Belknap (1999:3) point out, although some studies have 
shown a relationship between the degree of victims’ injuries and the likelihood 
of arrest occurring, other researchers have found no correlation.  
 
Table 3 Violence used, presence of injuries, and arrests 
POL 400 data – August 2004 (n=72) 
 
 
 Presence of 
injuries 
No injuries Total 
Arrest 
made 
11 3 14 
No arrest 
made 
14 44 58 
Total 25 47 72 
 
 
The current study has also found that the presence of an injury may influence 
the arrest decision (see table 3).  According to the POL 400 data, 72 (out of 
313) incidents attended during August 2004 involved the use of violence. Of 
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these 72 incidents, 25 recorded injuries (34.7%). Of these 25 cases 
aforementioned, 11 resulted in an arrest (44%). However, 14 (56%) of these 
incidents involving the use of violence and injuries did not result in an arrest. 
This suggests that the presence of injuries may have some bearing on the 
arrest decision, but it is not the sole factor. For example, three (21.4%) of the 
arrests involving violence used, did not record any injuries to the victim. 
 
 
Additionally, as table 4 shows, of the four arrests made for breaches of 
protection orders (n=16), only two recorded injuries, yet two of the breaches 
which did not result in an arrest, also recorded injuries. Thus it is clear that the 
presence of injuries alone is not sufficient evidence to justify an arrest in most 
cases (56%); however, for some officers, the presence of injuries may be 
adequate for an arrest to occur, particularly if they are unusually severe.  
 
Table 4 Breaches of protection orders 
August 2004 (n=16) 
 
 Yes No 
 # % # % 
Arrest made 4 25 12 75 
Injuries 2 12.5 2 12.5 
 
 
Summary 
While on first inspection, the low arrest rate for family violence offenders tends 
to suggest the philosophy of arresting offenders has not translated comfortably 
into practice, this does not necessarily mean that officers are not following the 
policy. As this chapter has shown, the situational contingencies faced by 
frontline officers, often preclude formal intervention in the form of arrest. 
Furthermore, although policy assumes that the arrest decision will be (relatively) 
straightforward, the fact remains that a number of legitimate factors influence 
officers’ decision-making. Indeed, it is obvious that officers need to exercise 
considerable discretion in some cases, particularly those where it is not clear 
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whether the law has been broken, or those involving mutual abuse. Additionally, 
there are a considerable number of domestic incidents where the law clearly 
cannot be applied, thus negating the need for an arrest. 
 
Although some of the legitimate variables which may impact the arrest decision 
are not necessarily criteria which managers, or indeed the policy itself, consider 
necessary for an arrest to take place, the reality is that such factors are 
considered important for frontline officers. At the end of the day, the type of 
intervention they choose is highly dependent on (what they consider) the 
necessary criteria being met. Thus, for frontline officers, the issue is not 
necessarily whether to arrest (or not arrest), but whether, in their opinion, such 
action is justified by the circumstances. As this chapter has highlighted, officers 
take into consideration a number of legitimate factors during their decision-
making process, such as: the presence and seriousness of injuries; whether the 
offender is intoxicated, the availability of witnesses; and the seriousness of the 
offence. What variables need to be present, and which are more important than 
others is not always clear (indeed, there is considerable debate), but it is 
evident that officers may often work from different sets of criteria in the arrest 
decision.  In sum, there are a number of valid reasons why the family violence 
policy has not been successfully implemented. However, as the next chapter 
will show, the arrest decision is not always contingent on legitimate variables 
alone,, and indeed, problems with the implementation of the pro-arrest family 
violence policy cannot always be easily justified. 
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Chapter five: Selective enforcement of the 
law 
 
Introduction 
While the arrest decision is largely contingent on a number of legitimate 
variables, there is evidence that various illegitimate factors may also come into 
play during the decision-making process. Unlike the valid criteria discussed in 
the previous chapter, basing the arrest decision on illegitimate variables can be 
troubling on a number of levels. As such, this chapter addresses some of these 
‘other’ variables which may influence the arrest decision, while at the same 
time, discussing the problematic nature of such criteria in determining whether 
the criminal law (and the policy) is applied. Such factors exemplify the double-
edged nature of discretion – that is, although discretion is important and needs 
to be exercised, the fact remains that it can also be abused.  
 
Although the illegitimate exercise of discretion may partially explain the 
incongruence between policy and practice, it is apparent that some of these 
implementation problems also stem from the fact that officers resist managerial 
attempts to control. Thus, although emphasis is certainly placed on the practice 
of arresting, and the illegitimate use of discretion, this chapter also explores 
how frontline officers develop and utilise resisting strategies, particularly how 
officers control the flow of information into the organisation, and how this 
‘gatekeeper’ status is utilised as an important weapon of resistance. Thus, while 
the previous chapter discussed how discretion is used legitimately, this chapter 
focuses on how and why discretion may be used illicitly.  
 
Legitimate vs. illegitimate discretion 
As the previous chapter has illustrated, there are a number of circumstances 
necessitating the need for officers to use their discretion. However, discretion is 
not always exercised legitimately; that is, sometimes officers use their discretion 
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in a discriminatory fashion, basing the arrest decision not on legitimate criteria, 
but on a number of illicit variables. As such, it is important to distinguish 
between the two. 
What distinguishes legitimate discretion from its illegitimate counterpart is often 
a fine line, but it largely comes down to three factors. Firstly, legitimate 
discretion is exercised within the regulatory boundaries of the police 
organisation. In other words, discretion is afforded to frontline officers by virtue 
of policy provisions, or legislative stipulations. Secondly, legitimate discretion 
can be easily justified, normally by the situational contingencies of the incident 
(e.g. insufficient evidence, conflicting stories etc.). Thirdly, discretion is 
exercised legitimately if it is used to benefit the citizens (especially victims) 
involved in the encounter. 
 
Discretion is inherently illegitimate if it is exercised in order to make an officer’s 
job less complicated or less time-consuming. Officers do not have the discretion 
to warn rather than arrest offenders because the incident occurs near the end of 
their shift, they are frustrated with the situation, or because they are apathetic to 
the victims’ situation. Similarly, officers do not have the discretion to do nothing 
when responding to domestic incidents, particularly if there is sufficient 
evidence of an offence. As the family violence policy explicitly states, such 
incidents must be reported (K6), and cannot be resulted as K1 (no further police 
action required, incident not formally recorded). Furthermore, officers do not 
have the discretion to base the arrest decision on offender/victim 
characteristics, which inevitably leads to the selective enforcement of the law. 
When discretion is exercised on this basis, it is not being used for the benefit of 
the citizens involved. Illegitimate discretion has a number of implications, but 
primarily it results in the under-enforcement of the law, or in some instances, an 
over-enforcement of the law.  
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Selective enforcement 
A major consequence of illegitimate discretion is that it results in the selective 
enforcement of the law. By virtue of their considerable discretionary powers, 
frontline officers decide whose behaviour to sanction, and whose to overlook. 
This means that citizen A might be arrested, yet in similar circumstances, 
citizen B is not. As Grosman comments: 
…unlike other bureaucratic organizations the police force gives to its 
lowest-ranking members the power to make critical decisions in making or 
not making arrests. A great deal of the discretion that he [sic] exercises 
would be considered by many as illegal or, at best, of questionable legality 
(1975:81). 
 
Grosman (1975) argues that because of their considerable discretionary power, 
police officers determine who enters the criminal justice system, and who does 
not. In other words, some individuals are labelled as criminals and treated as 
such, while others escape this labelling process, and are dealt with informally 
(i.e. caution). As Worden (1989) states: 
Officers who believe that they should be selective in enforcing the law 
might be expected seldom to invoke the law in resolving disputes and 
instead to avail themselves of informal methods; officers who are non-
selective might be expected to make arrests more frequently and to adopt 
extra-legal strategies less frequently (1989:689). 
 
When individual policemen decide to apply the law selectively, this means that 
law enforcement is neither total nor equal. If discretionary decision-making is 
not fairly exercised, the result, as Davis (1974) points out, is that justice is 
distributed unequally. Similarly, Smith et.al (1984) state: 
…the discretionary nature of police decisionmaking poses a constant 
challenge to fair and impartial application of law. Indeed, a system of 
justice which grants broad discretionary power to legal officials invites 
selective application of law (1984:235). 
 
However, there is convincing evidence that officers are sometimes selective in 
their law enforcement, and although there are a number of legitimate variables 
and circumstances which negate the need for arrest, the arrest decision may 
also be based on illegitimate variables.  
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Illegitimate variables 
While legitimate factors relate predominantly to evidentiary concerns, 
illegitimate variables, in contrast, are primarily concerned with the 
characteristics of the individuals involved in the encounter. Such criteria may 
include the relationship between offender/victim, the sex of the offender/victim, 
the geographic location of the incident, or the ethnicity and socio-economic 
class of the offender/victim. When the arrest decision is influenced by such 
variables, it may lead to discriminatory (and selective) law enforcement. As 
Gaines et.al (1997) states: 
Inappropriate exercise of discretion may be the product of prejudice or 
discrimination. While discretionary decisions can reflect consideration of 
factors that are appropriate in a given situation or are based on existing 
legal requirements, others may be inappropriately made on the basis of 
prejudice and may represent a discriminatory action (1997:186). 
 
Like one manager in this study commented, as members of society, individual 
police officers hold the same stereotypes and prejudices as other citizens. The 
difference however, is that when officers operate on the basis of these 
assumptions, the implications are greater, given the considerable powers they 
wield. As this manager pointed out, while officers are entitled to their own 
beliefs, their professional response must outweigh their personal point of view. 
However, these personal or occupational prejudices may lead officers to 
differentiate against victim/offender populations. Indeed, a number of 
researchers (e.g. Reiner, 1992; Jones and Belknap, 1999) have concluded that 
there are a number of illicit variables which may affect the arrest decision. 
Unfortunately, similar research in New Zealand is absent, and relevant statistics 
pertaining to the independent variables are not readily, or easily available, and 
in some instances, not even collected.  
 
Relationship between victim and offender 
As Jones and Belknap (1999:3) point out, some studies have concluded that 
the relationship between victim/offender is related to the arrest decision. In their 
own study, Jones and Belknap (1999:10) found that when the victim and 
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offender had been previously married, officers were less likely to take “any” 
action. However, when the offender/victim were involved in a current 
relationship, the police were more likely to jail defendants. In contrast, Brown 
(2004:45) found that police were more likely to charge offenders if they were 
separated from their partner (i.e. victim), whereas charges were “least likely to 
have been laid if the dispute was between a married couple” (2004:45)37. Other 
studies (e.g. Buzawa and Austin, 1993), however, have found no correlation 
between the victim/offender’s relationship and the arrest decision.  
 
Ethnicity and socio-economic class 
Some researchers have also found that the arrest decision may be related to 
ethnic and class status, to the detriment of lower socio-economic classes, and 
ethnic minorities (Jones and Belknap, 1999:3; see also Robinson and Chandek, 
2000).  It has long been argued that officers engage in the differential treatment 
of offender populations. As Reiner (1992:159) points out, young males, 
particularly those who are black and/or unemployed or economically marginal, 
are disproportionately subjected to the exercise of police powers. In the United 
States for example, there has been evidence that police utilise racial profiling, 
and that African-Americans are subjected to police surveillance and arrest more 
than any other social group (e.g. see Giddens, 1998:223). Like Edwards (1989) 
points out, officers’ decisions in cases of domestic assault are affected by: 
….class and race stereotypes of both victim and offender, which shape 
his/her attitude about the likely guilt of the offender and innocence of the 
victim (1989:92). 
 
                                                 
37 Whether or not the police may be more reluctant to arrest in incidents involving married couples, may 
be influenced by the fact that under New Zealand law, married spouses cannot be compelled to testify 
against their partners in court. This can make it particularly hard to prosecute cases involving married 
couples. However, the Evidence Bill is currently being reviewed, and it has been proposed that the 
spousal privilege law will be abolished if the amendment is passed. This means that the victim may be 
compelled to give evidence against their legal spouse, or their initial complaints made to police may be 
used if the testimony changes once the case reaches court. Obviously this will also help to reduce the 
number of complaints withdrawn, and a number of other problems encountered by a number of frontline 
officers. It may also mean that officers are less reluctant (if at all) to arrest if the incident involves a 
married couple.  
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Similarly, as Bennett (1979) comments, some labelling theorists suggest that 
the police: 
…will arrest and process persons form lower-class backgrounds more 
frequently than those from higher-class backgrounds, and persons of 
ethnic minority status more frequently than members from the dominant 
ethnic groups of that society, independent of the relative frequency or 
gravity of the offences committed (1979:134). 
 
The result of officers arresting some groups more than others, or treating some 
suspect populations more harshly than others, is that the stereotypes and 
prejudices held by officers may become self-fulfilling. As Lipsky states: 
Greater surveillance of adolescent blacks by the police results in their 
being arrested at a greater rate than other portions of the population. This 
tends to confirm that black young adults are the primary delinquency 
problem (1980:114). 
 
In other words, if the police are more likely to arrest those who are poor, or 
ethnically marginal, it means that those who are not may be more likely to 
escape arrest. As Pepinsky (1984) contends, ultimately law enforcement: 
…is literally a political exercise – an exercise of power – and in that 
exercise those who have more power as citizens are odds-on favorites to 
avoid the force of the law (1984:257). 
 
In short, because citizens from higher socio-economic groups have more 
‘social’ power, they may be less likely to be arrested, whereas citizens with low 
socio-economic or ethnic standing generally have less social power, and thus, 
they may be more likely to be arrested. 
 
Geographic location 
Tied into class/ethnic variables, is the geographic location of the incident. 
Herbert (1997) contends that the social space in which the particular incident 
occurs, appears to impact on the way officers understand the situation, and in 
turn, how officers respond: 
The context of police encounters shapes how officers choose to act. 
Officers often read situations against their understandings of what is 
normal or typical for the location; how they interpret action is shaped by 
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where it occurs…For police officers, the location of a given action shapes 
how they understand what is happening and how they should respond 
(1997:21). 
 
Consequently, whether an incident is defined as being criminal may relate to 
the geographic location of the act. As Grosman (1975) argues: 
Activities potentially defined by police as criminal that take place in a high-
crime area of the city are more likely to be defined as such (i.e. criminal) 
than the same activities taking place in an area which does not demand 
high levels of police resources (1975:89). 
 
The result, Cureton (2000) contends, is that citizens located in ‘troubled’ 
neighbourhoods may be more likely to be arrested: 
…there is evidence that police operations and services are concentrated in 
certain criminogenic, low-income, mostly non-White areas because of 
citizen requests, preference of victims, or public demands for restored 
social order in troubled neighborhoods.  Police concentration in low 
income, socially disorganized areas may increase the probability of arrests 
for residents in those areas (2000:705). 
 
In other words, whether the incident is defined and treated as criminal by 
responding officers, may have less to do with the nature of the incident itself, 
and more to do with the geographical location where it took place. On this 
basis, domestic assaults committed in low socio-economic and ethnically 
diverse neighbourhoods, such as Linwood and Aranui, may be more likely to be 
treated as criminal offences than those committed in more affluent areas of the 
city – e.g. Cashmere and Port Hills.  
 
Offender/victim sex 
Some studies have also indicated that the offender’s sex38 may influence the 
arrest decision. For instance, Ho (2003:191) found that while male victims’ 
preference for arrest was a strong determinant of female arrests, officers 
tended to rely on a wider range of arrest factors for male offenders. For 
                                                 
38 Although the police collect raw data relating to the sex of family violence offenders, this data is not 
readily or publicly made available, and does not differentiate between those offenders who were arrested, 
and those who were not. Consequently, these statistics, although collected, are left out for these reasons.  
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example, the arrest of male offenders was often contingent on the presence of 
a witness and a weapon, whereas in contrast, when the offender was female, 
the arrest decision was not influenced by these factors. 
  
When offenders are female, legal variables, such as the presence of injuries, do 
not appear to be as important. For example, Brown (2004:54) found that in 206 
cases involving a female offender (and injured male victim), arrests only 
occurred in 60.2% of these cases. In contrast, of the 1,452 cases involving a 
male offender (and injured female victim), 91% of offenders were arrested. 
When the victim suffered a major injury, female offenders were charged in 75% 
of the cases, whereas male offenders were charged every time.  Even when no 
injuries were sustained, 53.4% of male offenders were arrested, compared to 
the 2.2% of female offenders. The disparity in arrests between male and female 
offenders was also evident when the incidents involved mutual abuse. Brown 
found that in incidents involving mutual abuse, but no injuries, male offenders 
were 16 times more likely to be charged compared to female offenders 
(2004:51).  
 
As some managers in the current study (who had considerable policing 
experience) conceded, offender sex is likely to influence the arrest decision 
when mutual abuse is involved: 
…probably in practice you take the word of the female and arrest the male. 
But I think that’s probably just a fact of…you know, whether it’s a culture 
thing, about whether it’s alright for a male to hit a female…but in vice 
versa, it’s alright for a female to hit a male, and if you complain about it, 
you’re wimpy… I mean, it’s not sanctioned by policy or anything like that, 
but it’s fair to say that those types of generalisations are almost impossible 
to take away from people who respond to [domestics]. 
 
…if he (the male victim) wanted to make a complaint, and she said, ‘yeah, 
I hit him’, I don’t think she’d get locked up. And like I said, attitudinal. 
However, if the roles were reversed, he’d get locked up, even if she didn’t 
want to make a complaint, because that’s what we say…so there’s still that 
reluctance there to arrest a woman for a domestic assault on a man, 
definitely. 
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Theoretically, if a woman belted her man, she should be arrested. But in 
reality…it probably doesn’t happen [often]. 
 
While offender sex may influence the arrest decision, it is also apparent that the 
victim’s sex may have an equally important impact on officers’ decision-making. 
As Edwards (1989) points out: 
In the same way as police officers subscribe to stereotypes about ‘real’ 
crime and ‘real’ criminals, conventional police wisdom similarly 
accommodates its stereotypes of real and legitimate or false and 
illegitimate victims. These particular assumptions about victims are 
sustained and perpetuated in wider social attitudes, medical cultures, 
police culture, and legal culture, attributing blame to some victims while 
exonerating others (1989:92). 
 
With respect to domestic incidents, male victimisation has not been as readily 
acknowledged as female victimisation, and consequently, male victims are 
potentially subject to discrimination because of this. As Finn and Stalans’ (1997) 
study found, officers often disputed the credibility of male victims of domestic 
assault. Their survey of 130 police officers established that officers were less 
likely to arrest female offenders than male offenders, primarily because officers 
believed male victims of domestic assault were more responsible than female 
victims (1997:157). As one manager in the current study commented, if the 
male victim was not prepared to make a complaint, the female offender would 
probably not be arrested because, as this manager commented, “…I think the 
guy should be able to look after himself.”  
 
Brown (2004) also found that when victims were male: 
…their account of an incident of partner violence is less likely to be 
believed, and they are less likely to find sympathy with the authorities even 
when they are believed (2004:41). 
 
Similarly, one manager in the current study commented that male victims would 
face considerable barriers throughout the criminal justice system, and they 
would struggle to be taken seriously: 
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 I think people would….laugh. I mean, you imagine a male victim, I mean 
(laugh), going through court, ‘my wife beat me up’….you imagine it all the 
way through, you know, from dealing with the police, even though they 
may be sympathetic, the lawyer would be looking at him sideways, the 
judge would be looking at him sideways….right through the system they 
wouldn’t be treated equally.  
 
Since the arrest decision is sometimes informed by the victim’s credibility 
(particularly in incidents of mutual abuse), officers may decide not to arrest 
female offenders if their victims are male. As Finn and Stalans (1997) conclude: 
Our results support those of previous research that found that officers’ 
assessments of victims were as important as, or even more important 
than, their assessments of assailants in affecting police actions. The 
current findings suggest that gender shapes officers’ decisions to arrest 
through officers’ assessments of each disputant’s credibility and 
responsibility. However, gender influences perceptions of credibility only 
when the man is the assailant and the woman is the victim. In the atypical 
situation of a male victim, credibility and responsibility are unrelated 
(1997:171-172). 
 
Likewise, Brown summarises: 
When men do report their victimization, or when it is reported for them by 
third parties, the police are less likely to lay charges against their partners 
than they would be to lay charges against comparable male suspects. In 
fact, the police seem reluctant to lay charges against women in partner 
violence cases unless a relatively serious offense has been committed or 
other aggravating factors are present…Indeed, gender is often the most 
significant factor in predicting how the law-enforcement system responds 
to incidents of partner violence (2004:166-167). 
 
In the current study, most frontline officers vigorously denied that the sex of the 
offender would affect the arrest decision: 
It’s still the same offence. There is no discrimination against male abuse 
being worse than female abuse. -F32 
 
        …it doesn’t matter who has done the assaulting, it’s still an assault. -M44 
 
Likewise, one manager stressed that female offenders are not treated 
differently by frontline officers: 
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… they’d treat it just like another domestic. They’d treat it just the same as 
they would if it was a male offender. It would be exactly the same. 
 
However, while most frontline officers in this study maintain that they provide 
equal treatment to all clients, irrespective of their personal characteristics, as 
Lipsky (1980) contends, this is characteristic of modern street-level 
bureaucracies such as the police, since: 
…patterns of prejudice are more subtle in the modern bureaucracy 
dedicated officially to equal treatment. Modern bureaucracy promises to 
eradicate prejudicial behavior through universalistic treatment (1980:108-
109). 
 
Although most frontline officers and some managers contend that 
offenders/victims are not differentiated against on the basis of sex, others 
acknowledged that in practice, they probably are. Thus, in sum, there is 
evidence that offender/victim sex may have a direct bearing on the arrest 
decision. Furthermore, it is clear that discretion that is based primarily (if not 
solely) on illegitimate factors, is inherently discriminatory in nature. When the 
decision to arrest (along with other forms of intervention) is based on such 
factors, it flies in the face of equality. As Bayley and Bittner (1984) comment: 
 Little imagination is required to foresee what would happen to public 
confidence in the police if they admitted that age, education, class, race, 
and sex were considered when they decide what to do. These factors are 
considered, however, and the police believe, on the basis of hard-won 
experience, that they must be considered (1984:57). 
 
In short, selective enforcement, which is directly the result of officers exercising 
discretion illegitimately, leads to the unfair application of the law. While arrest 
decisions may be based on illegitimate factors, it is also clear that officer 
attitudes in general, may affect the arrest decision, and whether discretionary 
decision-making occurs. 
 
Officer attitudes towards the pro-arrest policy 
Although legitimate and illegitimate variables certainly appear to impact on the 
arrest decision, it is equally clear that officer attitudes towards family violence 
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and arrest may also influence decision-making. There is evidence suggesting 
that the arrest decision may be partly dependent on: a) whether or not officers 
believe that arresting offenders will deter future offending, and b) whether 
officers believe the pro-arrest policy works.  
 
If officers do not believe that arresting an offender will have any positive impact 
on future offending, they may be less likely to arrest offenders. Finn and Stalans 
(1997:168), for instance, found that officers who believed arrest would reduce 
future violence were more likely to arrest domestic violence offenders than 
those who did not.  Similarly, some officers in the current study stated that they 
would like to always arrest family violence offenders, whereas in contrast, other 
officers appeared more reluctant to arrest family violence offenders unless a 
number of criteria were met. These latter officers stated that they would not 
arrest unless the violence was serious, there was enough evidence to 
prosecute the case, and/or the victim was prepared to testify in court.   
 
However, even when officers do support arresting offenders, this does not 
mean that they will always arrest, irrespective of whether policy requirements 
are met. Their main concern appears to revolve around what is best for the 
victims. If arresting the offender is perceived as being non-beneficial to the 
victim’s situation, they may warn, rather than arrest, since the latter may be 
more detrimental to that household. If the victim is unemployed and has 
dependents in their care, arrest is going to result in far more serious 
consequences for that person, as opposed to someone who has financial 
independence, and no long-term ties to the offender (e.g. someone with no 
children in their care). As Grosman (1975) points out, officers may believe that 
enforcing specific laws against certain people may be unnecessarily harsh. 
Consequently: 
Police discretion may be based on the most humanitarian of 
considerations. The cold mechanistic enforcement of law may be 
inappropriate because of a variety of factors which make the enforcement 
of specific laws against certain individuals unnecessarily harsh. Actions 
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short of arrest may better achieve the desired goal of restoring order 
(1975:91). 
 
Officer commitment, therefore, is not necessarily towards the practice of 
arresting, but the outcome of that arrest, as the following frontline officer 
comments illustrate: 
It’s all about circumstances…what are you looking to achieve? I would be 
hesitant if I was just making a domestic violence arrest for the sake of it. 
It’s not about arresting someone for the sake of arresting someone. It has 
to be a positive outcome. –M33 
 
There are issues around arrest. Do you arrest for the sake of arresting, or 
do you arrest to try and stop future violence? –M33 
 
Similarly, as one manager commented: 
…we encourage constables to arrest people but they have to have turned 
their mind to what the other options might be – i.e., you arrest somebody 
because it’s in the interest of the victim, so that she or he can be safe 
during the next 24 hours… 
 
In sum, officers’ commitment is not necessarily to the policy (and its 
requirements), or to the philosophy of arresting offenders, but to positive 
intervention framed by individual circumstances. In some cases this will mean 
arresting the offender, while for others, it may mean that the offender is warned, 
and steps are taken to make referrals to social service agencies. In other 
words, if officers believe that the offender/victim may be able to resolve their 
situation without the need for arrest, officers may resort to warning the offender 
instead.  
 
Furthermore, if officers are committed to arresting offenders, the arrest decision 
may be contingent on fewer legal variables being met, than officers who are 
not. The arrest decision for the latter may be highly dependent on a wide 
number of variables being present, and officers may rarely arrest because the 
necessary conditions are infrequently fulfilled. In contrast, the arrest decision for 
those who believe arrest is a positive intervention, may be based on a more 
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narrow set of legal criteria being satisfied. As Ferraro (1989:179) summarises, 
some officers will treat domestic incidents seriously, and will make arrests that 
are only marginally justifiable on strictly legal grounds, while other officers will 
not arrest, even when there are legal reasons for doing so.  
 
Likewise, if officers believe the policy is ineffective for reducing and solving the 
problem of family violence, this may also affect their willingness to follow policy, 
and arrest offenders. Although some officers in this study believed that the 
philosophy of arresting offenders was a positive intervention model, others were 
more sceptical: 
It adds to the paperwork, but it doesn’t really change anything. If they 
really want to change things, they would put money into it. –M31  
  
At the moment, it’s like the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff – we’re 
there to intervene at the boiling point, and to deal with the situation at that 
point of time, but we’re not actually dealing with the situation at the top of 
the cliff. –M32  
 
(Domestic violence) It’s like capitalism – you have winners and losers. 
Most people have the social skills to know when a relationship is unhealthy 
and know when to get out. The police aren’t equipped to deal with the 
underlying causes of domestic violence – the police are there to intervene 
and defuse the situation. –M32  
 
Officers may be less likely to arrest if they are disillusioned with the policy (and 
the expectations of management), and they may believe that other, less direct 
means of intervention are more appropriate and effective than that proposed by 
policy. Furthermore, if officers do not think the policy can work in practice, they 
may be less likely (or able) to follow it. The Western Australian Ombudsman, 
reporting on the police response to domestic assaults, has commented that 
some officers: 
… appear to be attending incidents of Assault [sic] in the family home with 
the mindset that police policy does not necessarily provide them with the 
practical support they need, and that it is idealistic and therefore not able 
to be practically applied in all such cases. In short, to some officers, police 
policy…does not lend itself to a workable practice. In these cases, it is 
concerning that some police officers appear to be exercising discretion 
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about what action to take without regard to the policy and may in fact take 
action which unfortunately results in offenders not being charged and 
victims being left feeling vulnerable and unsupported by police (2003:36-
37). 
 
Likewise, one frontline officer in the current study argued: 
We all know what policy and what guidelines work. I think it’s inevitable 
that you will get a difference between the written and the practical. It’s very 
difficult. You need to get a balance. Our obligation is to do our best for the 
victims with the restrictions that we’ve got. – M33 
 
Additionally, the arrest decision may also be influenced by the way individual 
police officers view their occupational role. As Worden (1989:687) points out, 
officers generally view the police role in three different ways. Firstly, there are 
officers who believe the police role is solely to fight crime and enforce the law. 
These officers view order maintenance and service tasks (i.e. domestic 
incidents) negatively, since in their view, they fail to fit their narrow conception 
of the police role. Consequently, they:  
…might be expected to deal with disputes either punitively or not at all. 
Because they draw the boundaries of their jobs around the law 
enforcement function, minor disputes fall outside of their definition of police 
responsibilities, and the more serious disputes are police business only 
insofar as they constitute crimes. Officers with narrow role orientations 
may thus be more likely to make an arrest or to issue threats; alternatively, 
they may do virtually nothing, claiming that they have no authority in such 
circumstances (Worden, 1989:697). 
 
In contrast, other officers view the police role in broader terms, despite 
according priority to their law enforcement function, while still others believe 
their law enforcement and order maintenance roles are equally important 
(Worden, 1989). In short, these officers see their role primarily in terms of 
helping people, irrespective of what function is required to achieve that. 
Consequently, officers who have a broader conception of the police role: 
…might be more likely than others to adopt noncoercive (and time-
consuming) strategies, resorting to coercive measures only if other 
approaches fail (Worden, 1989:688). 
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The proclivity to arrest may also be influenced by officers’ perception of whether 
there is support from other branches of the criminal justice system – particularly 
the courts. If officers arrest offenders, who are subsequently released without 
conviction, or handed down minimal sentences, then this too, may affect their 
willingness to arrest offenders. As Worden (1989) comments, many officers: 
…believe that legal institutions are uncooperative and unsupportive. They 
see the courts as “soft” on offenders and out of touch with the reality of the 
street. Officers who believe that prosecutors and judges do not support 
them may thus be less likely to take legal action, since in their eyes an 
arrest is likely to be of little consequence…One might therefore expect that 
in disputes, officers’ attitudes toward legal institutions are directly related to 
the likelihood of informal action (1989:689). 
  
Schollum (1996:54) for example, found in her survey of New Zealand officers 
that a number (20%) of her respondents felt that the courts were “unsupportive” 
or “very unsupportive” of the police pro-arrest approach to family violence. 
Indeed, as one of her respondents stated: 
Without greater support from the Justice system any policy imposed by the 
police is relatively ineffective (1996:54). 
 
In short, if officers believe the courts will be unsupportive of the action they 
take, or indeed, the pro-arrest policy itself, this may affect their willingness to 
arrest domestic violence offenders, particularly if there are any concerns about 
whether the case will be successfully prosecuted. 
 
Furthermore, the type of intervention used in domestic incidents may be 
affected by whether officers believe victims/offenders are worthy of their 
services. As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) point out, officers often 
make normative judgements about who they will extend services to, and who 
they will withhold services and sanctions from. In other words, officers will go 
out of their way to help some clients, while going out of their way to sanction 
others. However, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) argue that 
distinguishing between the worthy and unworthy is never a simple process, and 
officers will often initially treat all clients alike, until there is evidence indicating 
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worthiness/unworthiness. Distinguishing worthy clients from unworthy ones, 
stems from the idea of ‘just desserts’ – that clients are treated as their 
behaviour and (moral) character warrant. As Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
comment: 
Street-level workers make moral judgments about individuals’ bad 
character and then reinforce definitions of good character by punishing the 
bad guys (2003:144-145). 
 
Similarly, as Lipsky (1980) points out, officers often differentiate between clients 
based on evaluations of worthiness/unworthiness, and sometimes these 
judgements are based on whether street-level bureaucrats (i.e. frontline 
officers) sympathise with the victim or offender. If, for instance, the officer 
sympathises with an offender, there is a greater likelihood that he/she will not 
be arrested.  For example, Edwards’ (1989) study found that the police 
response was affected by whether officers felt the victim was an innocent party 
in the incident. She suggests that officers may be less willing to protect poor or 
black women, “whom they perceive as less deserving and precipitative” 
(1989:92).  
 
Furthermore, according to Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003), officers often 
make normative judgements about citizen worthiness based on their 
employment status. As they point out: 
 …work and being a hard worker are a core characteristic of morality. 
Citizens who work – especially those who work hard just to help their 
families scratch by are forgiven numerous transgressions that would lead 
to harsh treatment for people who do not work (2003:146).  
 
In other words, if the offender is employed and a hard worker, they may benefit 
from officer discretion, whereas those who are unemployed may be less likely 
to invoke sympathy or leniency for their actions. Thus, in sum, officers may 
base the decision to arrest from an inherently moralistic perspective, rather than 
a legalistic one.  
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In short, this chapter has shown thus far, that officer decision-making is 
influenced by a number of variables, including illegitimate criteria, and officer 
attitudes in general. Although on the whole, officers utilise discretionary 
decision-making legitimately, there is evidence to suggest that discretion is 
sometimes used illicitly.  Whilst the reasons behind such decision-making have 
been discussed, examining why discretion may be used in this way in the first 
place is important. Thus, as the next section will show, the arrest decision, and 
indeed, officer decision-making per se, may be indicative of officer resistance. 
 
 
Why officers use discretion illicitly 
An important reason why frontline officers may use their discretion illicitly, and 
indeed, why the family violence policy has not been successfully implemented, 
relates to officer resistance. Frontline officers often resist managerial attempts 
to control their decision-making process, via policy and/or other formal rules 
operating within the organisation. Despite their insubordinate and insecure 
organisational positions, employees such as frontline officers seek to resist, as 
Collinson (1994) points out, because those: 
…at the lower levels of hierarchy often feel particularly vulnerable, unfairly 
treated and unacknowledged and most excluded from decision-making 
procedures. Their sense of grievance and insecurity frequently translates 
into oppositional discursive practices (1994:49).  
 
Indeed, as one frontline officer in this study commented: 
The police hierarchy are so narrow-minded. It’s quite easy to make policies 
within the safe and secure walls in Wellington, when you don’t know what’s 
happening out on the streets. – M33 
 
Although in theory, because of their insubordinate organisational status, 
frontline officers are supposed to have the least amount of power, in reality, 
frontline officers have considerable bottom-up and collective power. While some 
theorists (e.g. Lipsky) have argued that frontline officers have minimal 
resources for resisting managerial control, others (e.g. Manning, 1979) have 
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pointed out that officers have numerous strategies for resisting management, 
including manipulating their work load, and the speed and quality of their 
interactions with clients (i.e. citizens). As Manning (1979) comments: 
It is the capacity of the lower participants to manipulate the work load, 
speed and quality of their interactions with given publics which gives them 
organizational power in the larger context. They salvage from the 
organization some freedom and autonomy this way…They attempt, by 
means of this power, to force others into routinized and predictable 
patterns of behavior, while resisting the imposition of these patterns on 
their own actions. Through their discretion, they have power, power to 
resist managerial edicts, policies, and even disciplinary actions (1979:63). 
 
Similarly, Gottfried (1994) contends: 
As people ‘produce culture’ at work, they generate a set of practices and 
ideas that run counter to hegemonic ones, setting up alternative ways of 
‘making sense’, if only in embryonic form. Alternative ways of making 
sense inform resistance that occurs as everyday acts rooted in, and 
directed against, power relations experienced on the shopfloor. Resistance 
involves actions carried out by subordinate groups that undermine or 
disrupt the objectives of corresponding dominant groups (1994:118). 
 
In other words, officers may not follow policy, or may modify it, as a means of 
resisting management. While frontline officers may adopt a number of 
oppositional discursive practices (Collinson, 1994), perhaps the most important 
way that frontline officers resist, is through their ability to control the flow of 
information into the organisation, and the control they have over record-keeping 
practices.  
 
Record-keeping practices 
An important weapon of resistance against management (and thus 
organisational policy), relates to record-keeping practices. By requiring frontline 
officers to complete paperwork for incidents they attend, management attempts 
to control officer behaviour in terms which are conducive to policy provisions. In 
other words, if the paperwork conflicts with what is expected of frontline officers, 
then management have recourse to discipline the officer accordingly – and 
indeed, may consequently attempt to impose stricter controls over the officer’s 
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decision-making process. Furthermore, paperwork enables managers to find 
out what is happening out on the streets, as Manning comments: 
…evaluations and other official paper is taken by senior officers who do 
not otherwise have contact with men, or do not have other negative 
disconfirming evidence, to constitute evidence of ‘activity’ on the ground 
(1979:56). 
 
In short, most managers are not operational, and therefore do not really know 
how officers are responding to family violence in practice. Although they may 
rely in part on feedback from supervising officers, even this is largely restricted, 
since supervisors themselves can filter what information reaches the top 
echelons of the organisation. Thus, in many ways, management relies on the 
paperwork produced by frontline officers, to ascertain how officers are 
responding to incidents. For instance, if an officer does not arrest an offender, 
managers can review the paperwork to confirm that that was the appropriate 
action. Nevertheless, frontline officers are conscious that their actions may be 
retrospectively reviewed by management, and they often develop their own 
strategies of resistance. By controlling the flow and quality of information 
entering the organisation, officers utilise an important strategy of power.  
 
While requiring officers to produce the necessary paperwork is an important 
way of securing their compliance to organisational rules and policies, these 
rules and policies can also be utilised by frontline officers to justify the actions 
they take. As Ericson (2005) comments: 
…the police officer has control over the production of ‘facts’ about a case, 
and this control of knowledge becomes a very potent form of power. The 
rules are not only taken into account, but they also form part of the account 
to legitimate the action taken (2005:224). 
 
It is not just formal rules, however, which aid in the construction of an account, 
since the informal or “recipe” rules (Manning, 1977) developed at the frontline 
appear equally important. These recipe rules, Manning (2005) points out, guide 
officers: 
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…on how to get the job done in ways that will appear acceptable to the 
organization, which persons in what situations should be dealt with in 
particular ways, how to avoid supervisors and various organizational 
control checks, when it is necessary to produce ‘paper’ regarding an 
incident or complaints, and so on (2005:224). 
 
These informal rules are also developed in anticipation of retrospective review, 
and are designed to: 
… reconstruct reality in terms that are favorable to an officer’s actions. 
They prescribe that officers should control the release of information about 
incidents in their reports…Defensive report writing includes constructing an 
account that justifies the action an officer reports taking (Reiss Jr, 
1996:164). 
 
Because frontline officers are acutely aware that the paperwork they produce 
may be reviewed by management, reports are unlikely to contain information 
that may contradict the action/inaction that an officer took. As Prottas (1978) 
points out: 
After all, the street-level bureaucrat writes the record and knows that it is 
available to his/her superiors. One would not reasonably suppose that 
he/she would include information contradicting his/her judgments or 
reporting his/her unsanctioned behavior (1978:289). 
The ways in which important information can be omitted in accounts, was 
witnessed during fieldwork observations. For example, one incident I attended, 
a citizen had reported to the Police Communications Centre that a woman was 
being dragged down the street against her will. When we found the woman, she 
clearly had injuries (albeit minor), and there was physical evidence that she had 
indeed been dragged. However, despite the presence of injuries, and multiple 
witnesses to the event, the officer failed to formally record these details. Indeed, 
the officer actually stated on the POL 400 that there were no injuries, and no 
witnesses, and despite the officer recording that the victim received initial 
support from ‘family’, the only family members present with the woman, were 
her young children. 
 
Consequently, frontline officers produce accounts of the event, sometimes 
omitting relevant information. While pre-formatted forms may require particular 
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fields to be completed, how and when they are filled out may be contingent on if 
it fits the account produced. Indeed, quite often data about the context of the 
incident are omitted from written records (Manning, 2003). A number of POL 
400s in this study, for instance, were not fully completed. Of the 313 POL 400s 
collected during August 2004, 18.2% had no support box filled out, and 2.8% 
had no injury box filled out. Additionally, 2.8% of these POL 400s had no file 
number, and 7% had no file number or event number, which makes it 
particularly difficult for auditors to follow up on these cases. Furthermore, most 
POL 400s did not have sufficient information to determine whether the 
action/inaction taken was justified. Even though a supplementary text box is 
available for officers to record the situational contingencies of the incident in 
greater detail, it appears that most officers do not provide anything more than 
basic detail.  
 
Since accounts are constructed after the event, they can be retrospectively 
produced to safeguard officers from disciplinary action. As such, accounts will 
not necessarily reflect what actually happened, and as Sanders and Young 
(2003) argue, they can correspond “as much with legal expectations as with the 
reality of the incidents” (2003:233-234). Similarly, Manning (2003) contends: 
All reports are edited and shaped. The written story varies from the actual 
events in their fullest explication as experienced. The parallel is the 
analogue between the text (what is written) and the fabula (the story that is 
being told). The translated, encoded, written record of events may vary 
from the sense or spirit of the event as seen and responded to on the 
ground (2003: 222-223). 
 
Additionally, like Chatterton (1979) points out, frontline officers often rely on 
stock knowledge for providing justifications for inaction. This stock knowledge 
constitutes well-proven stories, which help to safeguard the officer from future 
disciplinary action. As Chatterton (1979) comments, officers quickly learn the 
importance of the ‘good story’ maxim: 
Always make sure you have a good story to cover yourself for everything 
you do, both on and off duty. Unless you have a good story, don’t do it 
(1979:94). 
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The control of information is an important resisting strategy, primarily because it 
allows officers to use their discretion, and determine the intervention 
accordingly, while still providing a guise that rules/policies are followed, thus 
legitimating the action taken. Since discretion is not always exercised 
appropriately, paperwork may be completed defensively by frontline officers in 
anticipation of future scrutiny by managers, and to “cover their arse”, in case of 
future complaints. As Lipsky (1980) comments: 
Since street-level decisions are made in private it is extremely difficult to 
second-guess workers, since the second-guessers are not at hand to 
evaluate the intangible factors that may have contributed to the original 
judgment. For this reason, the records kept by street-level bureaucrats are 
almost never complete or adequate to the task of post hoc auditing, and 
when records are kept, they are written sketchily and defensively to guard 
against later adverse scrutiny (1980:163).  
 
Likewise, as Sanders and Young (2003) point out: 
…officers are aware that the precise way in which forms are completed 
may either help or hinder a member of the public subsequently making a 
formal complaint about their actions (2003:233-234). 
 
Holding officers accountable for their actions, and to organisational policy, is 
difficult since any subsequent action is predominantly (if not solely) based on 
the officer’s original account. This is particularly problematic when incidents do 
not result in an arrest. When an arrest is made, the ability to “fudge” the truth is 
restricted by the fact that the case is not only open to review by management, 
but by the courts as well. However, when incidents are only recorded (i.e. other 
interventions used) it can be difficult to ascertain whether the officer used 
his/her discretion legitimately. As Grosman (1975) comments: 
It is only if an accused person enters the court system as a result of being 
charged with a criminal offence that the procedures leading up to that 
charge and following it are subject to review by the courts. If no arrest is 
made, whatever action has been taken by the police is not subject to 
review by the courts or by anyone else (1975:83-84). 
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In sum, while there are a number of valid reasons necessitating the need for 
officers to exercise discretion, it is clear that discretion can also be exercised 
illegitimately. However, distinguishing between the two can sometimes be 
complex, since even when discretion is exercised illegitimately it may appear to 
have been used legitimately on the basis of the paperwork produced by the 
officer. Although official records are used by managers to assess the behaviour 
of frontline officers, and to ascertain compliance with the policy, it is evident that 
paperwork is ineffective for controlling officers. Irrespective of whether 
discretion is used legitimately/illegitimately, officers can construct accounts that 
justify their intervention.  
 
Invisibility of officer decisions  
Frontline officers’ ability to resist is increased further by the invisibility of their 
decision-making. That is, the exercise of discretion often occurs in private 
contexts, exempt from the surveillance of supervisors. As Reiss Jr (1992) 
argues: 
…discretionary decisions are of low public visibility because often only 
police officers and those accused of violating the criminal law are 
present…Because police officers’ decisions have low visibility to 
supervisory and command officers, the misapplication of rules and misuse 
of authority are particularly problematic (1992:74). 
 
Similarly, as Jones (1980) comments: 
Uniformed patrol officers are difficult to supervise because constant 
observation of their activities is not possible, nor is subsequent inspection 
of their actions easily achieved. Patrol officers usually work alone on beats 
outside police stations where the usual organisational controls of 
hierarchical and peer group supervision are largely ineffective. Difficulty in 
providing supervision is one of the sources of the patrolman’s autonomy 
and discretion and, therefore, why, from a control point of view, he must be 
of most important concern to the police organisation (1980:8). 
 
Yet, it is supervisors who are best positioned to ensure compliance with policy 
and organisational objectives and rules, since, as Engel and Worden (2003) 
argue, they work most closely with officers, and consequently they: 
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… have the greatest opportunity to monitor what officers do (and fail to 
do), and to guide officers’ decision making (2003:2). 
 
While shift supervisors are often patrolling the streets alongside frontline 
officers, the fact remains that they are unable to provide constant support or to 
continuously monitor every officer. Although frontline officers are supposed to 
consult with supervisors whenever there is sufficient evidence of an offence, but 
an arrest is not contemplated, supervisors are not always available. As one 
manager commented: 
…quite often the patrol has got to make that decision straight away, and 
it’s the nature of policing… the constables have got to make on the spot 
decisions. Sure, if there’s supervisors around, and depending on what’s 
happening at the time, but the expectation is they can use their own 
commonsense and judgement. 
 
Prottas (1978) argues that street-level bureaucrats, such as frontline officers, 
are particularly difficult to control via supervision, since the ratio between 
officers and supervisors will always be uneven. Consequently, frontline officers 
have what Prottas (1978) defines as low “compliance observability”. Not only is 
it difficult and costly to determine how frontline officers (and other street-level 
bureaucrats) behave, but as Prottas (1978) points out: 
… much street-level behavior occurs in places inaccessible to superiors. In 
some agencies street-level bureaucrats spend a good deal of their time out 
of the office. This is most true in police departments, and so compliance 
observability is one of the oldest issues in police organization (1978:299). 
 
While managers can increase the number of supervisors each shift, and thus 
reduce the invisibility of officer decisions (thereby increasing the compliance 
observability), the fact remains that this is highly unlikely to occur. As Prottas 
(1978) comments: 
What police department could double the number of sergeants without 
increasing the number of its patrolmen on the street? In the end, the 
street-level bureaucrat delivers the service, and to substantially increase 
supervisory personnel (and so expenditures) without increasing street-
level personnel is rarely practical (1978:303). 
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Furthermore, the more management seeks to control the behaviour of frontline 
officers through closer supervision, the more frontline officers will resist. As 
Banton (1964) argues: 
…supervision is by its very nature a two-edged weapon. The more closely 
people are supervised, the more they bend their energies to satisfying the 
supervisor instead of to doing the job….If the supervisor interferes too 
much, the worker does nothing unless he [sic] is sure he can justify 
himself. When superiors try to supervise too closely, their subordinates 
combine to frustrate them (1964:161). 
 
Increased supervision effectively undermines officers’ ability to control their own 
decision-making. Some of the frontline officers in this study, for example, 
resisted the requirement of having to consult with supervisors. Indeed, any 
attempt to reduce the discretionary power of frontline officers is often heavily 
resisted and resented, as the following comments illustrate: 
…they’re trying to take away police discretion, and they’re basically saying, 
we don’t trust you to make that decision. - M31  
  
In any policy, you basically have to arrest where there is evidence of an 
offence you’re supposed to discuss with the sergeant if you don’t arrest, 
which takes away our discretion. They don’t trust us. – M31  
 
As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) point out, street-level workers often 
believe their decision-making is superior to that of supervisors and clients alike. 
As they comment: 
…street-level workers believe that they know better – better than 
supervisors, better than policy-makers, better than citizen-clients 
(2003:128). 
 
Additionally, whether supervisors can actually solve problems with policy 
implementation is questionable, because supervisors may be the cause of such 
problems in the first place (Grosman, 1975). Although supervisors are generally 
afforded greater professional status than frontline officers, they are often 
confronted with the same situational pressures and realities frontline officers 
face, which may mean that they may make unofficial adjustments to the policy 
 144
themselves. Furthermore, if supervisors do not support the policy in question, 
then this is likely to filter down to the frontline. As Engel (2002) comments: 
Several scholars have reported that past failures of particular strategies 
and structural changes was due in part to the lack of support among patrol 
supervisors. Furthermore, others have argued that if supervisors support 
changes within a department their officers are more likely to implement 
these changes at the street-level (2002:52-53). 
 
Therefore, it would seem that irrespective of the control mechanisms 
management puts in place, frontline officers will often develop or utilise existing 
strategies to overcome these attempts to control. Inevitably, officers want to be 
able to control their own decision-making process, and even when policies are 
developed to restrict them, whether the policy is followed out on the street is 
highly contingent on the support and commitment of frontline officers. 
 
Summary 
While there a number of valid reasons why the family violence policy has not 
been implemented particularly well, as this chapter has shown, such problems 
cannot always be reasonably explained. Although the arrest decision is largely 
contingent on legitimate variables, and indeed, on the nature of police work 
itself, it is equally clear that illegitimate variables may also influence officer 
decision-making. Indeed, officers have considerable discretion in determining 
whose behaviour to sanction, and whose to overlook, which inevitably results in 
the selective enforcement of the law (and the policy). How the policy is applied 
and to whom, may be contingent on the prejudices and stereotypes that 
individual officers hold. As such, these decisions do little in the way of ensuring 
citizens are treated fairly and consistently. 
 
Despite discretion clearly being warranted and exercised legitimately in many 
cases, discretion can also be abused. When officers use their discretion in ways 
that discriminate against some, but not others, it calls into question whether 
discretion should be exercised at all. The potential for discretion being used 
illicitly is further exacerbated by the ineffectiveness of control mechanisms, 
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such as record-keeping requirements, and supervision. Undeniably, frontline 
officers have considerable scope for resisting managerial attempts to control, 
and ultimately, the organisation is heavily reliant on officers responding 
appropriately on their own accord. However, it is clear that this does not always 
happen.  
 
Additionally, irrespective of what policy (and indeed, the organisation) says, 
officers are individuals, and their own personal attitudes will also affect their 
willingness to follow policy. It would seem that despite management’s 
dedication to the family violence policy, whether the policy is successfully 
implemented is highly dependent on whether frontline officers themselves are 
committed to it. Inevitably, if officers do not believe in the policy, there is little 
management can actually do to increase their support or commitment to it, 
although opening up a dialogue with frontline officers, or more training, may 
help increase these levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 146
Chapter six: Discussion and conclusion 
 
Introduction 
Like previous research in this field, the current study has taken a symbolic 
interactionist approach to understanding how the police respond to family 
violence in Christchurch, and more specifically, how the pro-arrest family 
violence policy has been implemented at the street-level. The implementation of 
such policies obviously raises a number of important issues that are not 
addressed within this thesis, such as the effectiveness of training or the pro-
arrest philosophy itself. However, focusing on how the policy is practically 
applied is important, given that the ultimate success or failure of the policy rests 
largely with those responsible for implementing it – frontline officers. 
Consequently, this study has focused on problems associated with applying the 
pro-arrest policy in practice. Moreover, particular emphasis has been placed on 
how officers exercise discretion – both legitimately and illegitimately – and the 
implications this has for the policy’s implementation and the police response in 
general.  
 
Up until the early 1980s, police involvement in domestic incidents was minimal, 
and early methods of intervention focused on temporarily resolving the conflict, 
and leaving as quickly as possible. Attendance at these incidents rarely resulted 
in arrest, which meant that not only were offenders not held accountable for 
their violence, but victims were also left vulnerable. However, during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, this police response was increasingly criticised for 
being ineffective and detrimental to the safety of victims. It soon became clear 
that a new approach to the policing of family violence was needed, and the 
release of the Minneapolis Experiment’s findings in 1984, provided impetus for 
this change to occur. Moving away from the minimalist intervention approach 
that characterised the police response until the early 1980s, police departments 
throughout the U.S., the U.K., and New Zealand, began adopting pro-arrest or 
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mandatory arrest family violence policies. The assumption was that arrest 
would hold offenders accountable for their violence, and consequently decrease 
recidivism. Proponents for change believed that by introducing pro-arrest and 
mandatory arrest policies, officers would treat family violence more seriously, 
they would demonstrate a greater willingness to arrest offenders (i.e. arrest 
considered as the first response, not the last), and that this would ultimately 
result in the increased use of arrest.  
 
While most police departments introduced pro-arrest policies, some went a step 
further and introduced mandatory arrest policies. Mandatory arrest policies 
order officers to arrest whenever there is evidence of an offence, and officers 
operating under such a policy are theoretically not allowed to exercise 
discretion in determining their response to the situation. In short, mandatory 
arrest policies direct action and limit discretion, to the point where it can no 
longer be exercised as freely as it once was. However, a number of studies 
have subsequently shown that mandatory arrest policies are not effective for 
changing police attitudes or behaviour, nor the level of discretion exercised. 
While theoretically, a mandatory arrest policy presumably removes officer 
discretion, in practice, officers are still able to employ considerable discretion 
when responding to domestic incidents (Morley and Mullender, 1994). As 
Buzawa and Buzawa (1990) note, even mandatory arrest policies are prone to 
officer resistance, meaning officers may conveniently find reasons for not 
applying the policy. 
 
In contrast, under pro-arrest policies, officers are permitted to exercise 
discretion, although it is closely circumscribed. Unlike mandatory arrest policies, 
pro-arrest policies acknowledge that an effective police response means that 
discretion cannot, and should not, be totally removed. Discretion is important for 
a number of reasons – most importantly, because policy cannot always provide 
‘meaningful guides to action’ (Manning and van Maanen, 1978) to all the 
situational contingencies officers may face, but also because discretion allows 
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officers to respond flexibly to individual circumstances. Thus, pro-arrest policies 
emphasise the preference for officers to arrest offenders whenever there is 
sufficient evidence of an offence. Although arrest is not mandated, and officers 
can still exercise some discretion, arrest is the officially favoured method of 
intervention.  
 
While the introduction of pro-arrest policies certainly signalled a significant shift 
in the way family violence was policed theoretically, they have not always been 
implemented as intended, at either the local (Christchurch), national (New 
Zealand) or international (the United States, and the United Kingdom) level. 
Indeed, a number of studies conducted after the implementation of pro-arrest 
policies (both in New Zealand and overseas), have shown that in practice, little 
has actually changed. Despite the premise and requirements of the policy, 
family violence offenders are still predominantly dealt with through informal 
means (i.e. warning and separation), even when arrest is applicable. 
Consequently, arrest is still the least-used police response to family violence.  
 
Although implementing pro-arrest policies is by no means an easy task, it is 
clear that most problems associated with their application at the street-level, 
stem from the discretionary powers of frontline officers. While for the most part, 
officers appear to exercise it legitimately, discretion, by its very nature, is a 
double-edged sword – that is, it will at times be exercised illegitimately. Despite 
the fact that there is often a fine line between legitimate/illegitimate discretion, 
two main factors distinguish them from one another. Firstly, legitimate discretion 
is exercised within the regulatory boundaries of the organisation – i.e. by virtue 
of policy provisions or legislative stipulations. Secondly, legitimate discretion 
can be easily justified, normally by the situational contingencies surrounding the 
incident (e.g. insufficient evidence, conflicting stories, lack of cooperation from 
citizens involved in the encounter etc.).  
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On the contrary, discretion is illegitimate when it is exercised outside regulatory 
boundaries, meaning it cannot be easily justified. When discretion is exercised 
on the basis of offender/victim characteristics (e.g. socio-economic class, 
ethnicity, sex etc…), officer characteristics (e.g. apathy/frustration towards 
domestic incidents), or features relating to the incident itself (e.g. geographical 
location, public/private place), it is inherently illegitimate. However, by fudging 
the facts behind a decision, even illegitimate discretion can be made to appear 
legitimate. Given the dual nature of discretion, two fundamental issues arise: 1) 
how can the implementation of the pro-arrest policy be improved; and 2) how 
can the illegitimate use of discretion be curbed? 
 
Improving the implementation of the pro-arrest policy 
As the previous chapter discussed, one of the main reasons why pro-arrest 
(and mandatory arrest) policies are not always implemented as intended, is 
because they are prone to officer resistance. This resistance may take the form 
of policy non-compliance or the illegitimate use of discretion, just to name two 
examples. Officers often resist managerial attempts to control their decision-
making, partly because management’s expectations are not always congruent 
with the reality of the streets. However, officers may also resist because of their 
alienation from the policy-making process. As some theorists (e.g. Lipsky, 1980; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003) contend, even though street-level 
bureaucrats, such as frontline officers, are expected to apply policies as 
intended, often they are not able to participate in their formulation. One potential 
solution to facilitating the policy’s successful implementation, therefore, 
according to these theorists, is to allow frontline officers to participate in the 
policy-making process – what Goldsmith (1996:324) refers to as ‘negotiated 
rule-making.’ 
 
Goldsmith’s (1996) ‘negotiated rule-making’ works on a collective bargaining 
model, which allows for consultation with all the affected parties. As Maynard-
Moody et.al (1990:833) point out, because frontline officers are the ones close 
 150
to both the problems at hand, and the organisation’s clients, they are more 
likely to know what will work in local environments and for particular groups. 
Also, frontline officers may be more acutely aware of possible problems that 
may arise during the policy’s implementation. Moreover, if frontline officers have 
a stake in the formulation of policy, and are able to negotiate its terms, there is 
a greater chance that they will help facilitate its implementation, rather than 
impede it.  
 
Another potential solution to implementation problems is through increased 
and/or improved training. Although officers already receive training from the 
Police College, and ongoing interdepartmental training once operational, 
problems with the policy’s practical application still persist. This tends to 
suggest that increased training may not be enough. If there is to be any affect 
on officers’ behaviour and attitudes, traditional, ‘formal’, classroom training may 
have to be substituted for other informal methods of learning. A more effective 
alternative, according to Wenger (1999:249) is an integrative training scheme, 
where learning is seen as a process of participation. This model places 
emphasis on the learning opportunities offered by practice – allowing frontline 
officers to discuss the practical problems relating to the policy with one another, 
and together, coming up with the necessary solutions. This starkly contrasts 
with the traditional method of training, whereby instructors tell officers what they 
have to do and why, sometimes without any real appreciation of, or solutions to, 
the difficulties encountered in practice.  
 
Nevertheless, what still appears to be the most effective mode of learning 
occurs through on-the-job training in the field. Most police work is learnt through 
a process of craft-like apprenticeship, in interaction with more experienced 
officers. However, it is also apparent that this informal training is not always in 
harmony with what is being taught in the classroom, and inevitably this 
disharmony translates into inconsistent practices. However, the importance of 
this informal training in changing the police culture, (or the beneficial influence 
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this informal culture can have on training)  should not be overlooked, since it is 
the practices within this culture that appear to have the greatest influence on 
what officers do out on the streets. In contrast, formal training appears to have 
a greater impact on what officers say, rather than what they do.  
 
Curbing the illegitimate exercise of discretion 
Likewise, increased and/or improved training may also provide a solution to the 
problem of officers exercising discretion illegitimately. By clearly stipulating how 
discretion is to be exercised through formal training sessions, and indicating 
what distinguishes legitimate and illegitimate discretion, officers will have little 
justification if, and when, discretion is abused. However, that said, mandating 
change through ‘traditional’ training programmes, or increased training, is 
unlikely to curb officers’ use of illegitimate discretion. Considering officers 
already receive formal training, it suggests that traditional classroom teaching 
has not been entirely effective in changing the attitudes and behaviour of some 
frontline officers.  
 
Alternatively, the development of informal (written) guidelines may help curb the 
illegitimate exercise of discretion. However, as with formal policy, if this is to be 
effective, such guidelines need to be developed in conjunction with frontline 
officers themselves, which would allow for officers to negotiate the terms with 
management. Nevertheless, although the development of formal/informal 
guidelines may go some way to reducing the illegitimate exercise of discretion, 
whether officers will stay committed to these guidelines out on the streets is 
another matter. The core issue here appears to be whether officer commitment 
can be increased through such processes.  
 
Increased supervision may also help solve the problem of illegitimate discretion, 
particularly since frontline officers with sometimes very little practical 
experience, exercise it illegitimately. However, as mentioned in chapter five, 
increased supervision is not only costly, but it is also impractical. Frontline 
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officers will always outnumber supervisors, which means the latter can only 
have a limited effect on the way officers exercise their discretion. Moreover, 
attempts to further tighten supervisory control are likely to cause greater 
resistance. Finally, given that supervisors themselves sometimes exercise 
discretion illegitimately, it further calls into question the effectiveness of this 
solution. Perhaps a more appropriate solution is ensuring that supervisors are 
setting a good example in their own practices, in the hope that officers will 
follow suit. This may entail monitoring supervisors to ensure they are 
responding appropriately themselves, or at the very least, ensuring that 
supervisors are directly involved in an integrative learning scheme. 
Alternatively, ongoing, reflexive evaluation of practice out in the field may be a 
worthwhile exercise. 
 
Similarly, it has been shown that paperwork requirements may be ineffective for 
curbing the exercise of illegitimate discretion. Considering officers can produce 
convincing accounts justifying their use of discretion, even when it has been 
exercised illegitimately, it is unclear whether officers can be held accountable 
through this type of mechanism. By ‘covering their arse’ through the production 
of acceptable accounts, officers who appear to be exercising discretion 
legitimately, may not being doing so in practice.  
 
Conclusion 
At the end of the day, in spite of its shortcomings, discretion is not only 
inevitable, but also desirable, since, as Meyers and Vorsanger (2003:249) point 
out, it promotes democratic control over policy processes, it allows policies to 
be tailored to individual needs, and it also serves to increase the effectiveness 
of policy implementation. Ultimately, we do not want ‘robo-cops’ – we want 
officers to be responsive to individual needs and concerns, and the only way we 
can ensure this, is to allow officers to retain their discretionary decision-making. 
At the same time, however, we should not downplay the fact that discretion can 
be, and is, sometimes abused, and that this has considerable ramifications for 
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the affected citizens, and the organisation as a whole. In the end, it is all about 
striking a necessary balance. On the one hand, it is important that frontline 
officers are able to continue exercising discretion, but on the other, steps need 
to be taken to ensure that it is being exercised appropriately, and when it is not, 
there must be accountability.  
 
Recommendations 
While this thesis does not propose to solve the problems inherent in the 
implementation of pro-arrest policies, it will hopefully contribute to our 
understanding of why such problems exist in the first place. Clearly this 
research has highlighted a number of factors that police managers may want to 
consider for future reference. In particular, this study stresses the need for 
greater involvement and consultation with frontline officers in the policy-making 
process. If problems of implementation are to be adequately addressed, then 
the implementers need to have input into the formulation of organisational 
policy.  This would not only help identify potential problems with its practical 
implementation, but it may also help increase the commitment of frontline 
officers to implementing the policy as intended.  
 
Although it is unclear how or if the family violence policy is evaluated, it is clear 
that the family violence policy needs to be constantly reviewed for 
effectiveness. Implementation is not a one-shot affair, but is a continuous 
process of negotiation between policy-makers, policy implementers, and those 
affected by the policy itself – the citizens. Ascertaining whether the pro-arrest 
policy is being effectively implemented at the street-level should be accorded 
high priority, particularly since there appears to be a number of problems with 
its practical application. Of course, any evaluation should once again ideally 
involve consultation with frontline officers, since this would allow management 
to understand why policy compliance may be difficult to achieve, and to 
comprehend more generally, the external pressures frontline officers face – 
something they may not always be aware of. 
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It is also evident that the family violence policy may need to be updated on a 
more regular basis. For example, the current family violence policy in the 
Canterbury District is now nearly eight years old, while the national policy is 
almost ten years old. By updating policy more regularly, this would allow for 
developments to be incorporated into the policy itself, and it would also provide 
an opportunity for managers to reemphasise the importance of a positive and 
effective police response to family violence.  
 
Directions for future research 
Although internationally there is a considerable body of research that focuses 
on the policing of family violence, very few studies have been conducted in New 
Zealand; most of what we do have here is now over ten years old, and those 
that are available are largely quantitative in nature. Given that the current 
research has a number of limitations (e.g. small number of participants, limited 
scope), replicating this study on a larger scale, and extending it to outside of 
Christchurch city itself, may be beneficial to the Canterbury Police. Ideally, this 
should include examining how rural and semi-rural officers respond to family 
violence, since this has been neglected, not only internationally, but nationally 
and locally as well. Similarly, research conducted in other metropolitan areas 
would be undoubtedly beneficial, especially given the high population density 
and ethnic diversity in centres such as Wellington and Auckland. Studying how 
the police respond to family violence in these regions would clearly be a 
worthwhile exercise.  
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APPENDIX TWO: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
 
Management interviews 
 
1. What training are officers given in regards to domestic violence/ 
2. Does this training also include information about other forms of domestic 
violence other than male domestic violence? 
3. Does New Zealand have a pro-arrest or a mandatory arrest policy? 
4. Is it important to arrest domestic violence offenders? 
5. Do you think there is an assumption that mainly men commit domestic 
violence? 
6. Do you think this assumption is carried through in policy? 
7. Do you think the current policy adequately addresses female on male 
domestic violence? 
8. What happens if both parties have been abusing each other? 
9. Do you encourage/support dual arrest? 
10. Do you think a woman abusing a man is usually less serious than a man 
abusing a woman? 
11. How great a problem is female domestic violence? 
12. Do you think there should be a female assaults male charge? 
 
 
Frontline officer interviews 
 
1. Is it important to arrest domestic violence offenders? 
2. Do you think there is an assumption that the male is usually the offender? 
3. Do you think women are capable of committing domestic violence against 
their partners? 
4. What happens if both parties have been physically abusing each other? 
5. Would you ever arrest both parties? 
6. Do you think a woman physically abusing a man is less serious than a 
man physically abusing a woman? 
7. Do you think female domestic violence is a problem? 
8. Have you ever arrested a woman for domestic violence? 
9. Do you think there should be separate female assaults male charge? If no, 
do you think we should get rid of the male assaults female charge? 
10. Do you think men might underreport being victims of domestic violence? 
Why? 
11. What do you think of the family violence policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
